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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem
Following a divorce, families face many adjustments. Issues to
be addressed include choosing a custodian for the children,
arranging visitation for the non-custodial spouse, and determining
child support. Jurisdictions have been struggling to find precise
and workable standards to help divorcing parties, and the courts
make these arrangements.
West Virginia, for example, uses a non-discretionary, rule-
based standard to determine custody; the West Virginia Legislature
requires that the child's best interests be considered in all custody
disputes.' The West Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted "best
interests" as being presumptively satisfied when custody is
awarded to the primary caretaker.3 Thus, if fit, the parent who has
taken primary responsibility for satisfying the child's physical,
social and educational needs will be given custody.4
The primary caretaker standard focuses on and awards custody
to the parent who provided the physical care and socialization for
the child, provided he or she is a fit parent.5 In West Virginia, to
determine who is the primary caretaker, the court is to look at
which parent provides the bulk of the nurturing duties. 6 Ten dut-
ies are to be considered: (1) who prepares and plans meals; (2) who
bathes, grooms and dresses the child; (3) who purchases and cares
for the child's clothes; (4) who arranges for and drives the child to
medical care; (5) who arranges and transports the child to social
activities; (6) who arranges for child care; (7) who puts the child to
bed and who wakes the child in the morning; (8) who disciplines the
child; (9) who educates the child in religion, culture, etc.; and (10)
who teaches the child basic reading, writing and math skills.7
The primary caretaker standard is loosely based on the
psychological parent standard proposed by Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud and Albert Solnit.8 The presumption behind the primary
caretaker standard is that children develop a stronger relationship
2. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-15 (Michie 1988).
3. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
4. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-15B (Michie 1988).
5. See id.
6. See Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
7. See id.
8. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 40-43 (1979).
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with the parent who provides daily care and that relationship must
be preserved after a divorce.9
In 1926, Sigmund Freud suggested that the dependence and
helplessness of infants burden the parents with the responsibility
for the offspring's survival and well-being, and "assure [s] that the
day-to-day ministering to the child's multiple requirements will
turn the physical tie between them into a mutual psychological
attachment."'0 The child subsequently becomes attached to the
parent who provides basic care. It is also suggested that
[a]ttachment is crucial to the survival and development of the
infant .... The power of this attachment is so great that it
enables the mother and father to make the unusual sacrifices
necessary for the care of their infant day after day, night after
night: changing diapers, attending to his crying, protecting him
from danger, and giving feeds in the middle of the night despite
their desperate need to sleep."
Later in the child's life, this psychological connection provides the
basis for the child's successful socialization.
This original parent-infant tie is the major source for all
the infant's subsequent attachments and is the formative
relationship during which the child develops a sense of himself.
Throughout his lifetime the strength and character of this
attachment will influence the quality of all future ties to other
individuals. 2
Scholars argue that the psychological parent should be afforded
an "uninterrupted opportunity to meet the developing physical and
emotional needs of their child so as to establish the familial bonds
critical to every child's healthy growth and development."13 They
warn against custody standards which permit case-by-case deter-
minations of what is best for the child, thus investing judges with
unlimited discretion to impose their own child-rearing preferenc-
es. 4 Such discretion and intervention risk denying a child the
continuity of affectionate, emotional care so needed for their
optimal development. The authors of Before the Best Interests of the
9. See id. at 40.
10. Id. at 8.
11. MARSHALL H. KLAUS & JOHN H. KENNELL, BONDING: THE BEGINNING OF PARENT-
INFANT ATTACHMENT 2 (1983).
12. Id.
13. GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 8, at 9-10.
14. See id. at 17.
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Child conclude "the disruption of developmental processes which
might otherwise carry the child forward toward normal adulthood
is a risk that no child should be forced to take." 5
Citing "substantial research" which has "confirmed that young
children, as a result of intimate interaction, form a unique bond
with their primary caretaker," the West Virginia Supreme Court
explained the psychological importance of the primary caretaker as
"an essential cornerstone of a child's sense of security and healthy
emotional development." 6
At the earliest stage, [the attachment to a primary caretaker]
is critical to the child's learning to place trust in others and to
have confidence in her own capacities. Later, it plays a central
role in the child's capacity to establish emotional bonds with
other persons. The sense of trust in others and in self that the
attachment provides may also affect the child's development of
intellectual and emotional skills. The growing child passes
through many developmental stages, each requiring her to
acquire critical skills and capacities.... The original bond of the
child with the primary caretaker is believed to have an impor-
tant continuing effect on the child's ability to pass though each
stage with success.'
For several years, Minnesota also used the primary caretaker
standard to determine custody. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that primary caretakers are essential to a child's emotional and
psychological stability. In Pikula v. Pikula,8 the court stated:
The importance of emotional and psychological stability to the
child's sense of security, happiness, and adaptation that we
deemed dispositive in Berndt is a postulate embedded in the
statutory factors and about which there is little disagreement
within the profession of child psychology. . . . For younger
children in particular, that stability is most often provided by
and through the child's relationship to his or her primary
caretaker-the person who provides the child with daily
nurturance, [sic] care and support. As we further noted in
Berndt, a court order separating a child from the primary
parent could thus rarely be deemed in the child's best
interests.19
15. Id. at 44.
16. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916-17 (W. Va. 1989) (footnotes omitted).
17. Id.
18. 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985).
19. Id. at 711.
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Later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rationale for
the presumption.20
Besides preserving the affectionate bond between the
caretaking parent and the child, additional benefits of a presump-
tion in favor of the primary caretaker exist: (1) husbands will be
deterred from using "the threat of protracted and emotionally
damaging custody battles to extract monetary concessions from
their wives in divorce settlements;"21 (2) the standard will eliminate
the need for a trial with expert witnesses who testify to the child's
best interests;22 (3) mothers and fathers will not be penalized on
account of their gender;23 and (4) custody proceedings will be
"shorter, more economical [and] less acrimonious.., leaving more
dollars in the marital estate to be divided."
24
In Garska,25 the Supreme Court of West Virginia summarized
its adoption of the primary caretaker standard: (1) to prevent
children from being used as sacrificial pawns in a custody battle; (2)
to provide judges with tools to make a more predictable custody
result; and (3) to promote settlement of cases.26
Despite many positive outcomes deriving from the use of the
primary caretaker standard, Professor Mary Becker has suggested
that judicial bias continues to pervade the standard due to its
gender neutrality. 28 In her study, of the thirty-five reported child
custody decisions since the adoption of the primary caretaker
20. See Brauer v. Brauer, 384 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Pikula v.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711-12 (Minn. 1985)). The Brauer court held that:
[P]lacing the child with the primary parent best serves the child's interests
because of the intimate relationship that exists between the child and the
primary parent. It is in the best interests of the child that there be a continuity
of caregiving and that there be stability in the child's life. That continuity and
stability is best achieved by salvaging the child's relationship with the primary
parent.
Id.
21. Dan O'Hanlon & Margaret Workman, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child: The
Primary Caretaker as Doctrine in West Virginia, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 355, 371 (1990) (noting
Justice Neely's concerns in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981)).
22. See id. O'Hanlon and Workman note that the Garska court characterized "trial by
experts" as being "expensive, intellectually dishonest and emotionally destructive of the very
children we are purporting to protect." Id.
23. See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 915 (W. Va. 1989).
24. O'Hanlon & Workman, supra note 21, at 372.
25. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d. 357 (W. Va. 1981).
26. See id. at 361-62.
27. See Richard Neely, The Primary Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of
Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168, 180-86 (1984).
28. See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 190-203 (1992).
[Vol. 5:1
1 JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
standard in West Virginia in 1981, Becker reports that "68% of the
cases appealed involved fathers who received custody at the trial
court level even though the mother seems to have been the primary
caretaker and fit."29 She suggests that judicial bias in favor of the
father is most evident in the circumstances where: "(1) the fathers
did more than the average father; (2) the mothers voluntarily
separated from the children at some point for some reason; (3) the
mothers were sexually active outside the marriage."3 °
B. Focus of the Study
This study examines how the primary caretaker standard is
used in appellate court decisions and makes some predictions as to
whether this standard has led to determinacy and consistency in
judicial custody decision-making. Reported (published) custody
cases in West Virginia, decided between January 1981 and July
1995 which utilized the primary caretaker presumption, were
examined using the research techniques of virginity analysis,
content analysis and map analysis.
First, cases were coded for the judge's analysis of the ten
primary caretaker duties specified by the Garska decision. Coders
determined which of the ten factors were manifestly or latently
discussed and which factors influenced the court's decision. They
then recorded whether that category was considered in the decision.
Coders also identified additional factors which influenced the court.
Second, the cases were content analyzed for pre-disposing condi-
tions which influenced how the court reached a custody decision.
Third, the cases were content and map analyzed for trends in
decision-making.
Specifically, this study concentrates on two questions: First,
how do West Virginia appellate courts decide who is the primary
caretaker? That is, have West Virginia courts been using the
primary caretaker standard by systematically applying the ten
factors? The answer to this question lies in determining which
factors are being used and to what degree and if other factors not
in the list are being considered. Second, are there analytical trends
and predisposing conditions which help predict patterns of decision-
making?
29. Id. at 194.
30. Id. at 195-96.
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C. Implication of the Study
For the last decade, legislators, judges and scholars have been
asking the questions: Which standard is better-the indeterminate
best interests of the child standard or the determinate primary
caretaker presumption? How can we operationalize "best?" Infor-
mation as to how child custody decisions are made using the stand-
ards is needed before either of these questions can be answered.
"[T]here has been a dearth of empirical data on custody issues.
Often decisions [as to which standard should be used] have been
based on impressionistic observations and anecdotal data because
valid empirical data have not been available.""' The need for this
type of information is great because more than one million children
a year, and almost forty percent of children to a marriage, will
experience a divorce. 2
This study attempts to increase our knowledge about the cus-
tody decision-making process. It singles out the primary caretaker
standard and its use in West Virginia courts over a fourteen year
period (1981-95). The goal of this article is to illuminate how judges
are using the ten factor, rule-based primary caretaker standard and
whether some of the factors are used more regularly or are more
determinative of a custody award than others.
Additionally, this study begins to predict whether rule-based
decision guidelines effectively eliminate judicial bias and discretion
which is inherent in the best interests standard which it replaced.
A principle complaint about judicial discretion is that it can be used
to reach a custody decision which ignores or underestimates the
importance of the child's attachment to the primary parent.
Destruction of this special psychological caretaking parent-child
bond can undermine the child's development and socialization.
Alternatively, even if the bond is considered, under an individu-
alized approach to the best interests of the child standard, the court
explores "the dark recesses of psychological theory to determine
which parent will, in the long run, do a better job."33 This inquiry
is intrusive and requires expert testimony which increases the
hardship for all concerned.
To arrive at a trustworthy opinion of a particular child's true
mental state as to who are his psychological parents is a matter
31. Stephen J. Bahr et al., Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 265-66
(1994).
32. See id. at 247.
33. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 918 (W. Va. 1989).
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which taxes the skills of even the most experienced clini-
cians-skills not easily taught and usually beyond the training
of courts, social service personnel, and other mental health
professionals. Such opinions are often not obtainable at all.
More than that, the many necessary intrusive sessions with a
child that a clinician requires before rendering an opinion would
create intolerable periods of uncertainty.34
When psychological information is used to determine the best
interests of the child, the mental health of the child can be under-
mined. "In much the same way that an artillery battery can
'liberate the hell out of' a peaceful hamlet, experts can create
emotional imbalances in the very children they are trying to
protect."35 In sum, if the primary caretaker standard is being
consistently used and is leading to predictable results, it is a useful
rein on unfettered judicial discretion.
Narrowly, this study will help fathers and mothers who live in
West Virginia and who are divorcing to understand how custody
will be determined and what evidence they must present to the
court if they wish to be the custodial parent. The more knowledge
parties have about their options, the less uncertainty and stress
they will face in the divorce process. This certainty may also foster
settlement rather than custody battles.
Additionally, this study will assist lawyers who are represent-
ing divorcing parties in West Virginia to plan their case and to
predict the result of a custody battle for their clients. It also will
provide guidance as to whether a trial court decision which is
unfavorable to one side should be appealed. Protracted family law
litigation is painful and costly to the parties and the children, so if
proceedings are fruitless, both human and material resources are
wasted.
Finally, it is hoped that this study will lead to progress in the
continuing struggle throughout our society and legal system to
make custody decisions less traumatic and more beneficial to
children, and fair to parents. "What is essential for reform is infor-
mation.... Only when acting on the basis of full information can
policymakers ensure that divorce law truly comports with the needs
and interests of American families."3' This study will help inform
34. GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 8, at 43.
35. David M., 385 S.E.2d at 919.
36. Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 101 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds.,
1990).
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legislators whether adoption of the primary caretaker standard
presumption is a viable alternative to the prevailing best interests
standard. Sugarman and Kay suggest that "divorce reform is now
at an important crossroads."3" This study seeks to shed some light
on one path that future reform might take.
Part II of this article explores the historical development of
custody decision-making and demonstrates how custody decisions
have evolved from rule-based gender presumptions to an indetermi-
nate focus on the best interests of the child. It then looks at the
evolution of the primary caretaker standard as a reaction to the
indeterminacy of the best interests of the child standard.
Part III reviews both prior studies of divorce/custody decisions
and commentaries about the primary caretaker standard. It begins
with a brief look at how judges decide cases and makes some
limited comments about research on judicial decision-making in the
child custody field. Then, it summarizes what we do not know
about how the primary caretaker standard works and suggests how
this study will fill some of those gaps.
Part IV presents research questions, hypotheses and the
theoretical framework used in the study. The study combines
quantitative and qualitative techniques and utilizes both social
scientific and legal perspectives to analyze forty-nine custody cases
from West Virginia which were decided under the primary care-
taker standard.
Part V reports research findings. Part VI discusses the results,
concludes and suggests opportunities for further research.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF CUSTODY DECISION-MAK-
ING AND EMERGENCE OF THE PRIMARY CARETAKER STANDARD
Judges operate from a historic context. Understanding that
historic context is key to studying the standard which a judge is
applying to a situation. Thus, one must begin by looking at the
evolution of custody decision-making in the United States, and at
how West Virginia created the primary caretaker standard in 1981.
More particularly, because the primary caretaker standard was
adopted to eliminate the unpredictability of the best interests of the
child standard,38 a further look at the evolution of the best interests
37. Stephen D. Sugarman, Introduction to DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 5
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
38. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981).
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standard and an analysis of how it promoted indeterminate,
discretionary decision-making is necessary.
A. Historical Development of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard in Custody Disputes
The prevalent ethical principle governing child custody
decisions today is that the best interests of the child should guide
decision-making. Application of this doctrine is varied.
Should the decisionmaker be primarily concerned with the
child's happiness or with the child's spiritual and religious
training? Is the primary goal long-term economic productivity
when the child grows up? Or are the most important values of
life found in warm relationships? In discipline and self-sacri-
fice? Are stability and security for a child more desirable than
intellectual stimulation?"9
As this quotation reveals, alternative moral theories which can be
utilized in decision-making exist. A judge's moral stance and her
view of her role as a decision-maker influence how she determines
which parent obtains custody after a divorce.4' Different judges can
reach different custody results given the same fact situation if their
ethical perspectives are different, and if the custody standard
allows them to exercise judicial discretion. This indeterminacy is
the major criticism of the best interests of the child custody
standard.
This section of the article reexamines the historical values
which operate in custody awards in order to identify distinct moral
theories in judicial decision-making regarding the custody of minor
children. Next, the article will explore the limitations and barriers
involved in using the best interests standard effectively. Finally,
the article will demonstrate how the primary caretaker standard is
one of several proposals to create more determinate custody
decision-making.
1. Historical Underpinnings of the Best Interests Standard
This part of the paper looks at the development of custody
decision-making from the late seventeenth century to the 1980s.
Value clarification is used to understand and classify the often
39. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 18 (1985).
40. See id. at 25.
1998]
14 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
conflicting value premises which operate in a best interests of the
child custody decision, and is used to specify the moral theory which
may be historically operating in the decision. Value clarification
essentially requires: (1) identifying the objectives of a particular
ethical position; (2) identifying the stakeholders who will affect and
be affected by the implementation of the position; (3) specifying the
values underlying and the level of each stakeholder's commitment
to the position; and (4) classifying these value premises.4 '
a. Increasing Judicial Intervention in Custody Deci-
sions: Patria Potesta vs. Parens Patriae (1640-1770)
Custody law started with the natural law concept of patria
potestas, which means paternal power. A father. had a near abso-
lute right to his children, whom he viewed as chattel.42 The first
stakeholder in a custody decision was the father, who had an
economic and legal right to his child's services.43 The courts were
powerless to interfere with the natural relationship between a
father and his children because of its foundation in religion.
[T]he Divine Command Theory states that morality is not based
on consequences of actions or rules, nor on self-interest or other-
interestedness, but rather on something "higher" than these
mere mundane events of the imperfect human or natural
worlds. It is based on the existence of an all-good being or
beings who are supernatural and who have communicated to
human beings what they should do and not do in a moral sense.
In order to be moral, then, human beings must follow the
commands and prohibitions of such a being or beings to the
letter without concerning themselves with consequences, self-
interest, or anything else."
In the late seventeenth century, a conflicting doctrine devel-
oped in the Chancery Courts of England-parens patriae-the State
as parent.45 Courts, as a second stakeholder, began to intervene in
custody matters to protect the welfare of the child. The parens
patriae doctrine evidenced the State's recognition of both its
41. See WILLIAM N. DUNN, PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 254 (1981).
42. See Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
121 (1994); Becker, supra note 28, at 168.
43. See Maurice Wilcox, Note, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody
Proceedings, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 920 (1976).
44. JACQUES P. THIROUX, ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 60-61 (1986).
45. See Wilcox, supra note 43, at 920.
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interest in children, and, secondarily, its sense of responsibility for
them.46 This paternalistic interference with and potential restric-
tion on parental rights could be seen as the beginning of a utilitar-
ian approach to custody decisions. The establishment of the
Plymouth Colony brought English custody law, and this utilitarian
approach, to the new world.
In pre-revolutionary America, ethical decision-making regard-
ing children was left to the courts.4 ' First, Plymouth Colony codi-
fied the doctrine ofparens patriae by permitting community inter-
vention upon parental neglect. "When 'persons in this Government
are not able to provide competent and convenient food and raiment
for their Children,' the latter might be taken in hand by local
officials and placed in foster families where they would be more
'comfortably provided for."'48 Second, although paternal authority
continued to reign, the colonial authorities set up the courts as the
final arbiter of familial disputes.49 This was to say that the author-
ities, not the parents, should evaluate the family relationship and
chastise the disobedient child if necessary.5 °
b. Children as Chattel Become Children as Potential
Citizens Protected by the State (1740-1840)
The issue of child custody in the post-Revolutionary era (1779-
1840) might be classified as a battle between competing stake-
holders for the right to the child's earnings. The stakeholders at
this point were the child as an emerging adult, the state with its
welfare and utilitarian concerns, and the father.
Children were regarded primarily as revenue-generating
property during the infancy of the United States. Parents farmed
their children out between the ages of seven and fourteen; they
were apprentices thereafter.51 Most youth were incorporated fully
into the work force by age fifteen.52 Ironically, children of the post-
Revolutionary period "enjoyed" greater responsibility and independ-
46. See id.
47. See JOHN DEMOS, A LrrrLE COMMONWEALTH 105 (1970) (quoting BRIGHAM, THE
COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH 245).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 101.
50. See id. If a child grossly disobeyed his parents, "his Father and Mother,..,. [shall]
lay hold on him, and bring him before the Magistrates assembled in Court, and testify unto
them, that their Son is Stubborn and Rebellious, and will not obey their voice and
chastisement." Id.
51. See JOSEPH F. KETr, RITES OF PASSAGE 18 (1977).
52. See id.
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ence from parental and state control than did children of subse-
quent eras, up until the present time.53
At this time, utilitarian concepts continued to influence judicial
decisions. Courts seemed to have had the power not only to make
custodial determinations, but also to evaluate the parent-child
relationship, to provide for the welfare of the child, and to ensure
the betterment of society.
One ephemeral utility or value which was to be maximized by
the courts when making a custody determination was:
the promotion of human interests or welfare. The most
significant difference between this conception and both the
happiness and desire [utility] conceptions is that what is in a
person's interests or promotes his welfare need not solely
depend on what he happens now to want or enjoy .... The
interest or welfare conception, with its appeal to some norma-
tive theory of human nature, avoids [this] commitment to the
status quo and the preferences fostered there ....
If the status quo could be ignored in order to promote social welfare,
the court could reach a decision which ignored the paternal
preference. Therefore, the view of the father as sole custodian
increasingly could be questioned. The interests of society may have
been to have a child emancipated, raised by the mother, or raised
in a institution. Judicial discretion thus became a popular concept.
The patria potestas doctrine, making the father the sole
custodian, continued, however, both in statutory and common law.
Yet, by 1840, the courts were subordinating this principle to the
interests of the infant, giving the mother custody under this
justification.55 In Green, Justice Story explains:
53. See id. at 111. Kett concludes that:
Flight from farm to city, the spread of commercial opportunities, and exposure
to intense moralism all rendered the period between 1790 and 1840 a
distinctive era for young people. The condition of coming of age in 1840 differed
radically from those of 1740 or 1640. Yet, viewed from a different perspective,
the entire period between 1640 and 1840 had an underlying unity, for prior to
1840 the immediate environment of young people was likely to be casual and
unstructured rather than planned or regulated. In families, frequent
departures from home put a limit on direct applications of parental discipline.
In schools, brutality and burlesque mixed with slackness and informality.
Id.
54. Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: NEW INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS
IN ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 217, 223 (Tom Regan & Donald Van De Veer eds., 1982).
55. See U.S. v. Green, 26 Fed. Cas. 30 (1824), reprinted in 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN
AMERICA 372 (Robert Bremner ed., 1970).
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As to the question of the right of the father to have custody
of his infant child, in a general sense it is true. But this is not
on account of any absolute right of the father, but for the benefit
of the infant... When, therefore, the court is asked to lend its
aid to put the infant into the custody of the father, and to
withdraw him from other persons, it will look into all circum-
stances, and ascertain whether it will be for the real, permanent
interests of the infant; and if the infant be of sufficient discre-
tion, it will also consult its personal wishes.... It is an entire
mistake to suppose the court is at all events bound to deliver
over the infant to his father, or that the latter has an absolute
vested right in the custody.56
c. The Birth of Best Interests Policy (1840-1870)
The period from 1840 to 1870 is characterized by the emergence
of a child-centered focus to custody decision-making and increased
judicial discretion. The child became a recognized stakeholder in
its own welfare. Additionally, the child's welfare was seen less in
terms of economic productivity and more in terms of personal
growth and development.
The ante-bellum and post-Civil War eras significantly changed
the lives of middle- and upper-class youngsters. The decline of
apprenticeships and the rise of lengthened academic and profes-
sional education made these youths more dependent on familial
support for longer periods of time.57 Only working-class children
remained in much the same situation as their predecessors. "At a
time when increasing numbers of middle-class parents were
sacrificing the labor of the children in favor of prolonged education,
most working-class parents and children remained caught up in the
sort of productive-contractual relationship that had once character-
ized family life in all social classes."58
Nineteenth century psychiatrists recommended that parents
protect their sons and daughters until adolescence from excessive
pressures, undue academic acceleration, and early labor require-
ments, while also maintaining structure and discipline in their off-
spring's lives.59 The absence of a well-regulated environment for
56. Id.
57. See KErM, supra note 51, at 171-72.
58. Id. at 170.
59. See id. at 134-35.
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the child and the adolescent would lead to disease, hysteria and
insanity.0
Starting about 1840, a mother became a recognized stakeholder
in the custody of her children.61 The "cult of womanhood" pro-
claimed woman to be the prime nurturer of children, and, hence, a
suitable custodian." Women, it was recognized, could shield child-
ren from the harshness of the world.
Simultaneously, the State increased its paternalistic efforts to
regulate children's welfare. In 1840, Jeremy Bentham spoke of the
"feebleness of infancy," referring to children from birth through
adolescence as demanding:
a continual protection. Everything must be done for an
imperfect being, which as yet does nothing for itself. The
complete development of its physical powers takes many years;
that of its intellectual faculties is still slower. At a certain age,
it has already strength and passions, without experiencing
enough to regulate them. Too sensitive to present impulses, too
negligent of the future, such a being must be kept under an
authority more immediate than that of the laws ......
Society's response to the words of Bentham, and others like
him, called for a "rising importance attached to the total regulation
of the child's environment." 4 The State could, and should, inter-
vene to promote the development of good citizens. Thus, by 1850,
a duality existed between the growing state intervention and the
laissez-faire approach to private family maintenance. "One strand
emphasized the private family, including the responsibility of
parents for children, the primary role of mothers, and the separa-
tion of the child-centered family from the harsh world outside. The
second stressed the responsibility of the state when families failed
to meet their responsibilities...
60. See id.
61. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 238-42 (1985).
62. See generally CATHERINE BEECHER, TREATISE ON DOMESTIC ECONOMY (1841).
63. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 135 n.2 (1979)
(citing JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 THEORY OF LEGISLATION 248 (1840)) [hereinafter BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS].
64. KETT, supra note 51, at 112.
65. W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES 19 (1982). Interestingly,
this value duality continues to divide the implementation of best interests policy today.
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d. Conflicting Moral Values from 1850s on-Natural
Rights vs. Utilitarian Concerns
As early as the 1850s, judicial applications of natural rights
competed with the more utilitarian concerns of society. 6 On the
one hand, the court was to apply the dictates of natural law-
"father must get custody," "mother must get custody," or "the State
has a right to decide with whom the child should live." 7 On the
other hand, the court could weigh the utilitarian concerns of
society-"what would be best for the child and society?"68
With 'increased judicial discretion and the new child-centered
focus came a conflict of moral decision-making. Three conflicting
natural rights concepts evolved from a best interests approach to
custody decisions: (1) a child's right to financial support; (2) a
child's right to choose which parent with whom to live; and (3) the
mother's and father's equal rights to request custody of a child.
First, New York courts pioneered the parental legal obligation
to support children throughout their minority in the 1850s. 69 As
courts recognized a child's legal right to support, they recognized
children as individuals with rights that must be protected and
enforced.7" This recognition represents a natural rights moral
stance in that the child is seen as an entity of worth, dignity and
intrinsic value to be respected.7'
Second, children were occasionally given a voice in deciding
with which parent they should live. 72 As to the child's right to
choose either parent, an author wrote:
It seems that where the child is old enough to choose for
himself, the law allows him to do so, but when too young to give
evidence of any choice, the Courts exercising a high discretion-
ary power, although far from disregarding the abstract right of
the father, compel this right to give way when the public good
and best interest of the child absolutely demand it.73
66. See MAXWELL H. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 119
(1976).
67. See supra notes 42-50, 55-62 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
69. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 66, at 119.
70. See id. at 117-20.
71. See id.
72. See The Rights and Liabilities of Parents in Respect of Their Minor Children, 1 AMER.
L. REG. 641, 644-45 (1853).
73. Id. at 645.
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The third natural rights concept which emerged consisted of
the belief that mothers and fathers had an equal claim to custody.74
The natural law presumption that the father was the ideal custo-
dian faded as the best interests of the child doctrine gained
momentum.75 For example, the Massachusetts Legislature codified
the basis on which a custody award should be made in 1855. "[The
rights of the parents to their children, in the absence of misconduct,
are equal, and the happiness and welfare of the children are to
determine the care and custody."
76
At the same time as the rise in a greater variety of natural laws
operating in and shaping custody decisions occurred, the State
began claiming discretionary control of families in the name of the
best interests of children.77 The shift from the father's absolute
right to custody to the best interests test can be characterized "as
a shift in principles governing the distribution of property interests
in children by way of the state's asserting its own proprietary
interest in them as future citizens."7' The advancement of chil-
dren's rights through the best interests standard can be seen, then,
as a by-product of a utilitarian approach, rather than purely an
acknowledgment of a child's intrinsic values. The court opinion in
Mercein v. Barry,79 supports this theory.
The interest of the infant is deemed paramount to the
claims of both parents.... By the law of nature, the father has
no paramount right to the custody of his child .... There is no
parental authority independent of the supreme power of the
state.... The moment a child is born, it owes allegiance to the
government of the country of its birth, and is entitled to the
protection of that government. And such government is
obligated by its duty of protection, to consult the welfare,
comfort and interests of such child in regulating its custody
during the period of its minority.80
On the other hand, the viewpoint reflected in this quotation
perhaps is not a utilitarian one. Maybe it reflects yet another
natural law-the State as the supreme arbiter of all relationships.
74. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 66, at 118.
75. See id. at 119.
76. Reprinted in BLOOMFIELD, supra note 66, at 119 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
77. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 82 (1991).
78. Id. at 83.
79. 25 Wend. 64 (1840), reprinted in BLOOMFIELD, supra note 66, at 118-19.
80. Id.
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Either way, by the 1870s, four recognized value stakeholders
existed in custody decisions-the mother, the father, the child and
the State. The next 100 years would witness the balancing of their
competing interests.
'e. Courts'Engage in a Utilitarian Cost-Benefit Analysis
Which Balances the Competing Parents' Custody
Rights and Wishes of the Child (1870-1900)
When Joel Bishop surveyed custody law in 1873, he found that
the "leading doctrine" was to "consult the good of the children
rather than the gratifications of the parents."E' Nonetheless, a
father's primary custody right to his children-patria potes-
tas-continued to pervade much of the law. In the 1870s, courts
actively screened custody cases, voluntarily exercising their
discretionary prerogatives and awarding custody to the father for
the "good of the child." 2 A tender-years concept also was emerg-
ing-that is, "[diuring the very young years, especially in the case
of girls, the mother can best take care of [children] in ordinary
circumstances. But in later years they still need the sterner
discipline of the father."1
3
Bishop quotes from an English case, Anonymous," to explain
when the father's primary right of custody should yield.
When the court refuses to give possession of his children to the
father, it is the paramount duty of the court to do so for the
protection of the children themselves; and the court will perform
that duty if the father has so conducted himself, as that it will
not be for the benefit of the infant that they should be delivered
to him,-or if their being with him affects their happiness,- or
if they cannot associate with him without moral contamina-
tion,--or if, because they associate with him, other persons will
shun their society.'
In a utilitarian manner, the court here is engaged in weighing the
costs and benefits to the child of being with the father. Bishop's
words also reflect the patriarchal norm of the time: men had to
81. JOEL BISHOP, 2 BISHOP ON MARRIAGE 446 (1873) (footnote omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 457.
84. Anonymous, 2 Sim. N.S. 54, 11 Eng. L. & Eq. 281, 290, reprinted in JOEL BISHOP, 2
BISHOP ON MARRIAGE 444 (1873).
85. Id.
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relinquish some custody over the private/domestic sphere where
women reigned and were sheltered.
Assigning women care of younger children in the home was
consistent with the notion that women needed to be sheltered
and protected so that they could fulfill their destiny and
reproduce and nurture the species. Both the social and legal
systems recreated Motherhood in a manner which enhanced
women's position concerning their children both in marriage
and at divorce, provided they did not violate patriarchal norms
such as fidelity, temperance, and so on.86
The best interests standard had developed more fully by 1890.87
As custody law evolved, the law "reduced the rights of parenthood
generally.""8 Indeed, the "judicially created standards of child
welfare and parental fitness" took "the ultimate decision of child
placement out of the hands of both parents." 9 Children, although
not seen as parties to a divorce, were allowed the opportunity to
voice an opinion, if of sufficient maturity.' Children fourteen and
older were consulted as to which parent they wished to live with.9'
An ambivalent conception of children also surfaced through
Freudian psychology and subsequently impacted the custody law
and when a child could voice an opinion.
Freudian theories, for example, resurrected the view of the child
as antisocial and dominated by a mass of uncontrolled impulses
that had to be firmly redirected in order to achieve a healthy
adult. But even more often, Freud was interpreted as calling
for greater freedom for children if their personalities were not
to be repressed.92
Consequently, a child's age became the critical indicator of the
weight (in terms of utility) to be accorded a child's wish.93
However, the child's wish was not the ultimate determinant in
a custody decision; rather, it was merely a utility factor to be added
86. FINEMAN, supra note 77, at 83 (footnote omitted).
87. See GROSSBERG, supra note 61, at 281.
88. Id. at 248.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 259 n.56.
91. See JAMES SCHOULER, 2 MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
2025 (1870).
92. GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 65, at 86.
93. See SCHOULER, supra note 91, at 2025.
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to a scale of "greater benefits."94 The "true interest of each child,"
as ascertained by the court, continued to govern the custody
decision.
Fault of one or the other spouse, and the obvious unfitness
of either or both to be guardian of the child's morals or mainte-
nance, are considerations; so is the sex of the child. An equal,
or nearly equal, division of the offspring is appropriate where
blame is not great on either side; tender infants and young
children to the mother, boys to the father. The common-law
preference of father to mother ... all these furnish suggestions,
variable to the circumstances, and callingfor both a humane
and just exercise of this painful judicial discretion.9"
f. Expansion of the State's Interest in Retaining the
Discretionary Best Interests Standard and Entrench-
ment of the Tender Years Presumption (1900-1960)
The first two decades of the 1900s "witnessed the appearance
of both the institutions and psychology that were to govern the
social treatment of youth for much of the twentieth century.... A
biological process of maturation became the basis of the social
definition of an entire age group."9 6 The prevailing child rearing
ideology lengthened the dependent, non-productive relationship
between parent and child. Leaders of the day advocated for a
"republican household in which child rearing had become the most
vital responsibility. As legislators and judges subscribed to this
idea of the home, they circumscribed parental (particularly
paternal) sovereignty, and expanded filial and maternal rights."97
The decline of paternal authority and the increase of authority over
children at the beginning of the new century led to an increase "in
judicial discretion over child placement."9 8
The widespread desire to use the law to encourage proper
family life led to statutory directives and judicial decisions that
subjected parents and children to ever-tightening controls....
The standards placed all parents-including mothers-and
94. See GROSSBERG, supra note 61, at 259 n.56.
95. SCHOULER, supra note 91, at 2025-26.
96. KEr, supra note 51, at 215 (footnote omitted).
97. GROSSBERG, supra note 61, at 281.
98. Id. at 283.
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custodians at the mercy ofjudicial assessments of their capacity
to rear the nation's free citizens.99
The rise of a family court system, beginning in Buffalo in 1909,
allowed for further expansion and entrenchment of the best
interests standard.'00 "Early in the twentieth century, most courts
adopted a new parental preference derived from the child's best
interests."'0 ' Indeed, as courts looked for simpler rules to apply to
guide decision-making, they increasingly applied the tender years
doctrine. This doctrine offered a presumption that children of
young years would be better off residing with their mother who
was, 0 2 at that time, 'the recognized best provider of love and
nurturing.
i. Widespread Use of Judicial Discretion to
Promote Citizenship
A unique, specialized court system facilitated the wide-spread
use of the best interests of the child standard as the penultimate
inquiry in nearly all custody decisions-neglect and divorce cases
alike. With the creation of the juvenile court system came the just-
ification for the extension of state control into all aspects of family
life, under the umbrella ofparens patriae.1°' "The welfare of future
generations is not a private but a social matter. It is a proper task
of society, acting through its government, to ensure that the
members of the next generation are not physical or psychological
cripples due to the ignorance, negligence or even indifference of
parents." 4 Also, the best interests concept of the twentieth
century, "though vague, suggested for the first time that a child has
rights and needs independent of those of his parents and that it is
not only in children's interests but in society's long-range interests
to raise healthy citizens and, therefore, to make custody decisions
based on children's needs."'
99. Id.
100. See SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST?: CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 160 (1982).
101. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the
Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN, L. REV. 427,433 (1990).
102. See Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker
as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 481,495 (1987).
103. See GROSSBERG, supra note 61, at 254-55.
104. Michael D. Bayles, Marriage, Love, and Procreation, in CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ETHICS 424, 431 (Brodsky et al. eds., 1984).
105. SuzANNE RAMOS, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF CHILD CUSTODY 35 (1979).
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The court's intuition, based on cultural norms as to how to raise
responsible citizens, played a key role in custody determinations.
Intuition should not be regarded as a quasi-miraculous flash of
insight standing by itself and not essentially linked with any
other thought process at all. It presupposes at least a rational
selection between different aspects of the situation, whether
this is done instantaneously or gradually, and it is certainly
affected deeply by our previous experience, thought and
action. 106
A judge's intuition is a judge's discretion to decide, independent of
the parties' wishes or the dictates of a pre-ordained law.
In sum, the best interests standard could be viewed as a form
of ethical egoism-serving the greatest good of the State. "Univer-
sal egoism maintains that everyone (including the speaker) ought
to look after his own interests and to disregard those of other people
except in so far as their interests contribute towards his own." 10 7
The State's own egocentric interest is to foster responsible citizen-
ship. Accordingly, judges should wield their discretion to foster the
making of model citizens by awarding custody to the "fit" parent, or
even to third parties, if both parents were unsuitable for the
custodial role.
In the 1970s, the model of the State as parent and as maker of
model citizens was increasingly rejected by liberals and conserva-
tives alike as being overly paternalistic. It was suggested that the
courts focused on the utility of their own interests (ethical egoism)
instead of actually looking at the good of the whole (ethical
universalism).
To characterize this transformation in summary fashion, there
now exists a wide-spread and acute suspicion of the very notion
of doing good among widely divergent groups on all points of the
political spectrum. To claim to act for the purposes of benevo-
lence was once sufficient to legitimate a program; at this
moment it is certain to create suspicion. To announce that you
are prepared to intervene for the best interests of some other
person or party is guaranteed to provoke the quick, even knee-
106. A.C. Ewing, Ethical Intuitionism, in AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 161, 164 (Robert
Dewey & Robert Hurlbutt III eds., 1977).
107. Brian Medlin, Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
ETHICS 209 (Robert Dewey & Robert Hurlbutt III eds., 1977).
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jerk, response that you are masking your true, self-interested,
motives."'0
ii. Rise and Death of the Tender Years Presumption
The mother became a valued stakeholder of increasing impor-
tance as the twentieth century progressed.10 9 "Early in the twen-
tieth century, most courts adopted a new parental preference
derived from the child's best interests. This preference, the tender
years doctrine, presumed that children of tender years should be in
the custody of their mother. It provided a standard for decision-
makers, thereby avoiding substantial trial discretion.""0 From an
economic viewpoint, the tender years presumption is characterized
as a "reward" to mothers whose societal role was to raise socially
productive future citizens. "[Glood mothers had 'paid for' or 'earned'
their children through continuous and systematic care of them.""'
The classic case of Ullman v. Ullman112 articulates the tender
years presumption that dominated custody decisions until the
1970s.
I consider that the [common law] rule in its entirety is not
stated... if it be intended to say that only this misconduct or
incapacity of the father or a cause of action for divorce in the
mother authorizes the court to give the mother custody of the
child. The mother may have been at fault and the father
blameless, and yet the age or condition of the child may require
a mother's care .... The child at tender age is entitled to have
care, love and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can
usually give."'
However, by 1970, the maternal preference had been chal-
lenged as sex discrimination. Feminists attacked gender-specific
legal tests as inherently discriminatory.'14 Father's rights groups
successfully challenged the tender years doctrine as having a "pro-
mother" bias.
108. David J. Rothman, The State as Parent, in CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN MODERN
AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 264 (Allen P. Davis & Harold D. Woodman eds., 1980).
109. See Crippen, supra note 101, at 433.
110. Id.
111. FINEMAN, supra note 77, at 83.
112. 135 N.Y.S. 1080 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
113. SHIRLEY KRAM & NEIL FRANK, THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SUBSTANTIVE LAw 23-24 (1982) (quoting Ullman v. Ullman, 135 N.Y.S. 1080 (N.Y. App. Div.
1912)).
114. See FINEMAN, supra note 77, at 81.
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Consistent with the goal of gender neutrality, any prefer-
ence based on motherhood... was to be eliminated. This had
to be accomplished for important symbolic reasons, no matter
how accurately a gendered rule seemed to conform to either
intuitive or empirical evidence as to which parent actually was
most likely to invest time and effort into child care in a system-
atic and continuous manner."5
In response, most states abolished the doctrine. "[Cliting evidence
that parenting patterns no longer supported the tender years
rationale, they determined that custody decisionmaking should
favor neither parent.... As a consequence of these developments,
trial courts [again] exercised greater discretion in child custody
disputes."116
g. Renewed Recognition of Children's Rights in Cus-
tody Decisions (1960-1980): Change or the Illusion
of Change?
The twenty years between 1960 and 1980 saw the rights of the
child championed. In 1967, the Gault decision gave a child the
right to legal counsel in a delinquency proceeding. 117 In 1972, A Bill
of Rights for Children was written." 8 In addition, jurisdictions
throughout the country created guardians ad litem, a spokesperson
or legal representative for the child."9 This era had a growing
recognition that a child was an individual with distinct legal rights
and opinions, or was it?
i. Changing Definition of the Situation: From
Children as Chattel to Children as Entities to be
Protected by the State
The sixties began with a renewed interest in the quality of
American life-an increased focus on children and heightened
governmental intervention in the name of state responsibility for
maturation. In the Gault 2° decision of 1967, the United States
Supreme Court mandated that a child has the right to legal repre-
115. Id. at 93.
116. Crippen, supra note 101, at 433-34 (emphasis added).
117. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
118. See Henry Foster & Doris Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972).
119. See text accompanying note 105.
120. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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sentation and due process rights in a delinquency case.'2' This case
created a "myth" that "children were being brought back to a
Golden Age of constitutional rights that they lost at the turn of the
century," 122 and suggested the intrinsic value of children apart from
their utility. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the model of the State
as parent was increasingly rejected by both liberals and conserva-
tives for a renewed recognition of children's rights.
In reality, however, society has and continues to view children
not as individuals, but as "instruments for achieving other
goals-economic growth, the reduction of welfare costs, stable and
fluid labor markets, a high level of profits, and social peace."123 The
"preoccupation with anticipated potential rather than with the
present realities of the child's life is symbolic of a more general
tendency... not to view children as functionally whole until they
become productive members of the economic structure."24 These
views hamper the recognition of children's rights.
In 1972, Professors Foster and Freed drew up A Bill of Rights
for Children to give children a voice in divorce proceedings and to
guide custody determinations.'25 Advocacy for increased children's
rights is perhaps a response to the rampant judicial discretion
121. Id. at 41.
122. Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1238 (1970).
123. GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 65, at 53.
124. SARA L. LIGHTFOOT, WORLDS APART: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMIuES AND SCHOOLS
84 (1978).
125. See Foster & Freed, supra note 118, at 347. The proposal states:
A child has the moral right and should have the legal right:
1. To receive parental love and affection, discipline and guidance, and to grow
to maturity in a home environment which enables him to develop into a
mature and responsible adult;
2. To be supported, maintained, and educated to the best of parental ability,
in return for which he has the moral duty to honor his father and mother;
3. To be regarded as a person, within the family, at school, and before the
law;
4. To receive fair treatment from all in authority;
5. To be heard and listened to;
6. To earn and keep his own earnings;
7. To seek and obtain medical care and treatment and counseling;
8. To emancipation from the parent-child relationship when that relationship
has broken down and the child has left home due to abuse, neglect, serious
family conflict, or other sufficient cause, and his best interests would be
served by the termination of parental authority;
9. To be free of legal disabilities or incapacities save where such are
convincingly shown to be necessary and protective of the actual best
interests of the child; and
10. To receive special care, consideration, and protection in the administration
of law or justice so that his best interests are always a paramount factor.
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under the utilitarian best interests standard. Instead, society
should recognize children as having certain intrinsic rights simply
because of their nature, not their utility.
ii. Proposals for Recognizing a Child's
Deontological Interest in the Custody Award
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, many jurisdictions
adopted statutes allowing for the separate legal representation of
children in custody proceedings. At least thirty-six jurisdictions
have adopted statutes explicitly authorizing the appointment of a
guardian ad litem (G.A.L.) in custody, visitation and support
disputes.'26
Why the sudden urgency to give children a voice in the custody
decision process? Proponents advocated that, as the subject of the
custody dispute, the child has immediate and lasting interests in
the decision which may differ significantly from the interests of her
parents. 127
The call for separate legal representation for children also
demonstrates the pervasive concern that children's rights continued
to be ignored by the fighting parents and the judiciary. Advocates
126. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.310 (Lexis 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-321 (West
1991); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3150, 3151 (West Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-116 (1998);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-54 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 721(c) (1993); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-918(b) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-401 (West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-
46(8) (Supp. 1997); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/506 (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
15-6-1 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.12 (West 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.090(1)
(Michie 1996); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-202(1) (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215,
§ 56A (West 1989); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(1)(e) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518.165(1) (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.423 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-358(1) (1993 & Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-a
(1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-8(A)
(Michie 1994); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.4
(1997); OHIO R. CIv. P. 75(B)(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §
107.425(3) (1989); PA. R. Civ. P. 1915.11 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-
16.2(c) (1996 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.4 (Michie 1992); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 107.001 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.2 (Lexis 1998); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 594(a)(b) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1991);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.110, 26.10.070 (West 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (West
1993 & Supp. 1997), § 757.48(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1997).
127. See MICHAEL WHEELER, No FAULT DIVORCE 84 (1974). The author quotes Judge Ross
W. Campbell of Michigan who suggests that children not only need a voice in their future,
but also need the right to contest a divorce.
The time has come to recognize the right of a child to continuation of its
parents' marriage relationship during the period of both physical and emotional
growth and development of the child until it reaches an age where separation
from the parent who leaves the home will not substantially damage the growth
and development of the child.
30 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 5:1
pointed to the growing awareness that the best interests of children
in contested custody proceedings were neither consistently consid-
ered, nor always brought to the attention of the court.12  Separate
representation would ensure that the child's best interests were
represented.
129
Proponents of separate representation for children during a
custody decision proclaim that the addition of a G.A.L. to the
proceeding will protect the minor child from manipulation by
parents and attorneys, promote workable parent-child, post-custody
relationships, while also fostering a genuine best interests determi-
128. See KENNETH KENISTON & THE CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN, ALL OUR CHILDREN:
THE AMERICAN FAMILY UNDER PRESSURE 184 (1977). The author states:
The right of children to be viewed as legal "persons" capable of interests and
deserving representation independent of their parents has emerged only
recently, clearly inspired by many of the attitudes of the 1960s-erosion of faith
in any authority, parents' included; the movements that view all consumers,
including children, as having some right to determine what happens to them;
and the generally increased awareness of civil rights and civil liberties.
Furthermore, the new belief in children's rights may have been partly inspired
by a general recognition of the capability, intelligence, and maturity of children
at a young age to make decisions on their own. Whatever the cause, in recent
years the legal trend has been decidedly in the direction of granting children
greater legal rights and responsibilities both by statute and by court decisions.
Id.
129. See M.J.J. McHale, The Proper Role of the Lawyer as Legal Representative of the
Child, 18 ALBERTA L.R. 216, 219-20 (1980). The author states that drafters of legislation
which gives children separate legal counsel continue to debate which of these roles the G.A.L.
should assume. Some variations include:
1. [T]he traditional advocate role: The lawyer in this role is characterized as
adversarial in orientation. His major concerns include: protection of the
client, observance of proper procedures, arguing technical questions of law,
testing of evidence, representation of the child's wishes, and rigorous
promotion of the child's strict legal rights.
2. [T~he neutral, officer of the court role: The lawyer shifts his position from
champion of the child's rights to intermediary between the child and the
court. He interprets court procedures and dispositions to the child and his
family, while advising the judge on points of law. He is responsible for the
accuracy and completeness of information put before the court for purposes
of disposition. He puts the child's opinions and wishes before the court, as
he does all other evidence, from a neutral position for the judge's
determination without argument or comment. He is a legal resource person
who plays a facilitative role in court proceedings.
3. [T]he guardian role: The lawyer shifts from a neutral officer of the court
position to a "helping" role aimed at promoting the "best interests" of the
child, or finding the "least detrimental" disposition. He adopts the treatment
philosophy of the court, not unlike a social worker, and acts in consideration
of the child's needs (i.e., needs not necessarily as seen by the child but as
perceived by the lawyer in his informed opinion). He submits reports and
makes recommendations.
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nation by the court. l 0 Thus, "[i]n part, the creation of the advocacy
role was a result of family court personnel's and judges' early
recognition that the best-interest test was not functioning well in
the traditional adversarial court context. " 131
Opponents of separate representation for children complain
that the G.A.L. addition will only add confusion to the complicated
task of a custody determination. 132  Other opponents question
whether it is proper to characterize children as victims of divorce
whose interests are sacrificed-and therefore cannot be adequately
represented-by their parents.133 These same opponents point out
that with this characterization of "child-as-victim" comes a shift in
the locus of custody decision-making. Martha Fineman writes:
The net result of the uncritical acceptance of the child-as-victim
construct is state-sponsored substitution of informal, non-legal,
professional decision making for that of parents or that of the
courts .... I am far from convinced that this development
benefits children and have serious doubts as to whether it is
even desirable.13
2. Limitations and Barriers to Utilizing the Best Interests
Standard in Ethical Decision-Making
Custody law came under attack during the seventies for
favoring the best interests of parents, rather than the best interests
of children. 135 Although the best interests of the child standard was
articulated in judicial opinions, critics found that the phrase was
used to justify any decision reached. 136
The concept of "children's best interests," unlike such
concepts as distance or mass, has no objective content. When-
ever the word "best" is used, one must always ask "according to
whom?" The state, the parents, and the child might all be
sources of views, worthy of consideration, about the child's
interests and how best to serve them. The child's view might
take either of two forms-the child's stated preference as to
custody or a view of what we would expect this child, or children
130. See FINEMAN, supra note 77, at 100-01.
131. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
132. See id. at 98-106.
133. See id. at 101.
134. Id. at 102.
135. See WHEELER, supra note 127, at 75.
136. See id. at 76.
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in general, to choose for themselves either now or from the
hindsight of their own adulthood.
137
In order to deal with the indeterminacy promoted by the best
interests standard, many jurisdictions developed "rules of thumb,"
predominantly the tender years doctrine, to facilitate judicial
decision-making. 3 ' This judicial swing from discretionary to rule-
based decision-making mirrors the shift that had occurred in the
1800s when courts abandoned the pater familias'39 (father has an
absolute right to custody) doctrine in favor of the best interests of
the child standard.
Scholars generally recognized that by 1970 the courts were
failing to adequately consider a child's best interests, notwithstand-
ing the welfare of the child goal. 4° Reasons for this failure include:
(1) administrative overload; (2) lack of professional assistance from
psychiatrists and social workers due to the escalating costs of
professional help; and (3) lack of input from the child.' Rather,
courts based custody awards on: (1) the negotiation or litigation
abilities of the parents and attorneys; (2) immediate impressions
gained from a party's dress or speech; (3) the preference for the wife
as custodian; or (4) one party's more sound financial condition. 4 2
Custody determinations, therefore, continued to be at the
judge's unbridled discretion. 4 3 Personality, background, and pre-
judices all impacted the decision-making process.4 Consequently,
from one courtroom to the next, wide chasms existed between cus-
tody considerations.'45 The best interests standard was too vague
and subjective. 146
137. David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 488-89 (1984).
138. See FINEMAN, supra note 77, at 82.
139. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
141. See Robert Epstein, The Rights of Children and the Law: The Role of the Child in a
Divorce Action, 1 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INT'L J. 153, 153-55 (1977).
142. See id. at 154-55.
143. See Kathryn L. Mercer, The Ethics of Judicial Decision-Making Regarding the
Custody of Minor Children: Looking at the 'Best Interests of the Child" and the "Primary
Caretaker" Standards as Utility Rules, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 389, 391 (1997).
144. See Epstein supra note 141, at 154-55.
145. See Mercer, supra note 143, at 392-94.
146. See MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 118. The author states:
Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less ultimate than the
purposes and values of life itself. And yet, where is one to look for the set of
values that should guide decisions concerning what is best for the child?
Normally judges look to statutes, but custody statutes do not themselves give
content or relative weight to the pertinent values. Moreover, if one looks to our
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The best interests analysis is unsatisfying at best. Judge Gary
Crippen of the Minnesota Court of Appeals summarizes the
infirmities of the approach with his observation that it "risks
unwise results, stimulates litigation, permits manipulation and
abuse, and allows a level of judicial discretion that is difficult to
reconcile with a historic commitment to the rule of law."14
7
a. The Impact of the Divorce Process
Historically, the divorce court system looks backward. It
focuses on terminating relationships, rather than on transforming
them or starting new ones. The end result of a divorce custody
decision is a change in family structure. Parents and children
maintain their former relationships in different settings. Although
the husband-wife relationship is usually terminated, the parent-
parent relationship continues. Thus, the battleground for custody
skirmishes outlasts the preliminary court decision.
The common issues of divorce relitigation are visitation rights,
child support obligations and custody modifications. The divorce
order and its terms are rarely satisfactory to the parties. Since the
court retains perpetual jurisdiction over these matters, relitigation
is quite possible.
An exposure to any divorce court quickly reveals some of the
weaknesses of the structure. Divorcing couples, with or without
children, arrive at the court with unresolved problems, looking to
the court for a just and wise solution. Their lawyers, however, are
entrenched in the adversary system. The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility prevent the lawyers from representing both a
society at large, one finds neither a clear consensus as to the best child-rearing
strategies, nor an appropriate hierarchy of ultimate values. The answer, in
short, is indeterminate.
Id. See also MICHAEL WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR DIVORCING
PARENTS 29 (1980) [hereinafter DIVIDED CHILDREN]. Wheeler also noted the uncertainty
about where to find guidance in custody determinations.
Ordinarily, society leaves such broad questions of value to the family to decide
for itself. Aside from laws which compel some kind of formal education and
inoculation for certain childhood diseases, parents have broad latitude to choose
for themselves what is in their children's best interests. Yet when families split
up and the parents cannot agree about raising the children, courts are called
on to settle the deadlock. This, however, raises a dilemma: ifjudges strive for
uniform results by applying values which are acceptable to the widest segment
of society, those parents with somewhat different ideas will be penalized, yet if
judges try to accommodate a great range of opinions about what is good for
children, then custody decisions inevitably will be subjective.
Id.
147. Crippen, supra note 101, at 499-500.
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party and their children where their interests conflict. 148 As each
lawyer works solely for her client's best interests, potential
reconciliation desires or the post-divorce child-parent relationship
are often ignored.
Children, unhappily, are often used as pawns in the bargaining
process. What might be an uncontested settlement becomes a
contested custody battle because a parent or attorney will ask for
the children in order to pressure the other party into a more favor-
able property settlement. 49 The parties of genuinely contested cus-
tody suits experience the same delay, uncertainty and expense of
the custody process. Court dockets are backlogged and the actual
time and expense of a full blown custody trial is prohibitive to most
couples. 5 ° Pressure exists, therefore, to settle out of court. The
benefits of settling out of court are overshadowed by specters of
individual coercion and feelings of powerlessness.' 5' Parties are
almost forgotten as the lawyers haggle over property rights, out of
the earshot of their clients. The halls of the courthouse hardly seem
the best environment for decision-making which so drastically
affects all family members. Figure 1 identifies and classifies the
limitations and barriers to utilizing the ostensibly utilitarian best
interests standard.
148. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1983).
149. See WILLIAM F. HODGES, INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 93 (1986).
150. See id. at 87.
151. See id. at 68.
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b. The Emotional and Psychological Impact of Parental
Divorce and the Custody Decision-Making Process on
the Child
Under the best interests of the child standard, the court must
determine which parent will do the better job of child rearing and
which parent will best fulfill the child's emotional and physical
needs. To predict who is the better parent, the court generally
relies on opinions of expert witnesses such as psychiatrists,
psychologists, and social workers. Unfortunately, however, "[d] ays
or weeks of testimony must be heard from experts whose opinions
are likely to do little more than cancel each other out."
152
Determining the bests interests of the child is a formidable and
time-consuming task:
Given the complexity of family relationships, the problem of
predicting future stability in the midst of upset over the divorce,
and the problem of changing developmental needs over time,
the judge or referee needs the wisdom of Solomon. Remember,
however, Solomon was wise only because his strategy worked!
What would he have done if both mothers had agreed to split
the baby in half?'53
Consequently, some commentators have called the best interests
custody decision futile.
154
Children are profoundly affected by their parents' divorce and
by the entire divorce process. Accordingly, the courts need to con-
tinue to consider the effects of divorce on children. Children grieve
over the loss of the family, feel intensely rejected, get angry at their
parents for splitting up, are lonely, feel guilty, and generally
suffer.'55 The majority of empirical studies suggests the temporary
152. Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Primary
Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 297 (1992).
153. HODGES, supra note 149, at 140.
154. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 137, at 480-86. See also WHEELER, supra note 127,
at 50. Michael Wheeler comments:
Even with the most careful and objective judges, some inquiries are bound to
be futile. Our capacity to predict needs of children and the ability of parents to
meet them is so imprecise that it simply cannot resolve close cases. Where both
parents have strong claims, a custody case can easily be a game of judicial
chance.
Id.
155. See J.S. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFrER DIVORCE 10-15 (1989). The authors state:
Divorce is a different experience for children and adults because the children
lose something that is fundamental to their development-the family structure.
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deleterious effects of parental divorce on children's personal adjust-
ments, self-concepts, cognitive functions, interpersonal relation-
ships and antisocial behavior."5 6
Literature on divorce reveals the "broad effect" that separation
and divorce play on child development."'7 "Young children are
likely to demonstrate aggression and other acting out behavior.
Teenagers may show more withdrawal and depression."' In
addition, children who experience their parents' divorce have more
problems than children who have intact, two-parent families,
including: "lower academic achievement, more behavioral prob-
lems, poorer psychological adjustment, more negative self-concepts,
more social difficulties, and more problematic relationships with
both mothers and fathers." 15 9 These differences continue as the
children grow into adulthood:
Compared with those raised in intact two-parent families,
adults who experienced a parental divorce had lower psychologi-
cal well-being, more behavioral problems, less education, lower
job status, a lower standard of living, lower marital satisfaction,
a heightened risk of divorce, a heightened risk of being a single
parent, and poorer physical health. 60
The intrusion of the State by engaging in a case-by-case best inte-
rests analysis, and the resulting inquiry into the personal lives of
each family member, can lead to more stress and can cause the
child to become insecure. 6' It has also been found that a best inte-
rests custody decision can have a negative impact on a child's emo-
tional stability. 162 Limited research on the long-term effects of high-
The family comprises the scaffolding upon which children mount successive
developmental stages, from infancy into adolescence. It supports their psycho-
logical, physical, and emotional ascent into maturity. When that structure
collapses, the children's world is temporarily without supports. And children,
with a vastly compressed sense of time, do not know that the chaos is tem-
porary. What they do know is that they are dependent on the family. What-
ever its shortcomings, children perceive the family as the entity that provides
the support and protection that they need. With divorce, that structure breaks
down, leaving children who feel alone and very frightened about the present
and the future.
Id. at 11-12.
156. See generally David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, The Impact of Divorce on Children,
in MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN TRANSITION 403-27 (John N. Edwards & David H. Demo eds.,
1988).
157. See HODGES, supra note 149, at 36.
158. Id.
159. Paul R. Amato, Life-span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents' Divorce, in 4 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 143, 145 (1994).
160. Id. at 146.
161. See GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 8, at 25.
162. See id. The authors state:
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conflict divorce suggests that a child's maladjustment increases
with the level of parental conflict in a divorce.
163
The best interests of the child standard can increase parental
conflict, and subsequently, the adverse effect on the child, as each
side prepares a case that the child would be better off with them.
The more fiercely the parents battle for custody, the longer the best
interests litigation lasts. The longer the custody litigation, the
more stress and uncertainty the child faces. Thus, it can be
extrapolated that the more stress the child experiences in the
divorce and after, the greater the adverse impact on the child's well-
being.
c. Competing Ethical Frameworks Permitted by the
Best Interests Standard16
4
The historical evolution of custody decision-making can be seen
as a progression from rule deontology to rule utilitarianism to act
utilitarianism. 1 5 Custody law began with the natural law view that
Children, on their part, react even to temporary infringement of parental
autonomy with anxiety, diminishing trust, loosening of emotional ties, or an
increasing tendency to be out of control. The younger the child, and the greater
his own helplessness and dependence, the stronger is his need to experience his
parents as his lawgivers-safe, reliable, all-powerful, and independent.
Id.
163. See Janet R. Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, in 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 165
(1994). The author reviewed research studies of high-conflict divorces, characterized in part
by ongoing legal disputes over custody, visitation and parenting practices, concluding that:
In each of the studies where standardized measures of maladjustment were
reported, these children [of high-conflict divorce] scored as significantly more
disturbed and were two to four times more likely to have the kinds of
adjustment problems typically seen in children being treated for emotional and
behavioral disturbance as compared with national norms.
Id. at 176.
164. See Mercer, supra note 143, at 392-94 (presenting a similar analysis to this section).
165. Id. at 392 n.10 (footnotes omitted). The terms are defined as follows:
(1) Deontologists claim that certain actions and results are inherently right or
good, or right or good as a matter of principle. Rule deontology operates from
these principles.
(2) A second ethical philosophy, teleology, proposes that actions and results
should be favored not because they are intrinsically good, but rather because
they promote the better good. The moral value of an action is a function of its
consequences. Teleologists advocate actions which are good because of their
consequences.
Utilitarianism, which holds that an action is right if it promotes the
maximum good for everyone, or at least the greatest number, is a form of
teleology.
Rule utilitarianism formulates the rules which tend to produce the greatest
good.
Act utilitarianism focuses on choosing the acts which tend to produce the
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the father was the pre-ordained and only legal custodian of
children.'66 It then moved from this deontological perspective to a
utilitarian ranking based on which parent offered the most value to
society as custodian of children. 67 Rule utilitarianism is reflected
in the tender years presumption which dominated the twentieth
century until 1970.168 Finally, custody law predominantly moved to
act utilitarianism when it adopted a best interests standard,
dependent on the weighing of factors-for example, the quality of
the child's environment, the child's relationship with each parent
and siblings, the child's wishes, adjustment to school, etc.-which
could be summed to find the custodian who offered the greatest
good for the child.'69
Even though the best interests standard seems to propose act
utilitarianism, however, in reality the court has favored rule
utilitarianism for presenting a more simple analysis. The past
seventy years has seen the predominance of the State's and the
parents' interests as having greater utility than the child's. 7 ° In
theory the best interests analysis was fostered to protect a child's
welfare; in practice, the decision-making often ignores the child.
With the advent of the tender years doctrine, the natural deon-
tological-law presumption of the father as primary custodian was
converted to a teleological rule of the mother providing the most
utility. As courts had uniformly awarded custody to the father prior
to 1820, from the 1920s until the 1960s, courts uniformly gave cus-
tody to the mother.' 7 ' The glimmer of a genuine best interests
determination that was seen between 1820 and 1920 yielded to an
overriding presumption of the mother as the best parent later in the
century.'72 Although the best interests terminology was frequently
used, the majority of custody decisions showed that it had little real
meaning or impact. The majority of jurisdictions statutorily allow-
ed courts to base their decisions on what was right, just, proper,
reasonable, necessary and expedient.'73 In the last twenty years,
most jurisdictions have moved away from the presumption that the
mother is the better custodian. Instead, they have focused their
greatest good without any guidance of rules.
Id. (citations omitted).
166. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., supra notes 107, 109-11 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
173. See CHESTER G. VERNIER, 2 AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 191-213 (1932).
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attention on the child's needs, the child's relationships, and the
child's right to personal growth.
17 4
In reality, none of these competing ethical perspectives have
been entirely abolished. Rule deontology, rule utilitarianism and
act utilitarianism survive and flourish under the nebulous best
interests of the child standard. Given the wide discretion inherent
in the standard, a judge is often free to apply her own ethical
standard while reiterating the best interests test. 175 Furthermore,
sometimes all ethical perspectives are used, resulting in subjective
judicial outcomes, in order to justify conflicting custody awards. 176
When the best interests of the child are not clearly defined, the
judge must impose her own ethical framework on the decision-
making process.
3. The Primary Caretaker Standard as One of Several
Proposals for Facilitating Judicial Decision-Making and
Reducing Judicial Discretion
177
Criticism of the best interests standard leads to three proposed
changes: "(1) that judicial discretion under the best interests
standard must be limited; (2) that children must be given a greater
voice in the custody decision; and (3) that the tender years doctrine
must be rejected because of the social and political climate which
demands the neutralization of the gender distinctions.178 In
response to these criticisms, several proposals have been made to
change the method by which custody awards are made. The
primary caretaker standard is one of these proposals.
a. Keeping the Best Interests Standard but Making It
More Specific
As suggested above, using the best interests standard without
the guidance of rules promotes unwanted variability in custody
decisions. 179 This variability would be curtailed if the court re-
turned to rule utilitarianism, rather than using act utilitarianism.
More 'specific rules would help guide the courts' decisions and would
facilitate the predictability of a result.
174. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
177. See Mercer, supra note 143, at 398-403 (presenting a similar analysis to this section).
178. Id. at 398.
179. See id.
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[Slince people's capacities ofjudgment are highly fallible, each
person deciding each case on its own utilitarian merits would
likely produce disastrous results, and would also undermine the
coordination and predictability that social and legal rules
provide .... Thus because we often lack sufficient time and
information, are biased in favor of our own interests, etc., the
act utilitarian goal of always acting so as to maximize utility
may be better served in the long run by adopting certain more
specific rules as guides to decision and action, rather than
appealing directly to the principles of utility each time we act."s
A few states have attempted to limit judicial discretion by
codifying specific guidelines for a best interests custody determina-
tion. For example, Ohio originally modeled its statute8 l after the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 1974.182
These specific statutes can be considered utility rules which
guide information-gathering, as well as decision-making. Best
interests custody statutes are useful because they give the court a
more complete basis upon which to make a custody determination.
They can also be used as a guide by the judge to request additional
information that is not being provided by the parents' counsel (i.e.,
psychological studies, expert witnesses, etc.).
180. Brock, supra note 54, at 226.
181. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(c) (Baldwin 1983) (historical statute).
182. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 402,9 U.L.A. 561 (1990). See also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.04(c) (Baldwin 1983) (historical statute). The Ohio statute states:
In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section, whether on
an original award of custody or modification of custody, the court shall consider
all relevant factors, including:
(1) The wishes of the child's parents regarding his custody;
(2) The wishes of the child regarding his custody if he is eleven years of age
or older;
(3) The child's interaction and interrelationship with his parents, siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
(5) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation;
Id. Missing from the Ohio Code, however, is a segment of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act that instructs that: "the court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child." UNiF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402,9 U.L.A.
561 (1990). This omission demonstrates that the Ohio Code does not completely reiterate the
Uniform Statute.
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b. Eliminating the Best Interests Standard in Favor of
Less Complex Utility Rules
The criticisms of the best interests standard as being an
arbitrary standard have remained, in spite of improvements in the
law. Critics condemn the best interests doctrine as being confusing
and questionable in its promotion of the child's continued welfare.'
Underlying this criticism is the sense that court discretion has
gone too far. "Courts, using the 'best interests' justification, leave
the door open for re-evaluation and for reshuffling of family rela-
tionships."' The modification of a custody award is an alternative
available to parents and other interested parties under this
doctrine. Excessive judicial discretion and authority over families
is seen as being damaging to the continuity crucial for child
development.'85 It is also argued that the discretion judges exercise
under the best interests test is misguided,, even if the judge has the
best intentions to reach the optimum result. 8 6
183. See, e.g., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 63, at 54. The authors explain:
Even though we agree with the manifest purpose of the "in-the-best-interest-of-
the-child" standard, we adopt a new guideline for several reasons. First, the
traditional standard does not.., convey to the decisionmaker that the child in
question is already a victim of his environmental circumstances, that he is
greatly at risk, and that speedy action is necessary to avoid further harm being
done to his chances of healthy psychological development. Secondly, the old
guideline, in context and as construed by legislature, administrative agency,
and court, has come to mean something less than what is in the child's best
interests. The child's interests are often balanced against and frequently made
subordinate to adult interests and rights. Moreover, and less forthrightly,
many decisions are "in-name-only" for the best interests of the specific child
who is being placed. They are fashioned primarily to meet the needs and
wishes of competing adult claimants or to protect the general policies of a child
care or other administrative agency. But, even if the child's rights were, in fact
and policy, determinative and thus unequivocally superior to adult interests,
the guidelines would remain inadequate.
Id.
184. Mercer, supra note 143, at 400.
185. See id.
186. See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986) (footnote omitted). The author states:
The "best interests" standard is a prime example of the futility of attempting
to achieve perfect, individualized justice by reposing discretion in a judge or
other third party. Its vagueness provides maximum incentive to those who are
inclined to wrangle over custody, and it asks the judge to do what is almost
impossible: evaluate the child-caring capacities of a mother and a father at a
time when family relations are apt to be most distorted by the stress of
separation and the divorce process itself. Arguing that the idea that a judge
can determine the best interests of a child under such circumstances is a
fantasy, and that efforts for legal reform should concentrate on the effect of
custody law on private ordering, [Robert Burt has suggested] that almost any
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i. Emancipation of Children from Custody
Decisions-A Recognition of Their Natural
Rights
Critics of the best interests standard propose that this standard
be discarded altogether in order to reduce judicial discretion, with
the exception of matters involving child abuse and neglect."i 7
Rather, an emancipation statute under which all children a certain
age (thirteen or older) could "be freed of both parental and court
control in determining their legal care needs,""88 is considered. This
idea could be the ultimate answer in giving children legal rights in
custody proceedings and removing them from the whims of the
judiciary. The authors caution, however, that they
do not recommend any such provisions because we do not
believe that there are or can be circumstances which justify
emancipating children to meet their own legal care needs in the
child placement process. Indeed, it is the purpose of the process
to secure or restore for every child an uninterrupted opportunity
to be represented by "parents." Because they are children, they
require representation by parents or by some other adult upon
the disqualification of their parents. They are persons in their
own right but are not adults in their own right. Children by
definition cannot be free of an adult's control in determining
either their need for legal assistance or what lawyers must seek
on their behalf in the process of their placement. 89
This answer is a deontological natural rights position which
recognizes the ultimate moral independence of the child.
The deontological natural rights of the child position was
partially recognized by the 1989 United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child."9 The Convention affirmed that children have
the capacity for growth toward autonomy, and deserve to be treated
accordingly.191 Law and social policy, therefore, should permit
children who are capable of expressing their own views to voice
them expressly or through a representative. "The Convention's
automatic rule would be an improvement over the present situation.
Id.
187. See generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 127.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Barbara B. Woodhouse, 'Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights:" The Child's
Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 331 (1994).
191. See id.
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norms are an amalgam of both connection and autonomy, combining
notions of children as dependent members of families and communi-
ties with notions of children as individuals with unique personali-
ties and emerging moral and social lives which parents and
governments are explicitly charged with acknowledging. "192
The 1989 Convention's emphasis on children's voices, their
personal dignity and their membership in their family and in their
community was a progression from the 1959 United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of the Child which was concerned
primarily with meeting children's material and developmental
needs.1 93 It has been proposed that the next phase in this progres-
sion is a "generist perspective" to thinking about revising custody
law.
A generist perspective views nurturing of the next generation
as the touchstone of the family .... This perspective views an
adult's relationship with children as one of trusteeship rather
than as one of ownership. Adult 'rights' of control and custody
yield to the less adversarial notions of obligation to provide
nurturing, authority to act on the child's behalf, and standing
to participate in collaborative planning to meet the child's
needs.194
This vision for the future is a compelling one.
ii. The Least Detrimental Available Alternative
Standard
Some critics of the best interests of the child standard have
suggested a new standard-the least detrimental available
alternative standard.'95 They suggest that custody determinations
are based on three utility rules. First, the importance of safeguard-
ing the child's need for continuity should be employed in custody
decisions.'96 The psychological parent should be identified in a
custody award and the custodial parent should have the sole say
over all caretaking responsibilities. Visitation should be encour-
aged, but not a judicially enforceable right. The custody award
should also be final and irreversible, except in abuse situations, in
order to protect the child from being dragged back and forth
192. Id.
193. See id. at 332.
194. Id. at 321.
195. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 63, at 53.
196. See id. at 31.
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between different homes. Second, a child's sense of time must be
given priority in the custody determination. 197 The trial must be
expedient in order to avoid further harm done to the psychological
development of the greatly-at-risk child. Third, the court must fully
recognize the limitations of ascertaining the best interests of the
child when arriving at a perfect, long-term solution for a divided
family. 198
The new standard proposed is: "the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and development."'99
These critics note that using "detrimental," as opposed to "best
interests," should "serve to remind decisionmakers that their task
is to salvage as much as possible out of an unsatisfactory sit-
uation." °° The use of "available alternatives" is designed to focus
the decisionmakers on the limited nature of their choices.20 '
If the choice, as it may often be in separation and divorce
proceedings, is between two psychological parents and if each
parent is equally suitable in terms of the child's most immedi-
ate predictable developmental needs, the least detrimental
standard would dictate a quick, final, and unconditional
disposition to either of the competing parents.2 2
The least detrimental available alternatives proposal is radical.
Yet, it clearly emphasizes the ineffectiveness of the best interests
standard, the questionable continued jurisdiction of the court over
custody matters, the often court-encouraged attractiveness of child
kidnapping, the rampant return of divorced couples to the court
system, and the detrimental effect these factors have on the
development of the children involved. Adoption of the least
detrimental standard would definitely hinder judicial discretion
while drastically reducing custody litigation.
iii. The Primary Caretaker Standard
No state has adopted the least detrimental standard. Closest
to it is the primary caretaker standard, which has been adopted in
West Virginia, and is used as one factor in a best interests determi-
197. See id. at 40.
198. See id. at 49.
199. Id. at 53.
200. Id. at 62.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 62-63.
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nation in several other states.20 3 "Courts in at least sixteen states
have identified and showed some favor for the parent who had been
the primary caregiver before the couple separated,"2 4 and "courts
from at least seven of these states have identified primary care-
taking as a significant factor in assessing the child's best inte-
rests."20 5 Finally, "[courts from five states, although declaring the
importance of primary caretaking, have rejected it as a presumptive
determinant of custody."
20 6
Currently, only one state, West Virginia, has singled out
primary caretaking as being the sole factor for indicating a child's
best interests.0 7 Prior to 1981, West Virginia courts awarded
custody of a child of tender years to the mother.0 s While the
majority of states abandoned the maternal preference doctrine in
the 1960s and the 1970s, West Virginia maintained its gender
bias.20 9 In 1978, the maternal preference came under public attack
due to a much criticized decision when the West Virginia Supreme
Court applied the maternal preference rule and awarded custody to
a mother presumably found unfit by the trial court.210 In response,
the West Virginia Legislature abolished the maternal presumption
and established a best interests standard. The relevant statute,
enacted in 1980, states:
In making any such order respecting custody of minor children,
there shall be no legal presumption that, as between the
natural parents, either the father or the mother should be
awarded custody of said children, but the court shall make an
award of custody solely for the best interests of the children
based upon the merits of each case.2 1
203. See, e.g., Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (explaining that
when the two natural parents are fit and the child is of tender years, "positive consideration"
must be given to the primary caregiver); In re Marriage of Derby, 571 P.2d 562, 564 (Or. Ct.
App. 1977) (noting that the mother's role as "primary parent" was a factor in determining her
award of custody as being in the children's best interest).
204. Crippen, supra note 101, at 434 (footnote omitted) (listing the sixteen states as:
California, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont and West Virginia).
205. Id. (footnote omitted) (listing the following seven states: California, Delaware,
Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana and New York).
206. Id. at 434-35 (footnote omitted) (listing the five states as: Iowa, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Utah and Vermont).
207. See id. at 439.
208. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (Michie 1980) (historical statute).
209. See id.
210. See J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978).
211. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (Michie 1988) (reflecting the 1980 amendment in response to
the decision in J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d. 248 (W. Va. 1978)). The court in J.B. established a
strong maternal presumption with regard to children of tender years. The 1980 statutory
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The purpose behind amending the statute "was merely to correct
the inherent unfairness of establishing a gender-based, maternal
presumption which would defeat the just claims of a father if he
had, in fact, been the primary caretaker parent."212
In its 1981 Garska v. McCoy decision,21a the West Virginia
Supreme Court followed the sex-neutral, rule-based standard for
determining what the best interests of the child would be-the pri-
mary caretaker standard.214 In Garska, a mother sought custody of
her minor child from the child's father.215 The lower court awarded
the child's father custody because he was better educated, earned
more money and offered a better social environment than did the
mother.21 The Supreme Court reversed the decision and awarded
the mother custody, finding that the mother was the primary
caretaker.217 The court held, where the child is of tender years,
"there is a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker parent, if
he or she meets the minimum objective standard for being a fit
parent .... 28
The primary caretaker standard presumes that the greatest
good for the child would be secured if the child is placed in the
custody of the parent who has provided continuous care. Thus, it
is a rule utilitarian standard, and custody decision-making is
simplified. The judge can focus on discovering which parent
provides daily child care, rather than focus on all of the acts which
favor the best interests of the child-the child's relationships to
school, peers, family members; the comparable home environments;
and the psychological makeup and parenting competence of each
parent. The presumption behind the primary caretaker standard
is that children need consistent day-to-day care, and the parent who
performed this care during the marriage should get custody; indeed,
the standard "singles out continuity of care-a standard proposed
by the authors of Beyond the Best Interest of the Child-to trump all
others."
219
amendment answered the J.B. decision by eliminating any gender based presumption when
awarding custody.
212. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981).
213. Id.
214. See id. at 362.
215. See id. at 358.
216. See id. at 359.
217. See id. at 364.
218. Id. at 362.
219. Sanford Katz, "That They May Thrive' Goal of Child Custody: Reflections on the
Erosion of the Tender Years Presumption and the Emergence of the Primary Caretaker
1998]
48 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
In West Virginia, the primary caretaker is defined as the
"natural or adoptive parent who, until the initiation of divorce
proceedings, has been primarily responsible for the caring and
nurturing of the child."22 ° West Virginia law has fleshed out the
primary caretaker definition as being the parent who:
(1) prepares the meals; (2) changes the diapers and dresses and
bathes the child; (3) chauffeurs the child to school, church,
friends' homes and the like; (4) provides medical attention,
monitors the child's health, and is responsible for taking the
child to the doctor; and (5) interacts with the child's friends,
school authorities, and other parents engaged in activities that
involve the child.221
Advocates of the primary caretaker standard have found sev-
eral justifications for the preference. Judge Crippen, a proponent
of the primary caretaker preference, suggests that the standard:
benefits all interests involved in the custody decision, including
the interests of the judiciary. [Proponents] provide three
justifications for the primary caretaker preference: protection
of the child's most vital parent-child relationship, avoidance of
error, litigation and abusive threats of litigation, and compati-
bility with gender neutrality and the child's many interests.222
Marcia O'Kelly notes that the judicial preference for the primary
caretaker standard is because: (1) it promotes the continuity of the
primary psychological relationship;223 (2) it provides past caretaking
as an objective basis for predicting future parenting;224 (3) it deters
litigants from misusing the custody issue-making a custody
request, not to gain custody, but to strengthen unrelated interests
in the negotiation process;225 (4) it encourages private settlement
and thereby avoids the impact of protracted custody litigation and
relitigation;226 (5) it is judicially manageable because primary
caretaking can usually be identified easily, and therefore should be
adequate, readily-available information--easy to find out which
Presumption, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 123, 133 (1992).
220. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 358 (W. Va. 1981) (syllabus by the court).
221. Neely, supra note 27, at 180.
222. Crippen, supra note 101, at 440.
223. See O'Kelly supra note 102, at 511-17.
224. See id. at 517-21.
225. See id. at 521-23.
226. See id. at 523-24.
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parent has this role;227 and (6) it permits effective appellate review
of the trial court's decision.228
Approval for the primary caretaker standard exists because of
its constraint on judicial speculation about the psychological
makeup of parents and the relative degrees of parental com-
petence.229 First, proponents assert that, as professionals, judges
must recognize the limits of their knowledge.23 ° Since judges are
not trained as psychologists, with a specialty in child welfare, they
should not engage in an attempt to determine what would be in the
best interests of the child or what constitutes the parents' psycho-
logical capacity for parenting. 231 Second, proponents congratulate
West Virginia for using a standard that explicitly identifies "the
factors to be considered in terms of their function-assuring
continuity of care for the child," and which enables "judges and
lawyers to achieve a degree of literacy in child development-to
gain some understanding of the reasons for the preference."232
Finally, the standard has been commended as using factors
which are "relatively objective" and which are highly visible and
open to challenges in courts and legislatures.233 Thus, an added
benefit of the primary caretaker standard as a form of rule
utilitarianism is that the primary caretaker factors can be "se-
lected, maintained, revised, and replaced on the basis of their
utility and not on any other basis."234
The primary caretaker standard has been used in West
Virginia for the past seventeen years. It is the only jurisdiction to
currently retain a firm custody preference for this parent. Some
jurisdictions have discussed this standard in best interests decision-
making as one of many considerations. Oregon, Ohio and Minne-
sota have experimented with giving the standard more weight, rela-
tive to other best interests factors, but none of these jurisdictions
has made the standard authoritative and determinative of a cus-
tody award, as has West Virginia.235 In essence, in spite of numer-
ous articles advocating adoption of the presumption, West Virginia
227. See id. at 524-30.
228. See id. at 530-33.
229. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 24 (1986)
[hereinafter IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD].
230. See id. at 24.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 67.
233. See id.
234. WiLLIAM K FRANKENA, ETHICS 39 (2d ed. 1973).
235. See generally Crippen, supra note 101, at 436-39.
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is the only jurisdiction which recognizes that the best interests of
the child is coextensive with residing with the primary caretaker.
B. Origins and Current Rationale for the Primary Caretaker
Preference in West Virginia
1. The Influence of Attachment Theory on the Standard
The principle argument in support of a presumption which
places the child with the primary caretaker is that the interaction
of a primary caretaker with a young child produces an emotional
bond that is more important for the child to sustain on a daily basis
than whatever bond the child has formed with the other parent.236
The West Virginia Supreme Court justified the primary caretaker
standard with scientific research which indicates that "young
children, as a result of intimate interaction, form a unique bond
with their primary caretaker... [which] is an essential cornerstone
of a child's sense of security and healthy emotional development."
237
The concept of bonding comes from ethological studies-the
study of the behavior of animals, including humans. Ethological
studies in the 1970s led to descriptions of the parent-child interac-
tive behavior, where "ethograms" catalogued the mother-child and
the father-child behavioral repertoire.238 Although the studies were
telling, some were "limited to descriptions of overt or surface be-
havior, without extrapolation of hidden motivation or meaning,"239
thereby diminishing, somewhat, their possible impact. More cur-
rent studies have moved away from the mere counting of parent-
child interactions to looking at behavior clusters as stimuli and
responses. One proposed model of cyclical parent-child behavior is
broken into periods of initiation, regulation, maintenance and ter-
mination.24 Under such a model, both parent and child act on and
shape the response of the other, mutually influencing the develop-
ment of their relationship.241
Two other fields, modern social learning and psychoanalytic
theory, have contributed to the theory that maintenance of the
236. See id. at 440-42.
237. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916-17 (W. Va. 1989).
238. See T. BERRY BRAZELTON & BERTRAND G. CRAMER, THE EARLIEST RELATIONSHIP 88-91
(1990).
239. Id. at 90.
240. See id. at 97.
241. See id.
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primary caretaker-child bond is crucial.242 One of the main tenets
of both modern social learning and psychoanalytic theory is that a
special biological and psychological bond, an attachment, forms
between the caretaker, usually the mother, and the infant.243
The substantial body of literature developed until the mid-
sixties concerning the attachment theory suggests, among other
things, a deprivation model which "underlined the powerful nature
of the bond between mother and child."2 " Other scholars formed
similar conclusions about a child's attachment.
In 1958; Heintz Hartmann suggested that an infant's ego
development is dependent on the child's attachment to the
parent.245 That same year, John Bowlbywrote an influential paper
on attachment theory entitled: The Nature of the Child's Tie to His
Mother.246 D.W. Winnicott expanded Bowlby's work by suggesting
in 1986 that the mother and child are "a single, interlocking
unit."247 Early parent-offspring bonding was also reported in stu-
dies by M.H. Klaus and J.H. Kennell.24
Attachment theory, or "bonding," proposes that "[iin the
earliest hours and days of life a strong mutual emotional attach-
ment or bond occurs between the newborn and an immediate nur-
turing adult. This bond tends to continue over the following years,
even in the face of harsh treatment of the child by the adult."241
Thus, attachment behavior, the bonding behavior between the
dependent child and the nurturing parent, although most noticeable
in early childhood, can be observed throughout the life cycle.25 °
242. But see Chambers, supra note 137, at 560. Professor Chambers' review of the
research concluded that "loin the basis of the current empirical research alone, there is ...
no solid foundation for concluding that children, even young children, will be typically better
off if placed with their primary caretaker." Id.
243. See ERNA FURMAN, HELPING YOUNG CHILDREN GROW 11 (1987). The author explains:
The young child's relationship with his mother indeed includes [the] fulfillment
of bodily and emotional needs, maintenance of security, protection against
excessive stimulation from within and harm from without, gratification of
wants and relief from discomforts. Above all, it includes the assurance that all
these "services" will be provided consistently and lovingly, in tune with the
child's personality and adapted to the situation at hand.
Id.
244. BRAZELTON & CRAMER, supra note 238, at 87.
245. See id. at 88.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 89.
248. See KLAUS & KENNELL, supra note 11, at 37-40.
249. R. MURRAY THOMAS, COMPARING THEORIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 455 (4th ed.
1996).
250. See id.
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Separation-individuation theory, based on the work of Marga-
ret Mahler, also recognizes the importance of the primary parent-
child bond for successful maturation and development. "Separation
refers to the child's movement from fusion with the mother;
individuation consists of those steps that lead to the development
of an individual's own personal and unique characteristics."25'
Again, the thought revolves around the belief that attachment is an
on-going process, although the principle steps are achieved by the
end of the child's third year.252
Dr. Mahler suggests that a sustained bond with the primary
parent is desirable. To grow optimally, the child must have a
"confident expectation" that her needs will be consistently met by
a reliable and attuned parent.253 The parent is a "safe anchor-
age"-the child feels free to explore, knowing that a familiar and
safe harbor to which she can return exists, should the challenge
prove too much. 4 In sum:
[s]eparation-individuation theory . . . confirms and gives
specificity to the role of "nurture" in human development. The
relationship between child and [nurturer] is critical for the
negotiation of this developmental progression. The nature of
this growth-promoting relationship alters, over time, in
accordance with the changing needs of the child. It is an early
attuned, symbiotic relationship between infant and mother, or
her substitute, that provides the firm foundation for all that
follows. Through the subphases of separation-individuation, the
physical and libidinal availability of "ordinarily devoted"
parents fosters the child's growing capacity for separateness,
and affords the child those opportunities for identification and
the achievement of a sense of selfhood."s
If attachment to the primary caretaker is the cornerstone for
a child's healthy development, then there is good reason for a
custody standard to prioritize the preservation of the attachment
figure-child bond. The primary caretaker standard does just that.
Continuity of care with the attachment figure is the goal of the
primary caretaker presumption. The premise of a custody decision
based on this presumption is that records of past nurturing by
251. JOYCE EDwARD ET AL., SEPARATION/INDIVIDUATION: THEORY AND APPLICATION 1 (2d
ed. 1991).
252. See id. at 2.
253. See id. at 23.
254. See id. at 24.
255. Id. at 3.
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caregivers provide the court with a reliable basis for predicting
future parenting and for identifying the child's strongest psychologi-
cal bond.
2. Custody Decision-Making Using the Standard256
The author of the primary caretaker standard in West Virginia
is Supreme Court Chief Justice Richard Neely. Neely created the
standard in 1983 when he wrote the majority opinion in the Garska
case.257 In 1984, he wrote an article describing the standard and
detailing how it was to be used by the courts.25 s
The first step in making a custody award in West Virginia is to
determine which parent is the primary caretaker. The court
created the following criteria for determining the primary care-
taker:
the trial court shall determine which parent has taken primary
responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of the following
caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1) preparing and
planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3)
purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical care,
including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for
social interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to
friends' houses or, for example, to girl and boy scout meetings;
(6) arranging alternative care, i.e. baby-sitting, day-care, etc.;
(7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle
of the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplinary, i.e.
teaching general manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e.
religious, cultural, social, etc.; and (10) teaching elementary
skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.259
All ten factors are to be reviewed quickly by the court, based on
the parties' testimony. There should be no need to turn to experts
for information.26 ° Judge Neely explains:
256. See Mercer, supra note 143, at 405-08 (providing a comparable analysis of how judges
use the primary caretaker standard to reach custody decisions).
257. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
258. See Neely, supra note 27, at 180-82.
259. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 923 (W. Va. 1989).
260. Note that the best interests standard necessitates expert testimony as to the child's
welfare in most jurisdictions. See Neely, supra note 27, at 175. Some feminist scholars have
suggested that women are disadvantaged under the best interests of the child standard
because of the cost of expert testimony. See, e.g., FINEM N, supra note 77, at 182 (suggesting
that women generally cannot afford the cost of protracted litigation and fact development
which often comes with a best interests of the child custody battle).
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Under West Virginia's scheme, the question of which parent, if
either, is the primary caretaker is proved with lay testimony by
the parties themselves, and by that of teachers, relatives and
neighbors. Which parent does the lion's share of the chores can
be demonstrated satisfactorily in less than an hour of the
court's time in most cases." 1
After identifying a primary caretaker, the court next considers
whether that parent is fit for custody. In this regard, the court is
not concerned with assessing relative degrees of fitness between the
two parents, but only determining whether the primary caretaker
achieves a passing grade on an objective test.262
Fitness as a primary caretaker is determined by showing that
the parent: (1) provided proper nourishment and clothing to the
children; (2) adequately supervised and controlled the children; (3)
provided habitable housing; (4) avoided extreme discipline, or child
abuse or other vices; and (5) refrained from immoral behavior which
would deleteriously affect the child.263 Again, lay testimony is to be
used for ease and quickness. "Whether a primary caretaker parent
meets these criteria can be determined through nonexpert testi-
mony, and the criteria themselves are sufficiently specific that they
discourage frivolous disputation."
26 4
Finally, when neither fit parent is the primary caretaker, the
court will consider the best interests of the child on a case-by-case
basis.265 That is, "[iun those custody disputes where the facts de-
monstrate that child care and custody were shared in an entirely
equal way, then.., no presumption arises and the court must pro-
ceed to inquire further into the relative degrees of parental compe-
tence."266
The primary caretaker standard only applies as an irrefutable
presumption-one that cannot be defeated-to children of tender
years. Children under the age of six are usually considered to be of
tender years. 267 "When, however, we come to those children who
261. Neely, supra note 27, at 181 (emphasis added).
262. See id.
263. See David M., 385 S.E.2d at 924.
264. Neely, supra note 27, at 181-82.
265. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 358 (W. Va. 1981) (syllabus by the court).
266. Id. at 363 (ruling that joint custody cannot be considered for the "equal parenting"
case unless both parties consent to it). See also Michael R. v. Sandra E., 378 S.E.2d 840 (W.
Va. 1989).
267. See Neely, supra note 27, at 175.
[Vol. 5:1
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
may be able to formulate an intelligent opinion about their custody,
our rule becomes more flexible."268
Children fourteen or older have the right to declare a guardian
under West Virginia law.269 The only limitation on this right is that
the named parent must be fit. "Often, as might be expected, this
means that the parent who makes the child's life more comfortable
will get custody; there is little alternative, however, since children
over fourteen who are living where they do not want to live will
become unhappy and ungovernable anyway."270
Children between ages six and fourteen are dependent on their
parents, but they can usually articulate their preference as to their
custody arrangement. The judge may ask these children their
preferences and consider the child's wishes as part of her determi-
nation.27' "When the trial judge is unsure about the wisdom of
awarding the children to the primary caretaker, he or she may ask
the children for their preference and accord that preference
whatever weight he or she deems appropriate."272 Although "the
judge... is not required to hear the testimony of the children, and
will not usually do so, particularly if he or she suspects bribery or
undue influence,"273 it is appropriate to treat "mature" and "intelli-
gent" children as "acceptable experts" who may act as "an escape
valve ... in unusually hard cases."274
Justice Neely praised the simplicity of the primary caretaker
standard in his article, published one year after the standard was
adopted in West Virginia.
Although this method for handling child custody may
appear overly cut-and-dried and insufficiently sensitive to the
needs of individual children, it has reduced the volume of
domestic litigation over child custody tremendously. Because
litigation per se can be the cause of serious emotional damage
to children (and to adults), we consider this to be in the best
interests of our state's children. Even more importantly,
children in West Virginia cannot be used as pawns in fights that
are actually about money. Under our system a mother's lawyer
can tell her that if she has been the primary caretaker and is a
fit parent, she has absolutely no chance of losing custody of very
268. Id. at 182.
269. See W. VA. CODE § 44-10-4 (1982).
270. Neely, supra note 27, at 182.
271. See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 914 (W. Va. 1989).
272. Neely, supra note 27, at 182.
273. David M., 385 S.E.2d at 924.
274. Id.
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young children. The result is that questions of alimony and
child support are settled on their own merits." 5
But is the standard as simple as Neely would suggest?
Courts have struggled with this standard in several situations.
For example, in determining who is a primary caretaker, where
parents have shifted their roles during different periods of the
child's life, Garska suggests that the court should focus on which
parent was the primary caretaker "before the domestic strife giving
rise to the proceeding began."276 Other cases have disagreed and
have focused on the entire parenting period. "A determination of
who is the primary caretaker of a child of tender years ... cannot
be determined simply by reference to any one moment of time....
The determination of primary caretaker is a task which must
encompass, to some degree, an inquiry into the entirety of each
child's life.... .277 Finally, still other courts have refused to look to
see who was the primary caretaker immediately before the
initiation of the divorce proceedings at all. Instead, these cases look
at who was the primary caretaker before the parents' lives began to
shift with the breakdown of the marriage. 8 "Under circumstances
where the status of primary-caretaker parent is lost as the result
of circumstances that are beyond the control of the parent, it is
appropriate for a court to look to who the primary caretaker parent
was immediately before the initiation of divorce proceedings." 279
Such a focus would result in an errant decision because the totality
of circumstances would not be considered.
In addition, the length of time a parent is the primary care-
taker is not always determinative of a custody award. In Dempsey
v. Dempsey, where the mother was the primary caretaker of the
children for the first six years of the marriage and the father was
the primary caretaker for only one year, the court said, "[ciertainly
[Mrs. Dempsey] had assumed these [primary caretaker] duties for
a longer period of time, but we feel that length of time alone is not
determinative of whether the presumption should attach."280 Thus,
using the primary caretaker standard may not be as easy as it
looks, or as it is reported by Justice Neely.
275. Neely, supra note 27, at 182 (emphasis in original).
276. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
277. Starkey v. Starkey, 408 S.E.2d 394, 398 (W. Va. 1991).
278. See J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67, 68 (W. Va. 1984).
279. Id. (syllabus by the court) (describing a mother who was not the primary'caretaker
right before the divorce, due to her mental illness, who was denied custody).
280. Dempsey v. Dempsey, 306 S.E.2d 230, 224 (W. Va. 1983).
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3. The Reasons for West Virginia's Adoption of the Primary
Caretaker Standard
The Supreme Court of West Virginia adopted the primary
caretaker standard: (1) to increase the predictability of and
standardize custody decisions; (2) to give parents less incentive to
litigate than to settle their custody cases; and (3) to eliminate the
use of children as bargaining chips in the process.2"'
First, in the absence of a simple, reliable presumption to
determine the best interests of the child, the Garska court worried
that custody awards would become unpredictable. The legislature
left a void when it overruled the maternal preference doctrine in
1980. Absent this objective presumption, custody decisions after
1980 would have to rest on the court's subjective assessment of each
parent's character and lifestyle and what each parent offered to the
child. Judges, who normally lack the ability to "measure minute
gradations of psychological capacity between two fit parents" would
unwisely be called upon to determine relative parental fitness with
scientific "precision."
282
Fineman suggests that the primary caretaker standard
eliminates this imprecision by focusing on concrete, past behavior
which is a fact-finding task that judges are trained to do.283 "[A]
major advantage of the primary-caretaker rule is that it is particu-
larly susceptible to legal analysis because it involves past fact-
finding, an inquiry traditionally performed by courts. It has the
benefit, therefore, of being a rule that judges can comfortably apply
and that lawyers can easily understand and use."284 In contrast, the
best interests standard requires future-oriented speculation about
which parent would produce the best environment and the quality
or extent of emotional bonding between parent and child.285 "The
primary-caretaker test assumes that these bonds exist between the
primary caretaking parent and the child; they are evidenced by the
caretaker's sacrifice and devotion to the child. The test also as-
sumes that the child reciprocates this devotion."286
Second, Garska suggests that the unpredictability in the
custody award process, which results when the best interests test
is applied, encourages parents to engage in costly and lengthy
281. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361-62 (W. Va. 1981).
282. See Mercer, supra note 143, at 408-14 (footnotes omitted).
283. See FINEMAN, supra note 77, at 182.
284. Id.
285. See id.
286. Id.
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litigation where they should settle out of court. In contrast, the
criteria for selecting the primary caretaker are clear enough that
generally parents would be able to predict the custody award prior
to litigation. This predictability would then reduce the need for
litigation and would eliminate the best interests "battle of experts."
Third, the Garska Court worried that parents would use the
unpredictable custody battle "as a coercive weapon to affect the
level of support payments and the outcome of other issues in the
underlying divorce proceeding."
281
Fineman echoes these concerns, and further complains that the
best interests battle disadvantages women.
The current set of rules, which requires individualized hearings
to determine a plethora of facts and to parade a bevy of experts
on the issue of what is in a child's best interest, does not provide
'justice,' particularly for women, who tend to be less well-off
economically than their husbands, and who cannot afford such
expensive procedures."'
To avoid this cost of litigation and the risk that they might lose
custody in a protracted custody battle, women will negotiate away
child support and property rights, subsequently leaving them
destitute after the divorce.289 The furtherance of justice, however,
is not one of the articulated policies behind the primary caretaker
standard. In fact, "[tihe primary caretaker parent rule may strike
some as unsatisfactory because it does not attempt to arrive at pre-
cisely the correct decision in each case."29° However, that adjudica-
tion in general is imprecise.291
287. Mercer, supra note 143, at 409.
288. FINEMAN, supra note 77, at 182.
289. See generally Neely, supra note 27, at 164-65 (stating that men will argue over
custody in order to avoid paying more child support and women, who are typically not as
well-off economically, will be forced to accept it).
290. Id. at 186.
291. See id. Justice Neely argues that
[tihe greatest frustration in lawmaking is that there is never a choice between
systems that work and systems that do not; the choice is always between two
systems that are both unsatisfactory in some manner. The best that can be
hoped for is a system that works better than others in most cases, and which
doesn't do too much damage in the instances where it doesn't. By this test, the
primary caretaker parent rule is a success: Although there is some unfairness
to parents who do not take a preeminent role in caring for their children before
divorce, that unfairness is more than balanced by the effectiveness of the rule
in preventing the trading of children for money and in reducing drastically the
need for complex and damaging inquiry into family life and parental fitness.
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To satisfy the three policies behind the primary caretaker
standard, the standard must be easy to apply and must lead to
certain, predictable results. One of the main purposes behind
reverting to an objective, rule-based standard is to limit judicial
discretion and uncertainty inherent in a utilitarian-based best
interests analysis.292
Justice Neely reiterated concerns about the impartiality and
the unpredictability of judicial custody decisions based on a best
interests analysis as recently as 1994 in the dissent of a West
Virginia case which was initially examined under the primary
caretaker standard.9 In that case, the trial court held that neither
parent could be accorded the primary caretaker presumption.294
Defaulting to a best interests determination, the court awarded the
father custody.295 The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the
decision and gave the mother custody.29 In his dissent, Justice
Neely asserted that
there is a rampant gender bias that has clouded the majority's
ability to render impartial decisions in the area of family law.
... Mr. Shearer sat on the 'nest' alone for the past two years,
and this court sent him home empty handed. I have no doubt
that 'but for' Mr. Shearer's gender, the outcome in this case
would have been different.297
4. Goal Achievement of the Primary Caretaker Standard
The primary caretaker standard purports to curtail judicial
discretion, the emotional and monetary costs of litigation, and the
opportunities for using child custody as a bargaining chip, all of
which result from an unpredictable individualized approach. By
292. See id. at 173-74.
The individualized [best interests] approach might be ideal if it were costless
and if courts actually considered the relative merits of the parents in each case.
In fact, however, the individualized approach is intrusive, time-consuming and
inherently distortive in its effect ... Under the "best interests of the child"
standard, custody, when contested, goes to the parent whom the court believes
will do a better job of child rearing... I cannot imagine an issue more subject
to personal bias than a decision about which parent is "better" . . . It is
unlikely that the decision will be the kind of individualized justice that the
system purports to deliver.
Id.
293. See Shearer v. Shearer, 448 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1994).
294. See id. at 167.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 169.
297. Id. at 171.
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according an explicit, almost absolute preference to the primary
caretaker, West Virginia law arguably encourages early, out-of-
court settlements in divorce cases. It is championed for these
virtues. But is it living up to its billing?
The primary caretaker standard is designed to be a "bright
line" standard for child custody decision-making in order to reduce
litigation and provide more predictable results. But if the primary
caretaker standard is to achieve its goal of predictable custody
awards, it must eliminate judicial discretion.298
The primary caretaker standard must operate as "an authorita-
tive, mandatory, binding, specific, and precise direction to a judge
that instructs him how to decide a case."299 Given a similar custody
problem, there should be a determinate preference for one
parent-like cases should be decided in the same fashion. More-
over, the custody result should be able to be predicted, with
accuracy, by divorcing litigants. 30
Many legal scholars advocate the primary caretaker standard
as "needed reform for a flawed process of decisionmaking."0 1 In
298. See Mercer, supra note 143, at 413 (footnotes omitted).
299. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best
Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2226 (1991).
300. But see Mercer, supra note 143, at 413.
But has discretion been eliminated? Carl Schneider suggests that "even as
simple a rule as the primary caretaker standard cannot be applied
mechanically, without an exercise of discretion in finding and interpreting the
facts. And that discretion can greatly affect the ultimate decision." Does the
judge's discretionary application of facts using the standard lead to inconsistent
results and unpredictable outcomes given similar situations? If it does, should
not the benefit of the primary caretaker standard be questioned? The standard
purposefully errs on the side of determinacy versus individualized justice. Is
this standard worth this cost? Perhaps only if it leads to predictable decisions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
301. Crippen, supra note 101, at 442. Research has identified eighteen commentators who
extensively discussed the primary caretaker standard. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-
Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988) (advocating that custody be given to the
"ordinary devoted parent," although no mention of the primary caretaker term was made);
Becker, supra note 28, at 139 (identifying the standard's promise but arguing that a
maternal deference standard would be even better); Phyllis P. Bookspan, From a Tender
Years Presumption to a Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really Changed?
Should It?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 75, 86-87 (1993) (arguing for a determinate standard, like the
primary caretaker standard, in order to remove the incentive for parents to threaten liti-
gation); Chambers, supra note 137, at 561-62 (favoring the primary caretaker standard for
children up to five years); Robert F. Cochran, The Search for Guidance in Determining the
Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody
Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1985) (recommending that the primary caretaker become
the primary physical custodian in joint custody awards); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1987) (criticizing the best
interests standard as being indeterminate and recommending the primary caretaker
standard as an alternative); FINEMAN, supra note 77, at 182 (urging adoption of the primary
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contrast to the best interests of the child standard, which provides
virtually unlimited discretion to decision-makers, the primary
caretaker standard is a workable custody standard which will
properly limit the judges' abilities to use their own bias, values, and
prejudices to decide the case.3 °2 The standard will also properly
limit the court's entry into a psychological arena where it has no
expertise.'"
This standard, however, has not been expressly adopted by the
courts as an irrebuttable presumption, except in West Virginia. 0 4
It has been used by courts in sixteen states as one of the factors to
be considered when awarding custody.0 5 However, in five of those
states, it was expressly rejected as a presumptive determinant of
custody, and two states, Ohio and Minnesota, have retreated from
the standard as not being as workable as it was purported to be.306
Commentators continue to sing the benefits of the standard,0 v
but the courts are not listening.3 8 Perhaps this is because the
literature is void of an analysis on how the standard is used by
judges and whether it is indeed "workable."
caretaker standard to balance the power relations in a custody dispute); Glendon, supra note
186, at 1180, 1182 (decrying the best interests standard as being open to the judge's bias and
proposing a more determinate standard); Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine:
A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335 (1982) (arguing that maternal preference should yield only
if the father assumed the caretaking role during the marriage); Mary Ann Mason,
Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1 (1990-91) (advocating either a presumption
for mothers or for the primary caregiving parent); Neely, supra note 27, at 168 (advocating
the primary caretaker standard, which he authored for West Virginia in Garska v. Garska);
O'Hanlon & Workman, supra note 21, at 388 (supporting the primary caretaker standard and
reporting how it works in West Virginia); O'Kelly, supra note 102, at 483 (suggesting the
preference for children who are too young to express their wishes); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why
Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7
WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 235 (1982) (advocating the benefits of the Garska criteria); Sack, supra
note 152, at 292-93 (arguing that the primary caretaker standard helps eliminate gender bias
but needs a more narrowly defined fitness exception). But see Sheri A. Ahl, Case
Commentary, A Step Backward: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts "A Primary
Caretaker" Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Pikula v. Pikula, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1344
(1986) (arguing that the standard is unjustified); Crippen, supra note 101, at 428-29
(questioning whether the standard has achieved any of its goals); Judith Ferguson, Is the
Primary Caretaker Presumption in Custody Cases for Us?, 7 OTAGO L. REV. 469 (1991)
(arguing against the adoption of the standard in New Zealand); Katz, supra note 219, at 133
(finding the presumption to be gender biased); Bruce Ziff, The Primary Caretaker
Presumption: Canadian Perspectives on an American Development, 4 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 186
(1990) (urging the rejection of the standard in Canada).
302. See GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 8, at 24.
303. See id. at 67.
304. See Crippen, supra note 101, at 434-35.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 434-37.
307. See supra note 301.
308. See supra note 301.
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III. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND JUSTIFICATION
FOR THIS STUDY
This article attempts to explore how judges are making custody
awards in West Virginia, using the ten factors 3 9 stated in the
primary caretaker standard. In focusing on the "workability" of the
standard, this article singles out one of the policy reasons advocat-
ing the use of the standard. It neither attempts to comment on
whether the standard is leading to better custody decisions in West
Virginia, nor to assess whether the standard serves the best
interests of the child by preserving the caretaker-child bond after
divorce. This study also does not assess whether the ten factors are
an accurate measure of the intimate bond which they are supposed
to promote between parent and child.
The issues addressed in this article fall into two categories:
whether judges are using the standard appropriately and whether
situations exist which render the standard inapplicable. This
section will explore current theories discussing exactly how these
judges have been assessing the standard with respect to child
custody cases in West Virginia. Questions that have arisen from
Justice Neely's factors include: are judges using these ten factors;
are they predetermining who should get custody and then molding
the standard; is one factor being used more frequently than other
factors; and finally, are there situations where the court cannot
determine who the primary caretaker is, and consequently, who
should have custody?
For example, what happens when both parents are working or
they share the duties of child-rearing? Justice Neely does not
anticipate a need for joint custody awards when there is a tie
between parents.310 Instead, he specifically states that "[[iun West
Virginia] we do not encourage court-ordered joint custody, although
parents can agree to such an arrangement."311
Has West Virginia changed its approach to the standard since
it was adopted by Neely in 1981? Does the standard lead to
309. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
310. See Neely, supra note 27, at 184-85 (arguing that alternative approaches such as joint
custody are sure to be counterproductive in the end because what a court orders has little
effect--but how the parents behave will be more determinative of how successful the attempt
at joint custody will be). See, e.g., David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 924 (W. Va.
1989) (describing the court's concern, not with whether there were relative degrees of fitness
between the two parents, but rather with whom was the primary caretaker and whether the
primary caretaker achieved a "passing grade on an objective test").
311. Neely, supra note 27, at 183-84.
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predictable results? Justice Neely suggests that a mother's lawyer
in West Virginia can tell a full-time homemaker, a primary
caretaker, that she will absolutely get custody of her children if she
is fit.312 Does she get custody or have the courts been able to
circumvent what appears to be the obvious conclusion that the ten
factor list "usually, but not necessarily, spells 'mother."
313
This article will enrich the debate about whether the primary
caretaker standard offers the best way to decide custody cases or
whether courts and legislatures, proponents and opponents of the
standard, need to move the debate to a new level.
A. What Do We Know About How Judges Make Decisions?
1. Understanding the Judges' Three Tasks
The judiciary has three tasks:314 (1) the central task of judges
is to allocate responsibility;3 15 (2) the secondary task is to settle
disputes;31 6 and (3) the final task is to use the law as a measure of
enduring social order and justice. 17
Divorce and custody decision-making involve all three of these
tasks. In a fault-based divorce system, a judge concentrates on the
task of allocating responsibility. The judge seeks to determine
which spouse harmed the viability of the marriage through her
actions of adultery, intemperance and abuse.1 8 Similarly, a court's
focus on parental fitness or unfitness for custody has an allocation
of the responsibility element. The rationale is that the parent will
realize the consequences of her actions by being denied custody.
Judges engage in the secondary task of dispute resolution when
they resolve conflicts between two parties regarding their roles and
relationships. The legal system "imposes a definition of what is in
dispute" and "establishes parameters" for resolving the situation.319
Any information not within the established parameters is irrele-
vant. For example, West Virginia has placed the child's parental
312. Id. at 182. See, e.g., David M., 385 S.E.2d at 925 (determining that "if fit, the
[primary caretaker] parent has absolutely no chance of losing custody of very young
children").
313. David M., 385 S.E.2d at 923.
314. See RICHARD LEMPART & JOSEPH SANDERS, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 5-7 (1986).
315. See id. at 5.
316. See id. at 7.
317. See id. at 135.
318. See generally David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 925 (W. Va. 1989) (discussing
the relationship between a parent's adultery and parental conduct).
319. LEMPHART & SANDERS, supra note 314, at 134.
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preference in custody disputes outside of the parameter of the pri-
mary caretaker standard.320 While a judge in West Virginia may
choose to hear the child's testimony in custody disputes involving
children under fourteen, the primary caretaker standard is
dispositive, unless rebutted by the child.32' To promote dispute
resolution, courts adopt rules to regulate the conduct between
parties, which ensures the maintenance of social order and
justice.322 Laws "arrange a bargaining space in which parties
negotiate" and "control the relative power" parties can exercise
during settlement efforts.323 Whether acting as a substitute parent
or echoing society's paternalistic concerns, the judge endeavors to
protect the child and to ensure the child's well-being.324 In all three
of these tasks, the judge acts from a nearly unassailable platform
of authority-what is perceived in reality by outsiders, the parties,
and even the court itself. Traditionally, judges, in their application
of the law, have an "epistemic authority" which cannot be chal-
lenged by "social realities themselves, nor by common sense, nor by
scientifically controlled observation."32 Judges decide cases from
this power base: "[tihe law autonomously processes information,
creates worlds of meaning, sets goals and purposes, produces reality
constructions, and defines normative expectations-and all this
quite apart from the world constructions in lawyer's minds."326
Both rule-based and discretionary decision-making operate from
this autonomous pedestal. However, a rule-based law, such as the
primary caretaker presumption, is more autonomous than a
discretionary standard, such as the ad hoc, case-by-case, best
interests of the child standard. For example, the latter (best
interests of the child standard) can incorporate social science
knowledge and delegate epistemic authority to child welfare experts
or guardians ad litem who articulate to the court what they see as
being in the child's best interests.
320. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981) (listing the ten factors).
321. See Neely, supra note 27, at 182.
322. See LEMPHART & SANDERS, supra note 314, at 6-7.
323. Id. at 7.
324. See id.
325. Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of
Law, 23 LAw & Socy REv. 727, 743 (1989).
326. Id. at 739.
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2. Judges Balance Discretionary and Rule-Bound Decision-
Making
The American legal system struggled to reconcile a preference
for rule-bound, determinate decision-making with the trial court's
desire to look at an issue on a case-by-case basis, providing
individualized justice in each case. 327
[Tlhere is a continuum between rules and discretion....
Toward the 'rule' end of the continuum are a series of
devices that are intended to limit decision-makers but that
are less directive than rules. These include the principles,
policies, guidelines, presumptions, and lists of factors in
which family law abounds. At the other end of the contin-
uum is discretion. There is, for instance, discretion to find
facts, discretion to choose rules, discretion to make rules,
discretion to interpret rules, and discretion to apply the
rules to the facts.32s
In any judicial decision, discretion, even the kind constrained
by rules, is arguably inherent. A judge ostensibly may be bound by
a list of rules for a particular case, but she may also be forced to
choose which rules are necessary to apply or focus on. This leaves
the judge the opportunity to decide the case as she sees fit, either
by intuition, or by what she believes justice requires, and then
adjust the rules to fit her desired result. Ultimately, the judge has
the final power and, consequently, discretion to interpret the law.329
For the enigmas that it may invent, discretion also has its
benefits. The virtue of discretion is the authority each judge has to
do justice in each case. Discretion also allows "the judge to respond
expeditiously to society's evolving preferences and practices."330
327. See Mercer, supra note 143, at 410-11 (footnotes omitted).
328. Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A
Report and a Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229, 232-33 (1993-94) [hereinafter Tension Between
Rules].
329. See Mercer, supra note 143, at 410-11 (footnotes omitted); see also Glendon, supra
note 186, at 1195.
I think the greatest and most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion end of
the scale, where rules and principles provide little or no guidance, where
emotions of deciding officers may affect what they do, where political or other
favoritism may influence decisions, and where the imperfections of human
nature are often reflected in the choices made.
Id.
330. Tension Between Rules, supra, note 328, at 235.
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Some scholars characterize the best interests of the child
standard as being "rule-failure discretion."331 Rule-failure discre-
tion "is created where it is believed that cases will arise in circum-
stances so varied, so complex, and so unpredictable that satisfactory
rules that will accurately guide decision-makers to correct results
in a sufficiently large number of cases cannot be written."332
However, it is this level of discretion that some judges abhor. Judge
Crippen questions the ability of decision-makers to carefully assess
situations while avoiding "undisciplined abuse of general princi-
ples."333 Justice Neely comments that it is impossible for a judge to
properly exercise discretion in deciding which parent is better.334
To avoid the dangers of unlimited discretion, judges and society
favor rules. Two primary advantages that rules have over discre-
tion exist.335 First, the results under rules are more predictable,
and their public nature serves the planning function of society.
Planning/predictability is one of the main goals of the law.336
People need to know what the law says so that they can
organize their lives rationally. Rules seem likelier than
discretion to inform people what the law is and what courts will
do. Rules are, after all, publicly stated and thus are, relatively,
accessible to perspective litigants. And rules are precisely an
attempt to state in advance how cases should be decided.3 7
Second, rules outweigh discretion in their ability to help the court
decide similar cases according to the legal principle of stare
decisis.338
331. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Judicial Decision: A Lawyer's View, in THE USES
OF DISCRETION 47, 62 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992) [hereinafter USES OF DISCRETION].
332. Id.
333. Crippen, supra note 101, at 431.
334. See Neely, supra note 27, at 174 (stating "[tihe decision may hinge on the judge's
memory of his or her own parents or on his or her distrust of an expert whose eyes are
averted once too often. It is unlikely that the decision will be the kind of individualized
justice that the system purports to deliver."). See also Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a Book Out
... ".: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1541
(1987) (commenting that "[a]s a former judge who has experienced the freedom granted by
this permissive view, I have had cause to doubt its wisdom").
335. See Schneider, supra note 299, at 2249-51.
336. See id.
337. Tension Between Rules, supra note 328, at 237.
338. See id. at 240.
Rules may serve better than discretion the goal of treating like cases alike. If
each decision-maker has discretion to decide case by case what principles to
apply and how to apply them, cases that are essentially similar are likely to be
decided differently. Rules, on the other hand, work to suppress differences of
opinion among decision-makers. Furthermore, rules serve as record-keeping
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Additional advantages of the use of rules over discretion exist
in that: (1) rules contribute to legitimacy of a decision by making
the decision more public; (2) rules allow a judge to focus on a
problem and not be distracted by irrelevant circumstances; (3) rules
can enforce social norms because the public nature of rules allows
individuals to plan for the consequences of their actions and to
change their behavior, if needed, to avoid negative consequences;
and (4) rules are more efficient because they relieve the decision-
maker from reinventing the wheel.3 s
The history of child custody law can be seen as a struggle
between rules and discretion. 340 West Virginia's adoption of the
primary caretaker standard is somewhat of a resolution of this
debate. The "ideal type"" of a rule "is an authoritative, mandatory,
binding, specific, and precise direction to a judge which instructs
him how to decide a case or to resolve a legal issue."3 42  The
presumption is that this "ideal type" rule will direct lower courts on
how to decide a divorce custody case.343
3. The Influence of Human Cognitive Processes on Judicial
Decision-Making
A social cognitive framework has been used to examine the
potential for bias in the nature of the categories of information that
judges use to make decisions. Human cognitive "processes guide
decision making and person perceptions and are heavily influenced
devices, so that decision-makers can more easily coordinate their rulings over
time and among themselves.
Id.
339. See Schneider, supra note 299, at 2249-52.
340. See Tension Between Rules, supra note 328, at 229-31.
For decades we have lived with an abundantly discretionary way of resolving
child custody disputes: The best-interests-of-the-child standard has long been
understood to give judges acres of room to roam. Yet in recent years scholar
after scholar has inveighed against the discretionary scope that standard
permits judges, and jurisdiction after jurisdiction has adopted one or another
standard-the primary caretaker presumption ... for instance-intended to
cabin, crib, and confine the range ofjudicial discretion... In short, family law
has recently been roiled by much debate and many changes in which the contest
between rules and discretion features centrally. This contest is hardly resolved.
Every day lawyers argue in courts and legislatures around the country about
whether a court should adopt a discretion-limiting rule, about whether a
legislature should preempt judicial discretion by devising authoritative
standards.
Id.
341. LEMPHART & SANDERS, supra note 314, at 3.
342. USES OF DISCRETION, supra note 331, at 50.
343. See Glendon, supra note 186, at 1181-82.
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by culturally determined expectancies."' Thus, where judges have
a great deal of discretion awarding custody, the potential for bias is
great because the judges' own conceptions of what an adequate
parent is may be based on their own racial-ethnic background,
subsequently influencing their findings.
In general, humans develop schemas or cognitive structures,
which organize knowledge and serve as prototypes for comparisons
of new information.3" Schemas help humans synthesize thousands
of pieces of information by assigning each information piece to a
concept, classifying the concept's attributes and ordering the
relationships between attributes.346 "When people's behavior fails
to fit our schemas, we are likely to attribute fault to something
internal to the person. If the schemas one holds are inappropriate,
overly narrow, or inflexible, bias can be introduced into judgments
made about others, resulting in faulty decision making."347
The reasoning processes that both judges and mental health
professionals use are comparable.348 Both share two types of
schemas for evaluating parent-child relationships and parental
competency. These types of schemas for decision-making are "role
schemas," which define the qualities or attributes which make up
a social position in society, and "event schemas," which define how
a person should act given a certain situation.349
By understanding general cognitive processes, one can
understand how a judge's values and beliefs can shape her interpre-
tation of the law. Common beliefs influence what meaning a judge
ascribes to legal requirements.350 A judge can shape criteria for
decision-making to fit the values she believes to be self-evident
truths.351 The judge's "culture provides [her] with [a] ready-made
frame of reference, "352 which gives her world "consistency and order,
.. . but which can also lead to [an] error in judgment."353 For
example, if a judge believes that it is morally harmful for children
to reside with a gay or lesbian parent, she can ignore the West
344. Sandra T. Azar & Corina L. Benjet, A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity, Race and
Termination of Parental Rights, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 249, 251 (1994).
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. Id.
348. See id. at 251.
349. See id.
350. See generally id. at 252 (arguing that "common beliefs shape interpretation of criteria
in the law (i.e. the meaning ascribed to the words put forth in statutes)").
351. See id. (suggesting that a judge might use her personal beliefs in determining the
meaning of a law).
352. Id. at 265.
353. Id.
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Virginia primary caretaker presumption and find the primary
caretaker unfit. That judge's idea of inappropriate parenting
practices may simply reflect the different values she has, rather
than the risk those practices pose to the child's health or well being.
Studies reviewing how judges decide abuse and neglect
terminations of parental rights cases find that racial or ethnic
biases may influence a judge's decision.3" The theories and models
of appropriate parenting skills "are heavily rooted in the values of
dominant, middle class, Anglo-American culture, and little attempt
has been made to examine their validity for diverse groups."35
Consequently, when
[elvaluating the fitness of standard middle class American
childrearing practices from the perspectives of other cultures,
one realizes the subjectivity and vast possibilities for mislabel-
ing parenting behaviors.... A few pieces of culturally misinter-
preted information, may begin to color impressions formed and
the processing of subsequent cues... which ultimately may tip
the scales toward a judgment of "unfitness." 356
4. Research on Child Custody Disputes and on Judicial
Decision-Making
Studies on the factors which influence judges and their
decision-making processes in child custody disputes exist. In one
study, a judge's "integrity"35 v was significantly related to the
amount of child support the court awarded to the custodial parent
after a divorce adjudicated in Franklin County, Ohio.35
In another study, child custody decision-making was assessed
through coding and statistically analyzing 282 investigation files
from the San Diego courts to determine psychological factors and
354. See id. at 253-64 (detailing examples of cultural traditions often mistaken for bad
parenting).
355. Id. at 259.
356. Id. at 263-64.
357. "Integrity" was rated by local attorneys who also considered the judge's temperament,
courtroom management skills, legal ability and use of the Ohio 1987 Child Support
Guidelines. See Walter L. Ellis, The Effects of Background Characteristics of Attorneys and
Judges on Decision Making in Domestic Relations Court: An Analysis of Child Support
Awards, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: ECONOMIC AND CUSTODIAL IMPACT ON
CHILDREN AND ADULTS 107, 111 (Craig A. Everett ed., 1991). Judges with low integrity
scores deviated from the 1987 guidelines. See id. at 117.
358. See id. at 114-16.
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factual information which influenced the judges' decisions.359 Only
two factors were found that would predict the judges' awards.
First, there was a significant relationship and agreement between
the judge's decision and the recommendation of a counselor who
was ordered to investigate the divorcing parties and children. In
the 164 cases, sixty percent of the total number had a counselor
recommendation, and seventy-five percent of those judges' decisions
agreed with the counselor's recommendation.36 ° In cases where no
counselor recommendation was obtained, the judge's decision was
significantly predicted by the child's expressed preference to reside
with one parent, which consisted of about fifteen percent of the
cases. '6 Additionally, the study found that a decision which
granted custody to the mother was more likely when the mother
was described by the counselor as having "good" physical appear-
ance, social skills and social adjustment.362 Other predictors used
in determining the mother's fitness included her maturity, the
quality of the mother-child relationship, and whether she had
custody of the children during the initial separation.363
In cases where the father was granted custody, the judge was
influenced by "the father's maturity, his drug abuse history,
whether he kept at least one child [after the separation], post-
divorce living arrangements, and the father's wishes with respect
to the custody decision."3 64  Fathers who co-habitated with a
woman, be it a with a new wife, a girlfriend, or their mother, in the
post-divorce home, had a fifty percent chance of gaining custody.365
Kunin and her colleagues arrived at a decision-making model
which explained seventy-five percent of the cases. The model
suggests that the counselor influences the judge's decision by
highlighting "mother and father factors." The judge also considers
the child's preference, as well as the father-child relationship.366
Figure 2 illustrates their proposed model.
359. See Carla C. Kunin et al., An Archival Study of Decision-Making in Child Custody
Disputes, 48 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 564 (1992).
360. See id. at 567.
361. See id. at 572.
362. See id. at 569.
363. See id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See id. at 570.
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Figure 2
Decision-Making Model for the Resolution
of Child Custody Disputes367
[ Fahr 1eor
Child I
367. Id. at 571.
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In 1981, Carol R. Lowery conducted a study of judicial decision-
making and concluded that each parent's responsibility, maturity
and mental stability influenced the custody outcome.368 Other
scholars used this preliminary study as a springboard for their own
analysis of the criteria judges utilize in making custody awards.36 9
In their study, Reidy, Silver and Carlson distributed questionnaires
to Superior Court judges in California. They found that the child's
wishes were given increased weight in the decision as the child's
age increased. 37' The wishes of a fifteen-year old child had the
greatest impact on judges' decisions (M= 7.33, SD = 1.48 on a 9
point scale, with 9 = extremely important and 1 = not at all
important).3"' A custody investigation report had the second
greatest impact (M = 6.87, SD = 1.63).372 The direct testimony of
the parents was moderately important to the judge (M = 6.60, SD
= 1.79). The testimony of school personnel (M = 5.45, SD = 1.57)
and the testimony of extended family (M = 4.37, SD = 1.57) were
also moderately influential.374 The recommendations of attorneys
(M = 3.94, SD = 1.86) and the testimony of friends (M = 3.92, SD =
1.68) received very little importance.375 The survey ranked the
wishes of a five-year-old child as being the least influential factor
of the available choices (M = 2.82, SD = 1.68).376
Peggy Davis investigated how judges use psychological theory
to inform their decision-making. 7  In this study,378 she focused on
the judicial absorption of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's psychologi-
368. See Carol R. Lowery, Child Custody in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey of Judges, 12
PROF. PSYCHOL. 492 (1981).
369. See Thomas J. Reidy et al., Child Custody Decision: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q.
75, 79 (1989). M stands for the mean and SD stands for the standard deviation.
370. See id.
371. See id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. Other criteria used in the process included: if a parent alienated the child from
the other parent (M = 6.92); if the child had a closer bond with a particular parent (M = 6.72);
which parent was the primary caretaker (M = 6.59); whether a parent had better parenting
skills (M = 6.57); whether one parent was more psychologically stable than the other (M =
6.56); whether a parent was in a homosexual relationship (M = 5.48); whether a parent was
angry and bitter (M = 5.41); which parent was more economically stable (M = 4.28); and
whether a parent was co-habitating while the other had remarried (M = 3.86). See id at 85.
Ranked as being less important or unimportant criteria were: whether one parent remarried
while the other lived alone (M = 3.14); which parent was more socially active (M = 2.61);
placing the child with the same sex parent (M = 2.58); and placing the child with her mother
(M = 2.40). See id.
377. See Davis, supra note 334, at 1539-1604.
378. See id. at 1543.
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cal parent theory which suggests that custody awards in the best
interests of the child should preserve the bond between the child
and the "psychological parent."3 79 After reviewing 179 appellate
cases between 1963 and 1984, she found that courts used the theory
in four ways: "as background for the determination of case-specific,
adjudicative facts[;] ... as legislative facts to support an interpreta-
tion or declaration of a common law rule; to support an interpreta-
tion of a statute; and to determine the reach or definition of a con-
stitutional principle."38 ° She concluded that judges used the theory
"incautiously."381 In sum, judges respond inconsistently and with
a great deal of confusion to the relevance of psychological theories.
One of the earlier studies discussing legal decision-making
which affects children of divorce consists of a ten-year study of
California divorce cases from 1968 to 1977.82 During that period,
California eliminated its fault-based divorce system and later
eliminated its statutory maternal preference when awarding
custody.383 In order to examine the attitudes and opinions of judges
making custody decisions, the researchers interviewed 169
matrimonial attorneys and forty-four Superior Court judges in the
San Francisco and Los Angeles counties between 1974 and 1976. 3
379. GOLDSTEuI ETAL., supra note 8, at 17-20 (describing "the psychological parent-child
relationship").
380. Davis, supra note 334, at 1547.
381. See id. at 1593-94 (emphasis in original).
Courts have frequently accepted the theory on the basis of one-sided
presentations, rendering case-specific results of its acceptance questionable.
Developments in the law based upon psychological parent theories have been
far reaching, yet they too have resulted from one-sided deliberations.
Moreover, -they have resulted from deliberations in which the evolution of law
was denied. In so easily accepting psychological parent theory while
disregarding competing theories and the consequences of doctrinal evolution,
courts have altered common law rules, ignored or transformed statutory
language, given constitutional sanction to significant state incursions upon
family autonomy, and diluted constitutional standards of scrutiny with respect
to rights of biological family autonomy. At the same time, full implementation
of legislated responses to psychological parent theory has been delayed by
judicial rejection or misunderstanding of the theories. The sweeping effects of
the various judicial reactions to this theory raise grave questions about how
judges absorb and evaluate social science theories.
Id.
382. See Lenore J. Weitzman & R.B. Dixon, Child Support Awards: Legal Standards and
Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support, and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 473 (1979).
383. See id. at 475 (describing the elimination by the legislature of fault-based divorce in
1970 and the maternal preference in 1973).
384. See id. at 476-77.
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They also "drew samples of divorce cases [from] three points in
time: 1968, 1972 and 1977. "s85
In 1975, "two years after the presumption favoring the mother
in custody decisions was removed from the law," ninety-eight
percent of the Los Angeles attorneys interviewed said that judges
continued to use a maternal preference when awarding custody of
pre-school children.3 86 One-third of the attorneys suggested that
judges still used the preference when making custody decisions for
older children as well.387 The study also explored factors which led
to fathers receiving custody of pre-school children. Interestingly,
these factors had nothing to do with the father's conduct or living
pattern, but rather were negative "mother factors." 388
Comparing the pre- and post- maternal preference periods,
fathers were no more likely to request custody in 1977 than they
were in 1972.89 On the other hand, of the few fathers who re-
quested physical custody, their success rates increased dramatically
from thirty-five percent being "awarded [custody] in 1968, 37% in
1972, and 63% in 1977."s39
Not as surprising, however, over the years examined in this
study, insignificant changes in which a parent received custody
existed. In both 1972 and 1977, mothers overwhelmingly received
sole physical custody eighty-eight percent to ninety percent of the
cases, respectively.
3 91
One explanation for the enduring maternal preference is that
judges are still following the traditional standard: most judges,
having spent the major portion of their legal careers in an era
in which a mother's special nurturing abilities were unques-
tioned, may still be reluctant to "take little children away from
their mothers." In fact, 81% of the Los Angeles judges we
385. Id. at 476.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 506.
388. Id. at 508 (footnote omitted).
The most frequently mentioned factors [by attorneys interviewed], in rank
order, were: if the mother physically neglects the children (36%), is sexually
promiscuous (33%), is an addict (31%), is mentally unstable (27%), or is an
alcoholic (23%). It is only when we reach the seventh ranked factor, that the
father had a better emotional relationship with the children, mentioned by 10%
of the attorneys, that we reach the father's relationship with the children.
These responses suggest that custody issues are still framed in terms of the
fitness or unfitness of the mother.
Id.
389. See id. at 502-03.
390. Id. at 503.
391. Id.
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interviewed said they thought that there was still a presump-
tion in favor of the mother for preschool children, although most
of them qualified their responses by noting that the presump-
tion was an attitudinal predisposition rather than "the law." 92
These findings were replicated in a 1990 Alabama study before
and after that state's maternal preference rule was abolished.393 In
the time period between 1976 and 1986, they found that the mother
was awarded custody in ninety-one percent of the cases,394 and that
no overall change in the percentage of fathers who either sought or
were granted sole custody existed.395
Similarly, a 1992 study of 1000 California couples who had filed
for divorce in 1984 and 1985 found that mothers received sole
physical custody in two-thirds of the cases, and that fathers
received sole physical custody in less than ten percent of the
cases.39' Researchers did find a dramatic movement toward joint
legal custody, an outcome often suggested by the parties' lawyers. 397
About eighty percent of the sample families had joint legal
custody-presumably shared decision-making in regard to the
child-although the child predominantly lived with the mother. 98
Nonetheless, they found this change toward joint custody largely
symbolic.
The overwhelming majority of mothers still want sole physical
custody of their children, and this is usually the outcome....
Many fathers do not file a conflicting [custody] request in their
legal papers.... And in cases where they do, and the requests
conflict, mothers succeed twice as often as fathers in securing
their preferred outcome. In short, although gender stereotypes
are no longer embedded in the statute books themselves,... the
actual custodial outcomes still reflect profound gender differen-
tiation between parents: the decree typically provides that the
children will live with the mother.399
392. Id. at 504.
393. See Laura E. Santilli & Michael C. Roberts, Custody Decision in Alabama Before and
After the Abolition of the Tender Years Doctrine, 14 LAw & HUM. BERiAV. 123 (1990).
394. Id. at 130.
395. See id. at 130-32.
396. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT MNooIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 112 (1992).
397. See id. at 113-14.
398. See id. at 112-13.
399. Id. at 113-14.
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Court records and parental interviews were used to measure
the level of conflict pertaining to custody and visitation issues.
Only ten percent of the sample experienced a high conflict sit-
uation.400 Fifty percent of the sample had uncontested divorces,40 1
close to thirty percent settled the case prior to intervention by a
third party, and about eleven percent settled after court-ordered
mediation.40 2 Judges decided custody in only one and a half percent
of the approximately 1000 cases examined.40 3
The two variables "most significantly related to legal conflict
were the father's concern over the child's well-being in the mother's
household and the father's hostility toward the mother."40 4
However, mothers continued to secure requested custody twice as
often as fathers in these few high conflict cases.40 5
A surprising finding, which belies the perception that divorce
decrees reflect a trade-off between custody and monetary issues,, is
that there was no evidence that mothers who experienced more
legal conflict had to give up monetary support to win custody.40 6
Contrary to popular belief, custody battles were not being used by
fathers as a bargaining chip to reduce support obligations or alter
the property settlement.4 7
A Utah study of custody decisions from 1970 to 1993 replicates
MacCoby and Mnookin's finding about the low percentage of
contested custody battles.48 While during this twenty-three year
period Utah eliminated the maternal preference, the percentage of
contested custody situations remained relatively stable-parents
contested between ten percent and 14.8% of the custody decisions.40 9
The proportion of fathers requesting custody did not significantly
change in 1993, resting at thirteen percent.410 Nor were fathers
more likely to receive sole custody in 1993 than they were in 1970
(5.5%).411
Among the ten percent of couples who formally disputed
custody, mothers received custody fifty percent of the time, fathers
400. See id. at 137.
401. See id.
402. See id.
403. See id. at 272 (stating that California has a mandatory mediation requirement for
contested custody disputes).
404. Id.
405. See id. at 273.
406. See id. at 160.
407. See id. at 273.
408. See Bahr et al., supra note 31.
409. See id. at 255.
410. See id. at 256.
411. See id.
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received custody twenty-one percent of the time, and the remaining
twenty-nine percent of the cases had joint custody awards.412 The
rise of joint custody awards, 0.9% between 1970-74 and 20.6%
between 1990-93, constituted the major change noted by the re-
searchers.413 A significant increase in more specific visitation sche-
dules was also noted. "In 1970-74 only 9 percent of the decrees had
a partially defined or specific visitation schedule and this increased
to 49 percent by 1990-93.414 The researchers concluded:
Although the removal of the maternal preference was not
followed by an increase in the proportion of fathers who were
awarded sole custody, there was a decrease in the'proportion of
mothers who were awarded sole custody, an increase in joint
legal custody awards, and an increase in specific visitation
schedules. The net result of these changes appears to be
greater opportunities for the involvement of fathers with their
children after divorce.415
In sum, the research on current custody awards indicates that
although the advent of joint and shared custody arrangements has
broadened the range of options available to divorcing parties,
gender differentiation prevails-promulgated by the judiciary,
attorneys and, most importantly, by the parties themselves.
By some estimates, 85% to 90% of children of formerly married
parents reside with their mothers while only 10% live with their
fathers. While joint physical custody arrangements alter these
figures somewhat, children in joint custody are still much more
likely to end up with their mothers than their fathers.
To a great extent, these arrangements reflect prevailing
social realities concerning who cares for children. Despite
recent evidence for enhanced paternal involvement with
offspring (and the popularization of "involved dads"), the
consensus of current research indicates that mothers assume
primary responsibility for domestic labor and child rearing,
even when they also work outside the home. Given that many
mothers assume a disproportionate role in the lives of their
children, it is reasonable that, when custody requires a choice
between mothers and fathers, mothers are more often awarded
physical custody of offspring. Indeed, because the large major-
ity of custody arrangements are privately negotiated by parents
412. See id. at 257.
413. See id. at 256.
414. Id. at 262.
415. Id. at 267.
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and judicially accepted, the predominance of maternal custody
might be viewed as parents' consensual decisions rather than
the outcome of judicial judgments.416
When judges are asked by the parties to make a decision because
the parties cannot agree, it is logical that they continue to focus on
the mother, her fitness for custody and her relationship with the
children, rather than the father.
B. What Don't We Know and How Will This Study Help Fill
Some of Those Gaps
A review of literature indicates that mixed support exists for
the belief that a primary caretaker preference leads to optimum
child placement because either it predicts the better parent or it
preserves the most important relationship/bond between parent and
child.417 Certainly, this is an area where research must be done if
the preference is to gain wide-spread acceptance. It seems just as
important to proponents of the standard that: it facilitates the
custody decision process by having judges focus on concrete
behavior and lay testimony versus expert testimony; it controls or
hampers discretionary judicial decision-making by giving a list of
ten caretaking tasks for the court to evaluate and sum up to find
who provides primary caretaking; and it provides an opportunity for
effective appellate review because the appellate court can judge
whether the trial court properly evaluated the caretaking bench-
marks.41 There is an equal paucity of research to see if the
preference is accomplishing these goals, as well as the optimum
child placement goals.
The West Virginia rule has three "escape valves:" (1) fitness of
the primary caretaking parent; (2) intelligent wishes of a child over
416. Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, 4 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 210,
215-16 (footnotes omitted).
417. See generally Margaret M. v. David M., 385 S.E.2d 912 (emphasizing the importance
of original bond with primary caretaker to child's growth and development); GOLDSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 8 (discussing the psychological parent standard which asserts that children
develop a stronger relationship with the parent who provides day-to-day care); KLAUss &
KENNEL, supra note 11 (supporting the crucial element of the infant-parent bonding tie and
subsequent child-parent bonding). But see BECKER, supra note 28, at 192-201 (suggesting
judicial bias pervades the primary caretaker standard); Schneider, supra note 299, at 287-88
(suggesting that the primary caretaker standard involves judicial decisionmaking that affects
the ultimate decision).
418. See Bruce Ziff, The Primary Caretaker Presumption: Canadian Perspectives on an
American Development, 4 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 186, 199-203 (1990).
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six; and (3) when child care is shared in an entirely equal way.41 9
These escape valves can be used by the parties to gain leverage,
and, thereby, to introduce a level of unpredictability in a custody
battle.420 This is just the leverage that the proponents of the
standard hoped would be deterred by having a predictable result.42'
Parties can raise the ante and increase the litigiousness of a
custody dispute by having the court focus on fitness issues, such as
whether the presumptive primary caretaker had an extra-marital
affair which would bring into question her fitness to be the child's
custodian. Parties can also use the wishes of the child exception to
suggest the child's stated, or unstated custody preference. This
article attempts to answer the question of whether these two
"escape valves" are being used to subvert a predictable award.
The third escape valve is the equal primary caretaker situation.
Garska implies that the "equal parenting exception" to the pre-
sumption will be rare.422 But, in a changing world where it is more
common to find both parents substantially participating in
parenting, is this exception as rare as Garska would have us
believe? For example, do courts find identification of the primary
caretaker easy and clear cut when major nurturing tasks have been
delegated to a non-parent, such as a day-care center, a relative, a
nanny? This study looks at this exception, when it arises, and how
courts resolve that situation.
Possible computation errors can occur if the court uses parent-
hood factors, other than the ten listed in Garska. For example, the
court could look at which parent emotionally supports the child.
The court could also prioritize certain factors. The likelihood of
more errors occurring is thus heightened when the time frame for
examining the ten factors is uncertain. Courts may differ with
regard to when to look and the length of time to look.
Finally, what happens when the court finds that different
parents are primary caretakers to different children in the same
family, or when an older child chooses to live with the non-primary
caretaking parent? Is it predictable that the court will split the
children up? This research will approach these types of questions
and will try to address the concerns they may place on the courts
and the persons involved.
419. See id.
420. See id. at 199-200.
421. See id. at 198.
422. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. Research Questions and Hypotheses
Quantitative Research Questions:
1. How do West Virginia trial and appellate courts use the
primary caretaker standard and its ten criteria to determine
custody?
HYPOTHESIS 1: In 100% of the forty-nine cases in the
sample, the court will consider all ten Garska factors to
determine which parent is the primary caretaker.
RATIONALE: To make a determination of who is the
primary caretaker, trial courts should receive, and
appellate courts should review, evidence on all ten
Garska factors of primary caretaking.
a. Which factors are being considered and, looking at the
sample as a whole, to what degree?
HYPOTHESIS la: The frequency of use for each factor,
looking at all forty-nine cases, will be 100%.
RATIONALE: Each factor should be considered in
each case. All factors should be considered to an
equal degree, as all ten tasks would be provided by at
least one of the parents or a substitute caregiver to
each child.
b. Are other factors, not in the list often, being consid-
ered?
HYPOTHESIS 1b: Zero percent of the cases will use
additional factors.
RATIONALE: No other factors should be considered
as the list was intended to be exclusive and exhaus-
tive for the court's inquiry.
c. Have the courts' considerations of the factors changed
over time?
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HYPOTHESIS 1c: There will be no variation in the
frequencies, showing in how many cases a factor is consid-
ered, when the cases are divided into three time periods
(1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95).
RATIONALE: The factors should be considered
consistently over time, each factor being considered by
the court in each case. Thus, the frequencies should
continue to be 100%.
d. Are there any differences in the courts' uses of the
factors when the cases are divided into four categories-
cases where the primary caretaker is unfit, both parents
are unfit, both parents are equal primary caretakers, and
where a child under fourteen states a preference?
HYPOTHESIS 1d: There should be no variation in the
frequency that each factor is considered when cases are
divided by topic. Each frequency should remain at 100%.
RATIONALE: There should be no difference in the
courts' original determinations of who is the primary
caretaker. All ten factors should be summed first.
Only after a court finds which parent is the primary
caretaker, or finds that the parents share caretaking
in an entirely equal way, does the court look at
fitness, the child's best interests, or the child's prefer-
ence.
Qualitative Research Questions:
2. Are there any predisposing factual situations that appear
to alter the courts' routine determinations of the primary
caretaker?
HYPOTHESIS 2: The standard does not anticipate that
there are any unique situations that merit a different
application or avoidance of the standard. However, situa-
tions exist which were not anticipated, where judges would
struggle with applying the standard-the hard case.
3. Are there additional factors which would help explain any
variances in the outcome (i.e., the age of the child, the child's
preference, sibling relationships, the time period looked at to
determine the parental status as primary caretaker)?
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HYPOTHESIS 3: Again, the standard does not anticipate the
impact of additional facts or factors, but there are likely to be
additional considerations as the courts strive to bring individu-
alized justice to each case.
B. Theoretical Framework for This Study
1. Weber's "The Ideal Type" '23 as a Framework for
Comparison
Max Weber's favorite methodological device, "the ideal type,"
is used to analyze the judicial opinions which employ the primary
caretaker presumption."2 ' Weber understood law to be made accord-
ing to either formal or substantive criteria. Formal criteria are
those which are intrinsic to the legal system--"procedural" rules
that mandate procedure for the courts and litigants to follow, as
well as "substantive" legal rules which proscribe how a court must
decide a case given a certain set of facts."2" The law is made by
substantive criteria (not to be confused with substantive law) when
the law turns outside of the legal system for the rules it applies; for
example, when it uses a religious code to decide a case."26
Weber also classified law-making as either being rational or
irrational."27 Law-making is rational if it leads to predictable out-
comes because the judge follows a routine of formal and substantive
norms to reach the decision. In other words, like cases are decided
the same. Law-making is irrational when the outcomes are not
predictable."28
The following classification scheme diagrams the relationship
between formal/substantive and rational/irrational law-making.
423. See LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 314, at 3 (referring to MAX WEBER, THE
METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edward Shils & Henry Fitch eds. and trans., Free
Press 1949).
424. See id.
425. See id. at 9.
426. See id.
427. See id.
428. See id.
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Table 1
The Typology of Legal Systems Classified by Formality and
Rationality of Decison-making Process429
Degree of Degree of Generality of Legal Norms
Differentiation
of Legal Norms High Low
High Logically formal rationality Formal
irrationality
Low Substantive rationality Substantive
irrationality
Lempert and Sanders explain:
A formally irrational procedure exists insofar as a process
prescribed by the legal order yields results that do not seek to
analyze the meaning of events and are unconstrained by reason
. . . Substantive irrationality exists when lawmakers and
finders do not resort to some dominant set of general norms but,
instead, act arbitrarily or decide upon the basis of an emotional
evaluation of the particular case.... Substantive rationality
exists when lawmakers and finders follow a consistent set of
principles derived from some source other than the legal
system. These may be religious, economic, or, God forbid,
sociological.... Formal rationality could, for Weber, be of two
types. The first, extrinsic rationality, exists when decisions turn
upon perceptible external characteristics that have been made
consequential by the legal system. For example, a case might
depend on whether certain formal words were uttered or
whether a seal was attached to a document. The second,
logically formal rationality, exists when behavior is evaluated
by reference to a theoretically gapless set of legal norms.
Logical reasoning allows one, in principle, to determine the
implications of the legal norms for any particular behavior.430
429. Id. (quoting David Trubek, Max Weber on the Law and the Rise of Capitalsm, 1972
Wis. L. REV. 720, 279).
430. Id. at 10.
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Custody law can be classified into the following framework:
Table 2
The Typology of Custody Law Classified by Formality and
Rationality of Decison-Making Process
Source of the Method For Law-Making
Legal Norms
Involved Rationality Irrationality
Formal Primary Caretaker
Determination Which Ad Hoc Primary
Follows Guidelines Caretaker
Analysis
Tender Year Presumption
Substantive Best Interests Determination
Which Follows Guidelines
and Uses Expert Opinion Ad Hoc Best
Interests
Irrebuttable Presumption that Analysis
Fathers Have a Natural Right
to Custody
Primary caretaker decision-making is formal-rational when it
follows Neely's advice to, in essence, total the ten parenting tasks
to determine which parent is the primary caretaker.43' Then, the
formal-rational process mandates that the judge determine whether
the primary caretaker is fit. The choice of the fit primary caretaker
is predictable where judges adhere to this "ideal type."
Primary caretaker decision-making is formal-irrational in those
instances when the judge uses factors of her own, outside of the ten
Garska factors,432 to determine primary caretaking, or where the
judge expands the "escape valves" and refuses to apply the pre-
sumption. She could do this for several reasons, such as unfitness,
sibling concerns, the sexual activity of the parent, and a child's
preference. It is in those instances when the decision against the
primary caretaker is more unpredictable.
431. See Neely, supra note 27, at 180.
432. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
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The traditional presumption that fathers have a natural right
to custody is substantive and rational.433 The natural law presump-
tion rests in part on the theocratic belief that a father is the
ordained head of the family.434 The result is then predictable
because it relies on a deontological principle that is consequently
religious in nature. 435 In contrast, the tender years doctrine436 is
formal-rational because the legal system presumes that children
need their mothers when they are young for nurturing and
socialization.
Best interests of the child decision-making is substantive-
rational when it relies on both expert testimony, as to what is in the
child's best interests, and a set of psychological factors to determine
the optimum parent-child relationship. This form of decision-
making becomes irrational when the judge attempts to form an ad
hoc psychological judgment about which parent is better.
Once we have the Weberian model437 for understanding the
different standards of custody law-making, we can formulate the
primary caretaker presumption "ideal type" as formal-rational
decision-making. Next, we can compare this "ideal type" with the
actual primary caretaker custody decisions to see if they are achiev-
ing the formal-rational goals. Because the ideal type is a perfect,
generalized, and thus unreal, example, it becomes "[an analytical
1438yardstick against which we might measure actual actions ....
This theoretical tool provides a frame of reference from which
to analyze a situation, helps the researcher identify and order the
empirical problem under investigation and to identify the dynamics
433. See LEMPHART & SANDERS, supra note 314, at 10 (explaining that substantive
rationality exists when lawmakers and finders of fact follow a consistent set of principles
derived from some source other than the legal system).
434. See Wilcox, supra note 43, at 920.
435. See LEMPHART & SANDERS, supra note 314, at 9 (explaining that substantive
rationality "yields outcomes that are predictable from the facts of the case... [t]hese may
be religious, economic, or .... sociological").
436. See SHIRLEY WOHLKRAN & NEIL A. FRANK, THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY: DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 19 (1982) ("[tlhe rule of law that envisioned the mother as
the preferred parent in most custody disputes . . . ."); see also Neely, supra note 27, at 175
(referring to the tender years as being children under six years of age).
437. See LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 314, at 3. Weber used "ideal types" to assist
research. An "ideal type" is a constructed paragon against which reality can be compared:
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete more or less present
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged
according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoint into a unified analytical
construct.
See id. (quoting MAX WEBER, THE METIJODOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (1949)).
438. Id.
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of how a system operates, and serves as a standard against which
given patterns of action can be measured. Justice Neely has sup-
plied the "ideal type" for custody decision-making using the primary
caretaker standard.439
In the best possible circumstances in West Virginia, a judge
should elicit evidence on all ten indicators of primary caretaking.44
Next, the judge should also consider whether the primary caretaker
was fit according to five requirements: "(1) [did she] feed and clothe
the child appropriately; (2) [did she] adequately supervise the child
and protect him or her from harm; (3) [did she] provide habitable
housing; (4) [did she] avoid extreme discipline, child abuse, and
other similar vices; and (5) [did she] refrain from grossly immoral
behavior under circumstances that would affect the child."441 The
child's preference would be considered only if the child was over the
age of six and only if intelligently made.442 Taken one step further,
the primary caretaker standard ideal type leads to rational,
concrete decision-making, uninfluenced by outside factors or the
judge's bias. The following figure is a representation of the primary
caretaker decision ideal type:
439. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
440. See id. (listing the ten factors used in the decision).
441. Neely, supra note 27, at 181.
442. See id. at 175, 182.
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Figure 3
Webster's Ideal Type: Primary Caretaker Decision-Making
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2. Content and Map Analysis-Looking for Trends in
Decision-Making
"Content analysis is any technique... for making inferences...
by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteris-
tics of messages."443 It is a process which involves analyzing data
as "symbolic entities,"' and it is appropriate when the investiga-
tor's data are limited to documentary evidence, as it is here." 5 It is
an unobtrusive measure which permits the researcher to audit
communication content against a standard." 6 In this study, the
court's primary caretaking decision-making process was monitored
against the original ten factors proposed by Garska and the process
mandated by Justice Neely."" Using content analysis, the re-
searcher could make inferences about the antecedents of communi-
cation, the encoding process, and the effect of the communication.
Content analysis permitted the researcher to ask: are there any
patterns of decision-making based on the facts of the case or
predisposing factors; what will be the future impact of the court's
use of the primary caretaker presumption; and does West Virginia's
use of the primary caretaker presumption further the accomplish-
ment of any of the stated goals? Ole Holsti claims that, "[qluali-
tative content analysis, which has sometimes been defined as the
drawing of inferences on the basis of appearance or nonappearance
of attributes in messages, has been defended most often, though not
solely, for its superior performances in problems of applied social
sciences.""8 Recursive qualitative context analysis was appropriate
for this study as: "[tihis form of qualitative content analysis puts
the researcher back into the research process, places emphasis on
critical reflection, and rejects the linear, hypothetico-deductive
model of positivistic research; it substitutes in its place a herme-
neutic spiral of growing awareness."449
443. OLE R. HOISTI, CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 25
(1969).
444. KLAUS KRIPPENDORF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY
10 (1980).
445. See HOLSTI, supra note 443, at 15.
446. See KRIPPENDORF, supra note 444, at 29.
447. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
448. HOLSTI, supra note 443, at 10.
449. Bryan Pfaffenberger, Microcomputer Applications in Qualitative Research, 14 SAGE
U. PAPER SERIES ON QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 9, 60 (1988) (citing K. Lindkvist,
Approaches to Textual Analysis, in ADVANCES IN CONTENT ANALYSIS (K.E. Rosengren ed.,
1981)).
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Lawyers are taught this type of analysis, which searches for
meaning and relevance in judicial opinions beyond the judge's
express words. To understand how to analyze the cases as both a
researcher and a lawyer, one must first understand what a judge
does. To resolve an issue which has been presented to a court, the
judge must identify the rule to be applied, identify the key facts
which fit within the rule and explain expressly or, more often,
implicitly how the contention must be resolved. The lawyer's job is
to identify the express and implied logical connections between the
factual evidence and the conclusion (the holding) that the court
reaches. "Much of what a qualitative researcher seeks to grasp
"goes without saying". . .,and it has to be 'uncovered by paying
attention to the tacit dimension of social life-what the philosopher
Alfred Schutz calls the common-sense, taken-for-granted world of
everyday reality."45 ° To do this, the lawyer reads, highlights and
rewrites the opinion, or briefs the opinion. She puts herself in the
judge's shoes and asks why would she reach the same result as the
judge and how would her result differ from the judge's, given the
facts and the standard? Rewriting allows the researcher to add "the
culturally provided, contextual knowledge"45' that may be missing
from the judge's statements.
Next, the factual information from each case was coded by
attaching categories to similar facts. In particular, the ten primary
caretaker factors were isolated for analysis. Then, analytic induc-
tion was used on the coded information---"all similarly coded instan-
ces of a category are examined together to determine which features
of social behavior are always present when the coded phenomenon
is present."52 That is, the texts of similarly coded cases where the
judges applied the primary caretaker standard were examined and
a determination was made as to what factors and facts were being
considered when the judges applied the standard. In particular, the
following questions were repetitively asked: are there any outside
behaviors or influences operating which interfered with the judges'
use of the standard; did they affect the outcomes; are the results
similar; and why or why not?
These comparisons were rewritten multiple times, continually
reexamining the cases until trends or patterns appeared.
[Ilt is a basic canon of qualitative data analysis that the
meaningful patterns in the data emerge only after a deliberate
450. Id. at 56 (citation omitted).
451. Id. at 26.
452. Id. at 29 (emphasis in original).
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(and human) confrontation with the data, in which the text is
read, reread, and most importantly of all, rewritten. The
rewriting process, in which the. researcher reorganizes the
material and amplifies it from memory, is crucial to the quality
of the analysis.453
Map analysis was also used to visualize the relationships between
the concepts and the patterns of decision-making. In sum, the
research design includes an impressionistic, exploratory survey of
the caselaw in West Virginia.
The research goal aims to illuminate the primary caretaker
standard through description, not to test hypotheses. The hypothe-
ses only provided the "ideal types" for data comparison and guided
the content analysis of the cases. Additionally, "instead of seeking
facts to prove or disprove an hypothesis, [a researcher is] simply
recording details, each in itself too insignificant for [her] to be able
to see-and thereby be biased by-its meaning. Only when [she]
has all the facts can [she] see which are emphasized most, which
least; only when all the facts are in can [she] see what is not
there."4
54
Krippendorff created a pictorial representation of the frame-
work which is shown by Figure 4.455
[This representation] suggests that data become dissociated
from their source or from their surrounding conditions and are
communicated one way to the analyst. The analyst places these
data in a context that he constructs based on his knowledge of
the surrounding conditions of the data including what he wishes
to know about the target of the content analysis. Knowledge
about the stable dependencies within the system of interest are
formulated as analytical constructs which allow him to make
inferences that are sensitive to the context of the data. Content
analysis results must represent some feature of reality and the
nature of this representation must be verifiable in principle.456
453. Id. at 41.
454. THOMAS F. CARNEY, CONTENT ANALYSIS: A TECHNIQUE FOR SYSTEMATIC INFERENCE
FROM COMMUNICATIONS 17 (1972).
455. See KRIPPENDORFF, supra note 444, at 28.
456. Id.
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Figure 4
The Framework for Content Analysis
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INFERENCES
2 ANALYTICAL
CONSTRUCTS
In content analysis, at least three interpretive moments exist: first,
when variables or categories are chosen; second, when statistical
procedures are applied; and third, when themes are derived and
inferences made so as to create a causal explanation for the data.457
Figure 5 illustrates the process of content analysis.
457. See CARNEY, supra note 454, at 42, 44 (explaining that different decisions regarding
these steps result in varying research designs and therefore different findings).
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Figure 5
The Process of Content Analysis
3. Limitations of the Sample and, Hence, the Study
First, the sample was limited to the period after the adoption
of the primary caretaker standard. It excludes cases decided under
West Virginia's maternal preference standard or the one year
period when courts used the best interests of the child standard
without a presumption, prior to the primary caretaker standard's
adoption in 1981. Thus, the study does not directly compare the
content and decision-making criteria of custody appeals before and
after the standard. The study does, however, cursorily look at
whether the presumption's use has reduced litigation inherent in
the indeterminate best interests analysis-one of the policy goals
behind the presumption.
Second, the sample is limited to case appeals taken to the
Supreme Court of West Virginia. Confined to appellate cases, the
sample is not representative of all custody cases, merely those
appealed. Decisions of appellate cases are not likely to be represen-
tative of either those cases which were negotiated prior to trial, or
those which were litigated at the trial level, but never appealed.
The study does not test how lower courts used the presumption
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"properly" to reach a "right" and non-arguable/non-appealable
result. Given that trial court cases are unreported (not published)
and that they are generally not written down at all, except for the
bottom-line result as to which party receives custody, (not why a
party receives custody), this research is currently impossible. A
review of trial transcripts would not be of much use either because
the judge may ignore or refuse to consider evidence, even though it
is presented by the parties.
So we are back to the need to use appellate decisions as a
written record of what the court is doing, and there are only a few
of these decisions. Why? Appeals are costly in West Virginia, as in
all states: $2000-$3000 in 1991.458 They also take time, usually a
year to a year-and-a-half after the trial court's entry of a custody
award.45 9 Appeals are usually only pursued when a glaring error
exists,46 ° and in West Virginia, divorce custody cases can only be
reversed on appeal where the trial court abused its discretion in
evaluating facts and reaching factual conclusions, or was clearly
erroneous in making a custody award which was contrary to the
evidence presented.46'
Because the study only focused on appellate cases, it only looks
at those cases where arguably a mistake was made by the lower
court when applying the law. Appellate cases provide us with a
skewed vision of how trial courts are using the primary custody
standard because generally a case would not be appealed unless
there was a viable argument that the trial court erred in applying
the law. However, appellate cases are useful to see how the
standard is being used by the judges who drafted it. Justice Neely,
the drafter of the Garska decision, has served on the West Virginia
Supreme Court during the entire time period on which this study
focuses. Thus, the study can show how the standard has evolved
over time.
Another problem with the limited sample is that it probably
over-predicts any finding that the standard is being used uniformly
by the court. Because the study only focuses on one court, the West
Virginia Supreme Court, and because there are five judges on that
court at one time, only a limited number of drafters of opinions
exists. Thus, eight authors drafted the appellate decisions over the
sample period of time. Justices Neeley and McHugh remained on
458. See Becker, supra note 28, at 198.
459. See id.
460. See id.
461. See, e.g., Marcum v. Marcum, 395 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1990) (describing amount of
deference given to a lower court's decision about which parent is the primary caretaker).
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the bench for the entire sample period. The other three justices
were gradually replaced, one at a time-Justice Brotherton
replaced Justice Harshbarger in 1985; Justice Workman replaced
Justice McGraw in 1989; and Justice Cleckley replaced Justice
Miller in 1994.462 The reliability of the same person reaching the
same result for the same reasons is higher than the reliability of
different people from different courts reaching the same result. It
would be less likely that different trial courts and judges would
apply the primary caretaker factors in the same way when they are
faced with the same circumstances. On the other hand, when
inconsistencies in appellate decision-making exist, it would be
reasonable to assume that different lower courts would be equally,
if not more, inconsistent.
The sample allows an evaluation of when the Justices on the
West Virginia Supreme Court agree to the application of the
primary custody standard. When they do not agree on the stan-
dard, a dissent is filed, and it is apparent why the justices dis-
agreed. These decisions also illustrate what evidence the trial court
reviewed, and, consequently, what factors the trial court considered
or should have considered. An appellate decision shows how the
law is to be applied to a particular situation, and what evidence
should be considered important to the trial court, if it were to apply
the standard correctly. Finally, appellate decisions give insight as
to the situations in which the trial courts are struggling the most
when reaching a decision using the primary caretaker standard.
V. RESEARCH FINDINGS
A. Quantitative Findings and Discussion
A content analysis of the forty-nine primary caretaking custody
cases since Garska reveals that none of the decisions included
consideration of all ten of the Garska factors in the custody
determination.463 Further, none of the decisions considered even
nine factors in the custody determination.4 Rather, in 42.9% of
the decisions (a = 21), the court considered no factors at all in the
462. See infra Part V.C.2. for a further discussion of this topic; see also infra Table 9 for
the number of appeals filed on a yearly basis between 1978 and 1995.
463. See generally Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making:
How Judges Use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination (1997)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University) (on file with the Case
Western Reserve University Library).
464. See id.
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custody decision."' In sum, the West Virginia Supreme Court has
only sporadically inquired about primary caretaker information.
The parent's planning and preparation of meals (factor one) is
the factor most often looked at by the Court-nineteen of the forty-
nine cases (38.8%) considered this factor.4 6 The parent's willing-
ness to arrange medical care, including nursing and trips to
physicians (factor four), and alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-
care, etc. (factor six), were discussed in 30.6% (n = 15) of the
cases.467 The Court routinely considered: factor three (purchasing,
cleaning and care of clothes) in 28.6% of the cases (A = 14); factor
seven (putting the child to bed at night, waking the child in the
morning) in 26.5% of the cases (n = 13); and factor eight (disciplin-
ing the child, such as teaching general manners and toilet training)
in 22.4 % of the cases (n = 11).468
Interestingly, over thirty percent of the cases in the sample
discussed other factors in addition to the ten Garska factors when
determining which parent was the primary caretaker.469 In sum,
the research rejected the hypothesis that the court would use all of
the factors, all of the time, when reaching a custody decision, as
Garska envisioned.4 v0
465. See infra Table 4. See, e.g., Channell v. Channell, 432 S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1993)
(illustrating a case in which the court found both parents shared caretaking responsibilities
but did not discuss any of the Garska factors).
466. See infra Table 3.
467. See id.
468. See id.
469. See, e.g., Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992) (using other factors, such as
the amount of time a parent spends with the child during the day). See also T.S.K v. KB.K,
371 S.E.2d 362, 366 (W. Va. 1988) (using evidence of greater emotional attachment to one
parent as another factor in the primary caretaker standard analysis).
470. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981). But see Shearer v. Shearer,
448 S.E.2d 166, 169 (W. Va. 1994) (explaining that all ten of the Garska factors are not
applicable in every case because the specific primary caretaker factors vary with age and
maturity of the child).
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Table 3
PERCENTAGES AND FREQUENCIES OF PRIMARY CARETAKER
FACTOR CONSIDERATION
FACTORS IL % (n)
PREPARE MEALS 38.8 (19)
BATHE, DREss 32.7 (16)
BuY CLOTHES 28.6 (14)
ARRANGE MEDICAL CARE 30.6 (15)
ARRANGE SOCIAL
INTERACTION 8.2 (4)
ARRANGE CHILD CARE 30.6 (15)
PUT TO BED 26.5 (13)
DISCIPLINE 22.4 (11)
TRAIN IN RELIGION 10.2 (5)
EDUCATE 10.2 (6)
OTHER VARIABLE 32.7 (16)
Note: Each cell gives the percentage of cases in which the court used a
factor to determine custody. The frequency is in parentheses. A Chi-
Square comparison of actual and expected frequencies showed a non-
significant difference between the frequencies reported by Coder One
and Coder Two.
n = 49; X' = 6.34, df= 9 (a = number of cases in the sample; x2 =
Chi Square; df = degree of freedom).
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Table 4
PERCENTAGES OF CASES USING ONE OR MORE PRIMARY
CARETAKER FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHICH PARENT IS THE
PRIMARY CARETAKER
NUMBER OF
FACTORS USED % (n)
ZERO 42.9 (21)
ONE 8.2 (4)
Two 14.3 (7)
TmEE 0 (0)
FoUR 6.1 (3)
FIVE 6.1 (3)
SIx 12.2 (6)
SEVEN 6.1 (3)
EIGHT 4.1 (2)
NINE 0 (0)
TEN 0 (0)
Note: Each cell gives the percentage of cases in which the court used
that number of factors to determine custody. The frequency is in
parentheses.
n = 49 (n= number of cases in the sample).
The research suggests that the trial courts are not specifically
discussing the ten Garska factors either. If they were, the West
Virginia Supreme Court's opinions which were analyzed by the
study would discuss those facts relevant to each factor. It is pos-
sible the trial courts gathered facts on each of the ten factors, but
then the West Virginia Supreme Court ignored those factors when
it wrote its opinions. Either way, the lack of a written discussion
of one factor does not automatically mean that a factor was not
included in the court's deliberation process. The court simply could
not be mentioning all of the facts in the written decision that are
relevant to which parent provided the primary care for the child.
Assuming that the trial court is not gathering information on
the caretaking duties, and which parent provided each duty, then
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the trial court is violating the supreme court's original mandate
that trial judges make specific factual findings about the ten factors
in their custody decisions.4 71 This assumption is well-founded as,
in general, the West Virginia Supreme Court tends to give what
appears to be a rather complete factual summary of the case, con-
taining all of the facts that the lower court proceeding developed.472
Moreover, the West Virginia Supreme Court has not remanded
cases for failing to discuss all of the Garska factors. Rather, if some
of the factors are being discussed, the court seems to be comfortable
in assessing a primary caretaker award without all of the factual
information. Arguably, the designated decision-making process, a
summary of all ten factors to determine who is the primary
caretaker and then a determination of whether the primary
caretaker is fit, is not being followed by either the trial courts or
the West Virginia Supreme Court. 73
Perhaps the lack of information about each caretaking duty is
due to the parties' failures to present evidence establishing which
parent provides the duty. It is difficult to understand why parties
would be unable to present evidence on each and every factor. I
speculate that at the trial court level, parties do present such
evidence. However, that evidence is not finding its way into the
trial court decision. It is clear that a primary caretaker custody
award can be deliberated, decided and appealed without factual
information on each of the ten points.474
The research also inquires as to whether the West Virginia
Supreme Court's consideration of the ten Garska factors has chang-
ed over time. The lower courts have been consistently reluctant to
make factual findings on each of the ten primary caretaker factors
over the three time periods.475
471. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
472. See, e.g., S. v. S., 435 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993) (demonstrating a lengthy factual sum-
mary of a lower court's records).
473. See, e.g., S.v.S., 408 S.E.2d 46 (illustrating a case in which the court discussed only
the fitness standard and remanded to the lower court for further fact finding as to who was
the primary caretaker, thereby indicating that the trial court never addressed this question
either).
474. See Burger v. Burger, 345 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1986); Allen v. Allen, 320 S.E.2d 112 (W.
Va. 1984) (illustrating two cases in which the Supreme Court of West Virginia criticized the
lower court for not conducting its fact finding task).
475. See infra Table 5 (showing the percentages of primary caretaker factor consideration
over the time periods).
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Table 5
PERCENTAGES AND FREQUENCIES OF PRIMARY CARETAKER
FACTOR CONSIDERATION OVER THREE TIME PERIODS
FACTORS 1981-85a 1 9 8 6 _9 0 b 1991-95'
% (n) % _n % (In
PREPARE MEALS 42.9 (6) 30.8 (4) 40.9 (9)
BATHE, DRESS 50.0 (7) 23.1 (3) 27.3 (6)
Buy CLOTHES 21.4 (3) 30.8 (4) 31.8 (7)
ARRANGE MEDICAL 35.7 (5) 30.8 (4) 27.3 (6)
CARE
ARRANGE SOCIAL 0 (0) 0 (0) 18.2 (4)
INTERACTION
ARRANGE CHILD CARE 28.6 (4) 30.8 (4) 31.8 (7)
PUT TO BED 35.7 (5) 15.4 (2) 27.3 (6)
DISCIPLINE 28.6 (4) 15.4 (2) 22.7 (5)
TRAIN IN RELIGION 14.3 (2) 7.7 (1) 9.1 (2)
EDUCATE 7.1 (1) 15.4 (2) 13.6 (3)
OTHERVARIABLE 42.9 (6) 23.1 (3) 31.8 (7)
Note: Each cell gives the percentage of cases in which the court used a factor to
determine custody. The frequency is in parentheses.
na = 14, nb = 13, nc = 22 (n = number of cases in the sample).
The raw numbers indicate that some variation exists in the
West Virginia Supreme Court's consideration of factors, albeit an
insignificant variation. For example, only in the last time period,
1991-1995, has the court specifically discussed a parent's ability to
arrange social interaction among peers after school, such as
transportation to friends' houses or transportation to girl and boy
scout meetings (factor five).4 76 A decreased concern also exists over
who bathes and dresses the child (factor two). Whereas fifty
percent of the cases were interested in factor two between 1981-
476. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 433 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1993) (giving a lengthy
description of how the mother primarily arranged the children's social activities).
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1985, only twenty-three percent and twenty-seven percent of the
cases were interested in this factor between 1986-1990 and 1991-
1995, respectively.477
Table 6 reports the percentage of cases which employed one or
more factors to determine custody, while also comparing the three
five year time periods.
477. Compare Heck v. Heck, 301 S.E.2d 158 (W. Va. 1982) with S.v.S., 408 S.E.2d 46 (W.
Va. 1991) (illustrating the decrease in the court's consideration of factor two. The earlier
case places emphasis on who bathes the child, whereas the later case, despite an extensive
consideration of the ten Garska factors, does not discuss factor two at all).
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Table 6
PERCENTAGES OF CASES USING ONE OR MORE FACTORS TO
DETERMINE CUSTODY OVER THREE TIME PERIODS
NUMBER OF 1981-85a 1 9 8 6 _9 0b 1991-95c
FACTORS USED % () % () % (a)
ZERO 35.7 (5) 53.8 (7) 40.9 (9)
ONE 7.1 (1) 15.4 (2) 4.5 (1)
Two 21.4 (3) 0 (0) 18.2 (4)
THREE 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
FOUR 0 (0) 0 (0) 13.6 (3)
FIVE 14.3 (2) 7.7 (1) 0 (0)
Six 14.3 (2) 15.4 (2) 9.1 (2)
SEVEN 0 (0) 7.7 (1) 9.1 (2)
EIGHT 7.1 (1) 0 (0) 4.5 (1)
NINE 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
TEN 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Note: A Chi-Square test comparing actual and expected frequencies over the three
time periods and for each of the coders revealed no significant changes over time
in the number of factors used by the court. Each cell gives the percentage of cases
in which the court used that number of factors to determine custody. The
frequency is in parentheses.
n' = 14, nb = 13, nC = 22 (n = number of cases in the sample).
Thirty-five percent of the cases from 1981 to 1995 never looked
at any of the factors.47 An even higher'percentage of cases (53.8%)
478. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Dempsey, 306 S.E.2d 230 (W. Va. 1983) (illustrating an early
case in which the court does not discuss any of the factors).
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failed to look at any factors between 1986 and 1990. 4 7 9  That
percentage dropped to 40.9% from 1991 to 1995.480
The West Virginia Supreme Court, and the trial courts at the
lower level who are developing the record,48 either consider just a
few factors or none at all, or they consider up to five or six factors.
Once parties start developing evidence on primary caretaking, that
evidence tends to be more complete. As reflected in Table 6, the
majority of the cases do not develop evidence on primary caretaking
at all, or at least that evidence is not being reported, and therefore,
not considered by the West Virginia Supreme Court.
The final question of the quantitative portion of this study is
whether any differences existed in the West Virginia Supreme
Court's use of factors when the cases were divided into four
categories: cases where the primary caretaker is unfit; cases where
both parents are unfit; cases where both parents are equal care-
takers (they share caretaking in an equivalent manner such that
the trial court is unable to determine who is the primary caretaker)
or neither parent is the primary caretaker (there is a substitute pri-
mary caregiver, such as a grandparent or a nanny); and cases
where a child under the age of fourteen expresses a preference to
live with one parent.482
Comparing the court's consideration of the ten Garska factors
by these types of custody cases, some differences can be seen.
479. See, e.g., Issacs v. Issacs, 358 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1987) (illustrating a case from the
middle period of the study in which the court did not use any of the primary caretaker
factors).
480. See, e.g., Feaster v. Feaster, 452 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1994) (illustrating a case from
the last period of the study in which the court does not discuss any factors).
481. A trial court record is a transcript of the testimony produced at the trial or hearing.
It also includes motions and written arguments filed by the attorneys. Any comments made
by the judge in the hearing are also recorded and become a part of the record. The transcript
is then attached to a brief which argues why an appeal should be granted. At the appellate
level, the court uses the record to familiarize itself with the case. Generally, during an
appeal, there is no opportunity to call witnesses or develop additional facts. Nor is there an
opportunity to test the credibility of the witnesses. Therefore, the appellate court gives great
deference to the trial court's findings of fact.
482. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 415 S.E.2d 276 (W. Va. 1992) (finding primary
caretaker to be unfit); M.v.M., 453 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1994) (finding neither parent to be the
primary caretaker); Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that both parents
are equal caregivers); Rose v. Rose, 340 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1985) (considering the child's
explicitly stated preference). There were eighteen cases in the sample where the primary
caretaker was alleged to be unfit. There were two cases where both parents were alleged to
be unfit, seventeen cases where either both parents were equal caretakers, or neither parent
was found to be the primary caretaker, and five cases where a child under the age of fourteen
stated a preference. See also Shearer v. Shearer, 448 S.E.2d 166, 169 (W. Va. 1994) (explain-
ing that all ten of the Garska factors are not applicable in every case because the specific
primary caretaker factors vary with age and the maturity of the child).
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Notably, for the cases in which the parents either shared
caretaking or the parents were not functioning as primary caretak-
ers at all, 58.8% of the cases 'considered many of the primary
caretaker variables.483 When the court found the caretaker to be
unfit, the court appears to have made this determination without
considering the primary caretaker factors at all,4 ' even though the
designated decision-making process for custody determinations
mandates the finding of which parent is the primary caretaker, and
then the determination of whether that caretaker is fit.
Ideally, under the Garska standard, the trial court should look
at the primary caretaker factors first, and then at the parent's
fitness."' Maybe this phenomenon is occurring, but since there is
little or no data showing that two-step deliberation, it is unlikely
that this process is being followed. The statistics do reveal that at
least at the West Virginia Supreme Court level, parental unfitness,
not primary caretaking, is the focus for the cases where the parent
was alleged unfit. In the very small sample in which the court
reviewed allegations that both parents were unfit (n = 2), the court
considered none of the primary caretaker factors.486
Table 7 reports the percentages and frequencies of the primary
caretaker factors considered by the West Virginia Supreme Court,
broken down into four classifications.487 Table 8 reports the
percentages of cases using one or more variables to determine
custody, divided by the four types of cases.488
483. See Mercer, supra note 463, at 216.
484. See infra Table 8; see also Mills v. Gorrick, 381 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1983).
485. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
486. See Boarman v. Boatman, 459 S.E.2d 395 (W. Va. 1995); Dottie S. v. Christopher S.,
408 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1991).
487. See infra Table 7; see also Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
488. See infra Table 8.
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Table 7
PERCENTAGES AND FREQUENCIES OF PRIMARY CARETAKER
FACTOR CONSIDERATION
BY FOUR TYPES OF CUSTODY CASES
FACTORS Grpl" Grp2b Grp3c Grp4d% (n) % (n) % (n) I
PREPARE MEALS 16.7 (3) 0 (0) 58.8 (10) 60.0 (3)
BATHE, DREss 16.7 (3) 0 (0) 52.9 (9) 40.0 (2)
BuY CLOTHES 11.1 (2) 0 (0) 52.9 (9) 40.0 (2)
ARRANGE 11.1 (2) 0 (0) 58.8 (10) 40.0 (2)
MEDICAL CARE
ARRANGE SOCIAL 0 (0) 0 (0) 5.9 (1) 40.0 (2)
INTERACTION
ARRANGE CHILD 16.7 (3) 0 (0) 47.1 (8) 60.0 (3)
CARE
PUTTO BED 5.6 (1) 0 (0) 41.2 (7) 60.0 (3)
DISCIPLINE 16.7 (3) 0 (0) 52.9 (9) 20.0 (1)
TRAIN IN RELIGION 0 (0) 0 (0) 11.8 (2) 60.0 (3)
EDUCATE 11.0 (2) 0 (0) 29.4 (5) 0 (0)
OTHERVARiABLE 33.3 (6) 0 (0) 47.1 (8) 60.0 (3)
Note: Group 1 contains cases where the primary caretaker was alleged to be unfit.
Group 2 contains cases where both parents were alleged to be unfit. Group 3
contains cases where both parents were equal caretakers, or neither was the
primary caretaker. Group 4 contains cases where a child under the age of fourteen
stated a preference.
Each cell gives the percentage of cases in which the court used a factor to
determine custody. The frequency is in parentheses.
W = 18, nb = 2, C = 17, ad = 5 (n = number of cases in the sample).
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Table 8
PERCENTAGES AND FREQUENCIES OF CASES USING ONE OR
MORE FACTORS TO DETERMINE CUSTODY BY FOUR
TYPES OF CUSTODY CASES
NUMBER OF Grpla Grp2b Grp3c Grp4d
FACTORS USED % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n)
ZERO 66.7 (12) 100 (2) 17.6 (3) 20.0 (1)
ONE 16.7 (3) 0 (0) 5.9 (1) 0 (0)
Two 5.6 (1) 0 (0) 17.6 (3) 0 (0)
THREE 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
FOUR 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 20.0 (1)
FIVE 0 (0) 0 (0) 11.8 (2) 20.0 (1)
Six 0 (0) 0 (0) 29.4 (5) 40.0 (2)
SEVEN 11.1 (2) 0 (0) 5.9 (1) 0 (0)
EIGHT 0 (0) 0 (0) 11.8 (2) 0 (0)
NINE 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
TEN 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Note: Group 1 contains cases where the primary caretaker was alleged to be unfit.
Group 2 contains cases where both parents were alleged to be unfit. Group 3
contains cases where both parents were equal caretakers, or neither was the
primary caretaker. Group 4 contains cases where a child under the age of fourteen
stated a preference.
Each cell gives the percentage of cases which used that number of factors to
determine custody. The frequency is in parentheses.
na = 18, nb - 2, C = 17, nd = 5 (n = number of cases in the sample).
B. Qualitative Findings and Discussion
The quantitative research discussed above reveals that a
number of pre-disposing factual situations exist which influence the
trial court's determination of the primary caretaker. These include
the following situations in which: the mother is alleged to be unfit;
both parents work; the father has a larger role in primary
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caretaking than traditional breadwinners; the caretaking responsi-
bilities shifted over a period of time from the mother to the father
or visa versa; there have been allegations of parental abuse; an
emotional bond exists between the father and the child; and one
parent has maintained physical custody of the child for a long
period of time prior to the conclusion of the appellate proceeding,
due to procedural delays.
1. The Impact of the Mother's Unfitness-Particularly
Adultery
In a large number of the forty-nine primary caretaker custody
cases appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court since Garska,
a key issue at the trial court level was the mother's fitness as a cus-
todian. 89 Twenty-one of the forty-nine cases4 .. raised the mother's
allegedly adulterous relationship with another man in the opinion
but did not always directly suggest that this fact constituted a
fitness issue.491 The mother's sexual conduct was also implicitly
raised in cases which discussed the following issues: the mother's
489. See Boarman v. Boarman, 459 S.E.2d 395 (W. Va. 1995); Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H.,
455 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1995); Michael Scott M. v. Victoria L.M., 453 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va.
1994); DiMagno v. DiMagno, 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994); Boarman v. Boarman, 438 S.E.2d
876 (W. Va. 1993); Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992); Richardson v. Richardson,
415 S.E.2d 276 (W. Va. 1992); Starkey v. Starkey, 408 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 1991); Kenneth
L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1991); Dottie S. v. Christopher S., 408 S.E.2d
46 (W. Va. 1991); Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990); Marcum v. Marcum, 395
S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1990); Warner v. Warner, 394 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1990); David M. v.
Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989); Mills ex rel. Gorrick v. Gorrick, 381 S.E.2d 273
(W. Va. 1989); Goetz v. Carpenter, 367 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1988); Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d
833 (W. Va. 1987); M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987); Bickler V. Bickler, 344
S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986); Stacy v. Stacy, 332 S.E.2d 260.(W. Va. 1985); Allen v. Allen 320
S.E.2d 112 (W. Va. 1984); T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1984); J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314
S.E.2d 67 (W. Va. 1984); Mormanis v. Mormanis, 296 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1982).
490. See Campbell v. Campbell, 460 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995); Boarman v. Boarman, 459
S.E.2d 395 (W. Va. 1995); Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H., 455 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1995);
DiMagno v. DiMagno, 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994); Feaster v. Feaster, 452 S.E.2d 428 (W.
Va. 1994); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 433 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1993); Cummings v. Cummings, 426
S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1992); Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992); Richardson v.
Richardson, 415 S.E.2d 276 (W. Va. 1992); Kenneth L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625 (W.
Va. 1991); Dottie S. v. Christopher S., 408 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1991); Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d
599 (W. Va. 1990); Marcum v. Marcum, 395 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1990); Warner v. Warner, 394
S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1990); David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989); Mills ex rel.
Gorrick v. Gorrick, 381 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1989); Goetz v. Carpenter, 367 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va.
1988); Bickler v. Bickler, 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986); Rose v. Rose, 340 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va.
1985); Stacy v. Stacy, 332 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1985); T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va.
1984).
491. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 460 S.E.2d 469, 471 n.1 (W. Va. 1995); Feaster v.
Feaster, 452 S.E.2d 428,429 n.2 (W. Va. 1994); Cummings v. Cummings, 426 S.E.2d 505, 510
n.1 (W. Va. 1992).
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association with a homosexual;492 the mother's new husband
exposing himself to a teenager several years prior to their involve-
ment;4 93 the mother moved into the home of a man with whom she
claimed she did not have a sexual relationship;4 ' and the mother's
sexual intercourse with a man on one occasion.4 95
In contrast, only one of the forty-nine cases mentioned the
father's sexual conduct as an issue. In that case, McDougal v.
McDougal,496 the West Virginia Supreme Court, and to a lesser
degree the trial court, appeared to disapprove that the father had
fathered twins with another woman while he was still married.
Although the trial court awarded joint custody to the parents, the
Supreme Court reversed and awarded custody to the mother.
The courts appear to have a preoccupation with a mother's
sexuality and her sexual behavior.497 This trend is particularly true
at the trial court level. When the husband introduced the mother's
"questionable" sexual conduct, or adultery during the marriage,
into evidence, she lost custody of her children to the father at the
trial court level in seventeen of the twenty-one cases.498 In these
cases, the trial court did not always decide that the mother was
unfit for custody due to the adultery. However, the court's obvious
preoccupation with the mother's sexual conduct suggests that it
influenced the decision. Quite often, adultery was the only fitness
issue raised by the court. Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly
reprimanded the trial courts for being influenced by a mother's
"improper sexual conduct" which was not shown to have any effect
on the mother's ability to care for the child.499
492. See M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442, 443 (W. Va. 1987).
493. See Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H. 455 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1995) (involving a case in
which the mother's boyfriend was arrested for indecent exposure to a minor and pled no
contest to a charge of disorderly conduct before dating the mother). See also DiMagno v.
DiMagno, 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994).
494. See Bickler v. Bickler, 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986).
495. See T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1984).
496. 422 S.E.2d 636, 637 (W. Va. 1992).
497. See generally supra notes 489-95 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the
mother's sexuality on custody awards).
498. See Campbell v. Campbell, 460 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995); DiMagno v. DiMagno, 452
S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994); Feaster v. Feaster, 452 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1994); Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 433 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1993); Cummings v. Cummings 426 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va.
1992); Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992); Richardson v. Richardson, 415 S.E.2d
276 (W. Va. 1992); Kenneth L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1991); Marcum v.
Marcum 395 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1990); Warner v. Warner, 394 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1990);
David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989); Mills ex rel. Gorrick v. Gorrick, 381
S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1989); Goetz v. Carpenter, 367 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1988); Bickler v.
Bickler, 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986); Rose v. Rose, 340 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1985); Stacy v.
Stacy, 332 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1985); T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1984).
499. See L.W. v. S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625, 627 (W. Va. 1991).
1998]
108 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
A mother's adultery influences the trial court and the West
Virginia Supreme Court's decision-making process and, therefore,
the outcome in the determination of the primary caretaker. Almost
uniformly, the trial court awarded fathers custody of children in
cases where the mothers had had an adulterous relationship, even
where that relationship occurred subsequent to the parties'
separation. 50° However, only half of the cases at the supreme court
level found that fathers should get custody under these circum-
stances."° The earlier cases particularly favored awarding custody
to the father.
Two general justifications are relied on by the supreme court
for affirming the trial court award to the father. First, the supreme
court routinely found children unsupervised, or that the mother's
care of the children, including cleaning house and making meals,
was questionable. °2 Second, the supreme court discussed a
mother's abandonment of her maternal responsibility when she
pursued an adulterous relationship.0 3
Relinquishment of maternal responsibility was also a consider-
ation in Marcum v. Marcum,504 where the supreme court reviewed
a custody decision in favor of the father. The Family Law Master
(FLM) found at the trial level that the mother "waivered in her
commitment" in an early hearing on the divorce when she insisted
that a divorce be granted immediately.0 5 When the FLM refused
an immediate divorce, she
stormed out of the room after asking. In so doing, she asked if
a divorce would be granted, and if her husband would be
granted custody of the child, if she did not show up at the next
hearing.
When the family law master responded in the affirmative,
the [mother] said something to the effect: "Well, by God, I just
won't show up."5°s
500. See supra note 498; see also Mercer, supra note 463, at 222-38 (case narratives of
primary caretaker decisions). But see Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990).
501. See Mercer, supra note 463, at 232-33.
502. See, e.g., T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 175 (W. Va. 1984) (holding that because the
mother had left the baby in the trailer to go next door to "smoke pot," the court denied her
custody). See also Richardson v. Richardson, 415 S.E.2d 276 (W. Va. 1992) (suggesting that
the mother's house was unclean); Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992) (finding the
mother to be a "poor housekeeper").
503. See, e.g., Warner v. Warner, 394 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1990) (finding the mother's fitness
discredited because of her adultery); Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1991) (noting that
the mother wanted "freedom" and pursued her lover from Germany to Georgia).
504. 395 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1990).
505. Id. at 509.
506. Id. at 511.
[Vol. 5:1
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Substantial testimony also showed that she was dating an individ-
ual who, on occasion, spent the night in her home and who had
been seen with her child.5"7 The FLM stated that the mother's
involvement with this man was "contrary to the moral fiber of our
society, and such an influence cannot promote the welfare of this
child in any fashion."50 8
In Marcum, the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the
award to the father and noted that in making its custody recom-
mendation, the FLM was apparently influenced by the affair, apart
from its impact on the child.0 9 Although the court noted that this
reliance was erroneous,510 the court stated that, "the real question
in this case is whether the trial court erred in awarding custody of
the infant child to the appellant's husband based on what is in the
best interests of the child."' The supreme court also explained
that
[there was evidence that the man with whom the appellant
was involved had violent propensities [he was twice arrested for
an assault], and the appellant on two occasions, in the separa-
tion agreement and in an early hearing before the family law
master, wavered in the commitment to the child.512
The supreme court has also been more willing to find shared
parenting when the mother committed adultery, in order to justify
circumventing its general pronouncement that a parent's extramar-
ital affairs are not relevant to a custody determination, unless they
impact the children.1 3 Marcum, in awarding the father custody,
turned on this shared parenting escape valve.514
In Marcum, the FLM had found that neither party had been
the clear cut primary caretaker of the child prior to their separa-
tion,"5 especially as both parents worked. The mother testified
that while she was married, she cared for her daughter in many
507. See id.
508. Id. at 510.
509. See id. at 512.
510. See id.
511. Id.
512. Id. Perhaps the custody decision also turned on the fact that the mother threatened
to commit suicide if her husband did not grant her custody of the child, and she aimed a
pistol and shot a round into a porch.
513. See id. (finding that shared parenting was appropriate when the mother had
committed adultery).
514. See id.
515. See id.
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ways, including: picking her up from daycare, reading her bedtime
stories, rocking her daughter to sleep, taking her to the doctor,
toilet training her, general disciplining, and usually changing dia-
pers.516 The mother also explained that she performed household
chores like preparing dinner, doing the laundry and cleaning the
house.517 Although the mother testified that she bathed the child,
she acknowledged that she shared this responsibility with her
husband.518
The father testified that he shared many of the responsibilities
for his daughter with his wife while they were married, such as
attending to the child in the evening, changing diapers, and caring
for his daughter while she was sick.519 He testified that he was
solely responsible for bringing his child to daycare in the
morning.520 Witnesses corroborated both the mother's and the
father's testimonies.
521
The trial court found, and the West Virginia Supreme Court
agreed, that:
[TIhere was substantial evidence that the appellant's husband
was deeply and integrally involved in the care of the infant
child before the parties' separation ...This evidence, in
addition to the evidence that the appellant [mother] also
provided substantial care to the child, supports the trial court's
conclusion that neither party was the primary caretaker of the
child.522
This case illustrates the two avenues the West Virginia
Supreme Court uses to circumvent the traditional primary
caretaker analysis and to make an award to the father in the child's
best interests. First, the mother is unfit due to her questionable
commitment to the children and her abandonment of her
caretaking role for at least a temporary period. Second, the
mother's current behavior as a "shared caregiver" draws into
question her future ability to care for the child.
516. See id. at 511.
517. See id.
518. See id.
519. See id.
520. See id.
521. See id.
522. Id. at 512.
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Figure 6
The Impact of Mother's Adultery on the Court's
Decision-Making Process
* Commitment to children?
" Abandonment of traditional
role during temporary peiod?
* Housekeeping ability?
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CARETAKER
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2. The Shared Parenting Escape Valve
A second factual permutation which influences the primary
caretaker decision-making process is the tendency to revert to a
best interests analysis where there are two working spouses on the
basis that no primary caretaker can be ascertained.
In West Virginia, fourteen cases involved two working
parents.523 In eleven of these cases, the trial court awarded custody
to the father.524 Up to and including 1988, the supreme court
uniformly awarded mothers custody, even if they were working
mothers.525 Beginning in 1988, the supreme court shifted away
from finding that working mothers were, nonetheless, primary
caretakers and awarded fathers custody in several of the cases.526
523. See Campbell v. Campbell 460 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 449
S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1994); Lewis v. Lewis, 433 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1993); Channell v. Channell,
432 S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1993); Cummings v. Cummings, 426 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1992); Moses
v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992); Brown v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 29 (W. Va. 1991);
Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 1990); Marcum v. Marcum, 395 S.E.2d
509 (W. Va. 1990); T.S.K. v. K.B.K, 371 S.E.2d 362 (W. Va. 1988); Wagoner v. Wagoner, 310
S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1983); Gibson v. Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1983); Heck v. Heck, 301
S.E.2d 158 (W. Va. 1982); Lounsbury v. Lounsbury, 296 S.E.2d 686 (W. Va. 1982).
524. See Campbell v. Campbell 460 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 449
S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1994); Channell v. Channell, 432 S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1993); Cummings v.
Cummings, 426 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1992); Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992);
Brown v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 29 (W. Va. 1991); Marcum v. Marcum, 395 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va.
1990); T.S.K. v. K.B.K, 371 S.E.2d 362 (W. Va. 1988); Gibson v. Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336 (W.
Va. 1983); Heck v. Heck, 301 S.E.2d 158 (W. Va. 1982); Lounsbury v. Lounsbury, 296 S.E.2d
686 (W. Va. 1982). In Wagoner v. Wagoner, 310 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1983), custody was
awarded to the father during the children's school year, and to the mother during the
summer. In Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 1990), the father received
legal custody of the children. The parents alternated physical custody of the children on a
weekly basis. In Lewis v. Lewis, 433 S.E.2d 536 (1993), the FLM found the father to be the
primary caretaker. Nonetheless, the trial court awarded custody of the four year-old
daughter to the mother, finding a young female child should be in the custody of her mother.
525. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1983). In Gibson, the trial court
concluded it was impossible to determine which parent was the primary caretaker because
both parents were employed and shared many of the child rearing responsibilities. The court
awarded the father custody. See id. at 338. The supreme court disagreed and awarded the
mother custody. See id. at 338-39.
526. See, e.g., Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992). In Moses, the mother took
care of the children for a considerable period of time during the day, although the court noted
that on a number of days each month she left the child in day-care. See id. at 509. On some
evenings at 5:00 p.m., she left home to attend the Actor's Guild. See id. The physician father
testified that he did all the laundry, did a lot of the cooking, and took care of the children "on
frequent occasions" when his wife was in the hospital with premature contractions and
during her deliveries. See id. He put the children to bed, bathed them, and brushed their
teeth, maybe as many as five times a week. See id. He also coached a Little League baseball
team, and when he was involved with coaching, would watch his children in the dugout until
the game was over. See id.
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By 1993, the supreme court was willing to find that a full-time
homemaker, who spent her entire day with the children, was not
the primary caretaker, and subsequently awarded custody to the
wage-earning husband, using a best interests analysis.527 In that
case, each parent organized and participated in social activities
with the children.528 The father was responsible for disciplining the
children 529 -he admitted he had used a belt to hit the boys but
stated that he used his hand to hit the girl.53 ° The supreme court
found ample evidence that the mother and father shared caretaking
to an entirely equal degree, and therefore, neither parent was
entitled to the status of the primary caretaker.531
The case demonstrates that primary caretaking analysis shifts
to emphasize different factors when parents work. This case
further shows that the trial court and supreme court are using this
category as an escape valve to find a way to reach a best interests
analysis and to support a decision which would appear contrary to
primary caretaking facts.
The trial court awarded custody to the father, and the supreme court affirmed,
although it found the evidence on who was the primary caretaker contradictory. See id. at
511. Nonetheless, given the father's involvement with his children, the court could not say
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in finding that the father was the primary
caretaker, and finding him fit to have custody. See id.
527. See Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S., 435 S.E.2d 6, 14-15 (W. Va. 1993) (per
curiam). The court said:
[Tihis Court has recognized that the length of time a parent has alone with a
child is not determinative of whether the primary caretaker presumption
should attach.... The (mother] was at home for the children when they would
return from school while the [father] would work throughout the day. However,
the [father] was also a substantial participant in the child care duties once he
came home from work.
[The father] would be responsible for getting the boys ready for school and
fixing their breakfast. Both parties further testified that the [mother] would
primarily plan and prepare the evening meals on the weekdays, but on the
weekends the [father] would often prepare the .evening meals. The parties also
testified that they shared the responsibility for getting the children ready for
bed each night.
Id. at 10 (citation omitted).
528. See id.
529. See id.
530. See id.
531. See id.
114 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
3. Fathers Are Given Credit for Role Shifting Activities
The father's efforts to assist in caretaking at all has at times
"bowled over" the court. 32 In Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S.,
Chief Justice Workman, in a dissent, stated the following:
It is unfathomable that a woman who gives up her career (in
this case, that of being a kindergarten teacher) to stay home to
raise three children does not qualify as the primary caretaker,
when as a full-time stay-at-home mother she breast-fed all
three children; was so concerned about unnecessary additives
and excess sugar that she processed her own baby food; was
responsible for the majority of meal planning and preparation;
was primarily responsible for laundering the family's clothing
and housecleaning; was a Girl Scout troop leader; was a regular
volunteer at her children's school and an active member of the
parent-teacher organization; was responsible for scheduling
and taking the children to their medical appointments; and was
primarily responsible for managing the children's social
activities. For some unarticulated reason, both the family law
master and the circuit court appear to have been bowled over
by the fact that the father helped in the evenings and week-
ends. Not unlike many modern fathers, the Appellee did
participate in some of the household and childrearing responsi-
bilities.... Given the fathers admitted ten to twelve-hour work
days combined with frequent business trips which took him
away from home, it is difficult to conceive how he could ever
qualify as having equal caretaking responsibility. The family
law master and circuit court's [and Supreme Court's] conclu-
sions that neither individual qualified as the primary caretaker
has the effect of somehow elevating the father's necessarily
limited hours with the children, given his lengthy work days, to
accord him the same caretaker status as the full-time stay-at-
home mother. The majority in essence places a higher value on
a father's time and contribution.533
4. The Impact of a Shift in Caretaking Responsibilities
Courts at both the trial and supreme court levels are confused
about the time period which should be considered when evaluating
which parent should receive the primary caretaker presumption.
532. Id. at 16 (Workman, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the mere mention of a father
participating in child-rearing seems to sway the lower courts to award custody to the father).
533. Id. (emphasis added).
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This uncertainty is particularly apparent in cases where parents
have shifted caretaking responsibilities.
In Starkey v. Starkey,3 4 the mother was the undisputed
primary caretaker from 1971 until 1985.531 Her children were born
in 1971, 1979, and 1980.536 In July of 1985, she left home for ten
days without notice.53 7 Later, she claimed that she was afraid "she
would lose control of her emotions and harm her children."538 She
presented testimony that she was the daughter of an alcoholic, and
it was uncontested that her husband's drinking problems contrib-
uted to their marital strife.539 From September of 1985, after the
Starkeys agreed to separate, the children resided with their fa-
ther.540 In May, the mother reclaimed custody of the two younger
children.14' The Starkeys filed for divorce in August, just a little
over a year after her ten day disappearance. 
2
The FLM and the trial court found the father to be the primary
caretaker and was thereby entitled to the presumption of
custody. 543 Further, the FLM suggested that the mother's "aban-
donment of the children in July of 1985... abandoned any prior
existing primary caretaker status . . . ."'4 Upon the mother's
petition for a review of the decision, the trial court vacated its
award and gave custody to the mother by focusing on the parent
who was the primary caretaker at the time of the institution of the
action.545 At that time, the mother had physical custody of the
children.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's determination of
the appropriate time period for evaluating parental rules.546
Almost inexplicably, the court discussed that determining which
parent is the primary caretaker "is a task which must encompass,
to some degree, an inquiry into the entirety of each child's life, with
obvious emphasis on the more recent period of time."5 47 In spite of
this statement, the court ignored fifteen years of primary
534. 408 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 1991).
535. See id. at 396.
536. See id.
537. See id.
538. Id.
539. See id.
540. See id.
541. See id.
542. See id.
543. See id. at 397.
544. Id.
545. See id.
546. See id. at 398-400.
547. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
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caretaking by the mother, and instead, focused on the seven
months prior to the filing for divorce, as well as the period where
the father had custody at the time of that filing.
Perhaps the problem that the supreme court was struggling
with is that, by the time this case was appealed, three years had
passed, during which time the children lived with their father, due
to the original temporary custody award. The supreme court did
raise other factors which could have contributed to its decision. It
suggested that the mother's ten day departure from the home could
possibly be considered an abandonment of the children and of her
status as primary caretaker (even after fifteen years of serving in
this capacity).548 Alternatively, the court discussed that the best
interests of the children would be served by placing them in the
custody of their father because, since 1987, there were report cards
and certificates of achievement which indicated that the children
were thriving in his care.54 9 The court did not believe it would be
in the children's best interests to disturb "their education and
familial environment. 5
50
Certainly, this justification sounds like the court is using
unbridled judicial discretion to determine the children's best inte-
rests, which under the established standard, should not have been
looked at where there was a primary caretaker. It would seem that
in this case, the best interests analysis preceded the primary
caretaker analysis. Finding it in the children's best interests to
remain in the stable home in which they had resided since the FLM
temporary award, the court then found the primary caretaker
presumption defeated. 55'
So, what is the appropriate period of time for the trial court to
focus on to determine primary caretaking? The most recent case,
Campbell v. Campbell,552 suggests the proper period is prior to the
separation and divorce. "As we explained in Starkey . . . ,the
determination of primary caretaker status cannot be made 'simply
by reference to any one moment of time. It is not merely a snap-
shot in time taken on the day the divorce proceedings are initiated.
•.. In another case, Michael Scott M. v. Victoria L. M. ," the
court focused on the period after a temporary custody award was
548. See id. at 399.
549. See id.
550. Id.
551. See id. at 399-400.
552. 460 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995).
553. Id. at 473 (citation omitted).
554. 453 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1994) (per curiam).
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made to the father by the Family Law Master, but did not directly
point this out.555 In Shearer v. Shearer,556 Justice Neely suggests
in a dissent that the court should focus on the stable relationship
the child has gained with the father by residing in his home for two
years between the divorce and the supreme court hearing.557 Few
of the cases look at the entire period of the child's life, as illustrated
by the court in Starkey, which ignored fifteen years of the mother's
caretaking.55 The court in Moses v. Moses559 ignored the first four
years the couple had children, during which time the mother was
the primary caretaker, and focused on the last two years, during
which time the father was the primary caretaker.56 ° The court in
Efaw v. Efaw56' ignored six years of primary caretaking by the
mother and focused on the most recent eighteen months, twelve
months of which the father had custody under the FLM temporary
award and during which time the father was the primary care-
taker.562 Finally, the court in Dempsey v. Dempsey563 looked at the
period one year prior to the filing of the custody decision.5'
5. Parental Abuse
Just a few of the cases discuss the parent's abuse of their
children as a factor impacting the determination of primary
caretaking, probably because this category is rather obvious, and
these cases are not being appealed. In Boarman v. Boarman,5"5 the
supreme court struggled to determine the primary caretaker where
both parents were borderline fit to be the custodians of their
children. The court split the children-six to the mother and the
oldest son to the father. 6 In this case, witnesses testified that the
mother frequently verbally abused the children, called them
various names, did not provide adequate clothing for the children
in the winter months, and allowed them to catch mice and place
555. See id. at 665-66.
556. 448 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1994) (per curiam).
557. See id. at 171 (Neely, C.J., dissenting). The majority in Shearer awarded an out-of-
state mother custody of her son. See id. at 169-70.
558. See Starkey v. Starkey, 408 S.E.2d 394, 398-400 (W. Va. 1991) (per curiam).
559. 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992) (per curiam).
560. See id. at 508-11.
561. 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990) (per curiam).
562. See id. at 602-04.
563. 306 S.E.2d 230 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam).
564. See id. at 231-32.
565. 459 S.E.2d 395 (W. Va. 1995) (per curiam).
566. See id. at 401.
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them in the microwave until they exploded.56 A twelve year-old
neighbor testified that children were permitted to play with knives
and sticks and to watch pornographic films.568 The neighbor had
also personally observed a specific incident in which case the
children had seen their mother in bed with another man.569 The
mother also did not cook properly for the children, neglected to
clean the living area, allowed the children to use profanity, did not
remove feces when changing diapers, drank straight.whiskey in the
morning while caring for the children, and had sexual relations in
the presence of the children a second time. 70
The father was not much better. Witnesses testified the father
conveyed social and political ideas to his children which included
the belief that "Jews and Negros" should be killed, and that Adolf
Hitler's political principles were laudable. 71 The father allegedly
shot at cows in order to change their direction, lost his temper
easily, and threatened to physically harm the children. 572 He also
shot cats, one of which was alleged to be the children's pet.573 The
court noted that, amazingly, two home studies conducted by the
Child Welfare Bureaus to assess the suitability of the mother's and
father's homes, characterized these parents in almost glowing
terms .
The court was deeply concerned that "something here is awry.
We cannot abandon the question of these children's well-being
without further inquiry into the situation."75 On remand, no signi-
ficant further facts were developed, and the supreme court later
affirmed the split custody award.576
6. The Child's Emotional Bond or Preference to Live with
One Parent
A child's emotional bond with a non-primary caretaker has
appeared to influence the court's decision-making. For example,
the court in Michael Scott M. v. Victoria L. M. stated: "[wie have
567. See Boarman v. Boarman, 438 S.E.2d 876, 878 (W. Va. 1993), affd, 459 S.E.2d 395
(W. Va. 1995) (per curiam).
568. See id.
569. See id.
570. See id.
571. See id.
572. See id.
573. See id.
574. See id. at 879 n.3.
575. Id. at 880.
576. See id.
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also emphasized the important consideration of the extent of the
emotional bond between the child and each parent" when address-
ing the primary caretaker issue.5" In Patricia Ann S. v. James
Daniel S.,578 the court emphasized the children's emotional bond
with the father in justifying why he should have custody.579 The
trial court used three psychological experts to provide information
about the parent-child relationships,8 ° something that the court
cautioned against in David M. v. Margaret M.581 The supreme
court, in its review of these cases, remarkably was not troubled by
the violation of the rule that primary caretaking should be
developed by lay (non-expert) testimony. The court emphasized
that the children felt emotionally safe and more stable with their
father.582 It awarded the father custody of the two older boys, but
remanded the case with directions to determine if the mother
should have custody of the daughter.583
There have also been a few cases which have considered the
child's preference. A sixteen year-old's preference was considered
in Boarman;84 a four year-old's desire, as expressed via a licensed
social worker who interviewed her, was mentioned in DiMagno v.
DiMagno.585 In S. v. S.,5. as just explained, the trial court
permitted two boys, thirteen and ten, to elect to live with their
father. Their six year-old sister indicated she would like to live
with her brothers, and the supreme court remanded the case for
more information on whether that result would be in her best
interests. In Reynolds v. Reynolds,58 an eight year-old chose to live
with the father and the trial court agreed. The supreme court
reversed since the mother was the primary caretaker.
577. 453 S.E.2d 661, 665 (W. Va. 1994) (emphasis added).
578. 435 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993).
579. See id. at 13.
580. See id. at 16-17 (Workman, C.J., dissenting).
581. 385 S.E.2d 912, 913 (W. Va. 1989).
582. See Patricia Ann S., 435 S.E.2d at 13.
583. See id. Justice Workman's dissent sheds additional light on this case. She complains
that:
[tihe majority opinion marks a sharp departure from the primary caretaker rule
which has been a viable and working concept in West Virginia for more than a
decade. More disturbing, however, is the determination that it is in the best
interest of children to place them in the custody of a parent who has abused
both the wife and the children. In doing so, the majority implicitly places its
stamp of approval on physical and emotional spousal abuse.
Id. at 15 (Workman, C.J., dissenting).
584. Boarman v. Boarman, 459 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995).
585. 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994).
586. Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S., 435 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993).
587. 433 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1993).
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As anticipated by Garska,588 the older the child, the more the
court has given weight to her preference in the decision. Some in-
dication exists that this factor is being used by courts in cases of
younger children, as an opportunity to help circumvent a primary
caretaker award-as is the child's emotional bonding with the
father.
7. Procedural Delays
Some of the more recent cases noted how long it takes to get an
appealed case through the West Virginia court system. In Camp-
bell v. Campbell,589 almost three years elapsed between the filing
of the divorce and the FLM's decision. An additional one-and-a-half
years passed before the supreme court decision. The court's deci-
sion to leave custody with the father, based on a rather weak fac-
tual record, can be partially explained by the court's desire to
promote the continuity and stability of the children's lives.59 ° They
had resided with their father for the three years prior to the
decision because the FLM had originally awarded him custody.59'
Other cases in the sample took from two to four years, from the
filing of the divorce through the date of the appellate decision. This
time period is not remarkable. However, what is interesting is the
delay that would sometimes occur between the filing of the divorce
and a FLM's review of the situation. In Cummings v. Cummings
92
more than two years elapsed between the filing of the divorce and
the trial court decision.
Due to the procedural delay in moving a custody battle through
the West Virginia courts, temporary custody becomes a crucial
issue. In thirty-two of the forty-nine cases, or sixty-five percent,
the temporary custodian was eventually awarded custody by the
West Virginia Supreme Court.5 93 The sample of forty-nine cases
588. Garska v. Garska, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
589. 460 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995).
590. See id. at 472-73.
591. See id. at 471.
592. 426 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1992).
593. See Boarman v. Boarman, 459 S.E.2d 395 (W. Va. 1995); Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H.,
455 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1995); Michael Scott M. v. Victoria L. M., 453 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va.
1994); DiMagno v. DiMagno, 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 449 S.E.2d 75
(W. Va. 1993); Boarman v. Boarman, 438 S.E.2d 876 (W. Va. 1993); Patricia Ann S. v. James
Daniels S., 435 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993); Lewis v. Lewis, 433 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1993);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 433 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1993); Channell v. Channell, 432 S.E.2d 203
(W. Va. 1993); McDougal v. McDougal, 422 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1992); Richardson v.
Richardson, 415 S.E.2d 276 (W. Va. 1992); Starkey v. Starkey, 408 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 1991);
Brown v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 29 (W. Va. 1991); Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990);
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includes seven cases in which it was impossible to determine which
parent had original custody awards. By removing these seven from
the total sample, seventy-six percent of the temporary custodians
received custody from the supreme court. Continuity of care is
clearly playing a role in the supreme court's decision, albeit not an
explicit one.
8. Other Factors Figuring into a Primary Caretaker
Decision
Other factors considered by the supreme court in primary
caretaker decision-making include the child's exposure to secondary
smoke;594 the child's interaction with the father's family;595 which
parent takes the child to school;596 the parent's involvement in
school board meetings and extracurricular activities; 597 the parent's
flexibility in addressing the children's needs and providing a
"listening ear;"598 and reading books to the children.599
To return for a moment to the influence of the father's family,
the court has found in several cases that the father's parents (the
child's grandparents) were actually the primary caretakers, not the
father. In three cases, Michael Scott M. v. Victoria L. M.,6 °°
Channell v. Channell,6 ' and Isaacs v. Isaacs,"2 the court made
such a finding. In the most recent cases, fathers received custody
nonetheless. °3 However, in the earliest case, the supreme court
Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 1990); Marcum v. Marcum, 395 S.E.2d
509 (W. Va. 1990); Warner v. Warner, 394 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1990); Mills ex rel. Gorrick v.
Gorrick, 381 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1989); Goetz v. Carpenter, 367 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1988);
Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1987); M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987);
Bickler v. Bickler, 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986); Stacy v. Stacy, 332 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va.
1985); Graham v. Graham, 326 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1984); Allen v. Allen, 320 S.E.2d 112 (W.
Va. 1984); T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1984); J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67 (W.
Va. 1984); Dempsey v. Dempsey, 306 S.E.2d 230 (W. Va. 1983); Lounsbury v. Lounsbury, 296
S.E.2d 686 (W. Va. 1982); Mormanis v. Mormanis, 296 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1982); Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981); see also Mercer, supra note 463, at F-1 (case
narratives), G-1 (chart of primary caretaker decisions).
594. See Michael Scott M. v. Victoria L. M., 453 S.E.2d 661, 666 (W. Va. 1994).
595. See Shearer v. Shearer, 448 S.E.2d 165, 168 (W. Va. 1994).
596. See Graham v. Graham, 326 S.E.2d 189, 190 (W. Va. 1984).
597. See Brown v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 29, 32 (W. Va. 1991).
598. See T.S.K. v. K.B.K., 371 S.E.2d 362, 366 (W. Va. 1988).
599. See Heck v. Heck, 301 S.E.2d 158, 159 (W. Va. 1982).
600. 453 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1994).
601. 432 S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1993).
602. 358 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1987).
603. See Michael Scott M., 453 S.E.2d at 663; Channell, 432 S.E.2d at 442.
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reversed a trial court decision for the father because the court
found the mother to be the primary caretaker." 4
Yet another factor which repeatedly influences trial court and
supreme court decision-making is deference to a custody evaluation
made pursuant to Family Law Rule 34(b).6 °5 This Rule permits a
home study to be ordered. Nine of the cases in this study utilized
custody evaluations or guardian ad litem (GAL) opinions to reach
their decision, in spite of Justice Neely's mandate that primary
caretaking should be presented primarily by lay witnesses.0 6 In
Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S. ,67 the supreme court found the
trial court did not overly rely on the three experts.0 8 Similarly, in
DiMagno, °9 the court used the licensed social worker's court-
ordered home study, which concluded the mother was a suitable
custodian and that the children had a significant relationship with
her, to reverse the trial court decision that the mother was unfit.610
In Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H.,611 the home study indicated that the
mother's stable relationship with her current husband, who had
previously exposed himself to a teenager prior to the current
marriage, was dispositive.612 It appears that home studies were not
being made prior to 1988, as no case mentions a custody evaluation
before that time.
Another rather recent wrinkle in primary caretaking decision-
making is the introduction of the FLM. When the supreme court
has reversed trial court decisions which ran contrary to the
recommendations of the FLM, the supreme court has sporadically
indicated that deference must be accorded to the FLM's findings.
In affirming a trial court award, the court has indicated that there
was abundant evidence which the FLM ignored. The relevant
standard is an abuse of discretion.
It seems there is no discernible pattern of when the supreme
court gave deference to either the trial court or the FLM opinion.
It appears that the court felt comfortable in reaching an independ-
ent determination and then used the standard of review to its
benefit. In Michael Scott M. v. Victoria L. M.,13 the court states
604. See Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d at 836.
605. W. Va. Fain. Law, Rule 34(b).
606. See Neely, supra note 27, at 181.
607. 435 S.E.2d 6 (W.Va. 1993).
608. See id. at 12.
609. 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994).
610. See id. at 408.
611. 455 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1995).
612. See id. at 572.
613. 453 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1994).
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that some deference must be given to the FLM who was "in the
unique position to hear the evidence presented and to assess the
credibility of the witnesses." '14 But in DiMagno v. DiMagno,615 the
court ignored the FLM and the trial court's recommendation that,
although the mother was the primary caretaker, she was unfit
because she excessively disciplined her child, and she had a
relationship with a boyfriend with whom the mother occasionally
spent the night.616 The supreme court reviewed the evidence, as
well as testimony by the social worker, which indicated that the
child had a closer bond with the mother and that it would be
detrimental for her to be separated from her mother, and found the
allegations that the mother had slapped or smacked the child to be
unfounded.617
C. Findings on Other Concerns
1. Has the Rate of Appeals Decreased Since the Introduc-
tion of the Primary Caretaker Standard in 1980?
One of the reasons that the supreme court adopted the primary
caretaker standard was to give parents less of an incentive to
litigate their custody cases.6"8 If custody decision-making at the
trial court level is concrete and clear using the primary caretaker
standard, it should result in less appeals to the supreme court.
Alternately, there may be more appeals because a primary
caretaker award can be challenged when the lower court ignores
the standard. Increased ability to appeal an award based on this
presumption is another of its stated benefits. This study compared
the rate of appeals from 1960 to 1981 when West Virginia courts
were using the best interests of the child standard with a maternal
preference versus the appeals rate under the primary caretaker
standard used from 1981 to 1995 to see if there was a constant level
of appeals.
The number of custody awards being appealed in West Virginia
has increased.61 9 There were only six custody appeals filed between
614. Id. at 661.
615. 52 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994).
616. See id. at 406.
617. See id.
618. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981); see also supra Part II.B.3.
619. See infra Table 9; see also Crippen, supra note 101, at 443-44. Judge Gary Crippen
briefly looked at the comparable rate of appeals when Minnesota used the best interests test
with and without a primary caretaker presumption:
[e]xcept for cases premised on saving the child's relationship with a primary
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1960 and 1977 to the West Virginia Supreme Court. These six
include modification of custody cases, as well as appeals of original
custody awards. Between 1978 and 1981, when Garska was
decided, an additional nine appeals were filed-three in 1978, two
in 1979, and four in 1980. Again, these figures include modification
of custody cases. Looking at the number of appeals filed between
1981 and 1985, and 1986 and 1990, there were twenty-two and
eighteen original and modification of custody appeals filed during
these periods, respectively. Between 1991 and 1995, there were
twenty-two original custody appeals filed. This information is
reflected in Table 9.
caretaker, Minnesota's appellate courts have never reversed or even remanded
an original child custody decision during the era of gender neutral
decisionmaking, beginning in 1969 .... The volume of such appeals is unknown
for the years 1969 through 1983 .... Between 1983 and 1985 [when Pikula v.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1980) urged the primary caretaker preference]
. . . the court of appeals had approximately twelve appeals per year from
original custody decisions.
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Table 9
NUMBER OF APPEALS FILED IN WEST VIRGINIA BETWEEN
1978 AND 1995
Original Modification Total
Custody Appeal Of Custody
Filed Appeal Filed
1978 3
1979 2
1980 4
1981 1 1 2
1982 4 4 8
1983 3 2 5
1984 4 0 4
1985 2 1 3
1986 2 1 3
1987 2 0 2
1988 3 1 4
1989 2 2 4
1990 4 1 5
1991 4 0 4
1992 4 1 4
1993 6
1994 5
1995 3 Before July
The increase of appeals of custody cases could be due to several
factors. First, as noted above, increasing uncertainty exists about
how the primary caretaker standard operates, and the standard is
1998] 125
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beginning to erode as it is challenged by the lower courts in
unusual circumstances. Since the supreme court appears to be
willing to undertake a de novo, or brand new, review of the factual
findings of the trial court in many cases, parties or their attorneys,
could view an appeal as an opportunity for a second bite of the
apple-a new chance to win custody. This certainly was not the
result intended by Justice Neely when he drafted the Garska
presumption.
The standard also prompts appeals in cases where parents
appear to be sharing the primary caretaking duties, and courts are
confused as to whether they can find that the primary caretaker
presumption is defeated. Given the current changing gender roles
in our society today, fathers have an opportunity to take increased
responsibility for the caretaking of their children. As noted, the
West Virginia courts appear to be willing to recognize even rather
minimal caregiving contributions by fathers and appear to be
willing to award them custody on that basis.62 °
Second, the fine-tuning of the distinction between when the
primary caretaker presumption operates, and when it is defeated
by the joint efforts of parents to care for their children, requires
appellate litigation.
A third reason for increased appeals may be the situations
where the trial court judges attempt to seek individualized justice
for the parties or the child, and the result the judge desires
contravenes a strict application of the presumption. Here, the
judge's decision may violate the standard because the judge failed
to make factual findings about which parent provides the primary
caretaker duties. These awards will be appealed if there is a
dissatisfied party, and if she has the resources and fortitude to con-
tinue the battle.
The maternal preference, which preceded the primary care-
taker doctrine in West Virginia, did not require factual findings.62'
Therefore, it was often fruitless for appeals to be pursued. The
appellate court would merely defer to the lower court's decision as,
in essence, it was unable to be reviewed. The requirement of
factual findings under the current standard is precisely why
appeals can now be argued. Just like a best interests of the child
standard which has been defined by a state legislature in an
attempt to make it more determinate,622 the primary caretaker
620. See supra Part V.B.3.
621. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
622. See supra Part II.A.3.a. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(c) (West 1998).
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standard requires a marching through of factors and fact determi-
nations. These findings can then be challenged at a higher level as
being not supported by the evidence. Alternatively, a party can
argue that the court failed to make the requisite findings when
deciding the case. Either way, appeals are fostered. The appellate
court, having a complete fact record comparatively to pre-1981, (or,
alternatively, a deficient one under the standard's requirement for
factual findings), is in a situation to render an independent opinion
about the merits of the case. Again, parties want to appeal if they
believe they can get a second chance.
Finally, under the assumption that society has become
increasingly litigious over the past two decades, there probably
would be a natural rise in custody appeals regardless of the
standard which is used.
2. Who Decided the Cases During the Fifteen Year Period?
Five judges sit on the West Virginia Supreme Court. The five
who participated in the 1981 Garska decision were Justice Neely,
the author of the opinion, and Justices McHugh, Harshbarger,
McGraw, and Miller, all of whom are males. In 1985, Justice
Harshbarger was replaced by Justice Brotherton. In 1989, Justice
McGraw was replaced by Justice Workman, the sole female on the
bench during the sample period, and the author of the article
considered earlier." 3 Justice Miller, although replaced by Justice
Cleckley in 1994, continued to serve by temporary assignment
through 1995 for Justice Brotherton (who may have become
incapacitated due to illness or the like). During 1995, Judge Fox
also occasionally sat by temporary assignment for Justice
Brotherton.
Thirty-seven of the cases were decided by the Court as a whole
(per curiam). Justice Neely authored the majority opinion in five
of the cases. McGraw wrote three majority opinions; Workman
wrote two; and Brotherton and Miller wrote one each. Nine
dissents were filed: three by Neely, two by Brotherton, two by
Miller, one by McGraw, and one by Workman.
623. See O'Hanlon & Workman, supra note 21.
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3. What Custody Outcomes Are Being Reached at the Trial
Court and Supreme Court Levels?
Custody cases being appealed to the supreme court are
predominantly those where the father had been awarded custody
of his children. Thirty-three of the forty nine cases in the sample
(67.3%) made custody awards to the father: In contrast, the trial
court only awarded the mother custody of her children in six cases
(12.2%) in the sample. 4
The finding that the overwhelming majority of cases being
appealed were cases where the court awarded the father custody
makes sense. Again, Justice Neely suggested that "[ulnder our
system a mother's lawyer can tell her that if she has been the
primary caretaker and is a fit parent, she has absolutely no chance
of losing custody of very young children."125 If the mother has "no
chance of losing custody" and then loses at the trial court level,
naturally her lawyer might suggest that she should appeal the
decision. Justice Neely's comments suggest that a father who lost
custody at the trial court level may be encouraged not to appeal his
case due to the unarticulated, but obviously implicit, gender
preference of the standard. Therefore, the majority of cases
appealed may be those that ran counter to the typical "mother-gets-
custody" awards.
Simply because the mother is not being awarded custody at the
trial court level in the overwhelming majority of cases appealed to
the supreme court does not mean that she was not found to be the
primary caretaker by the trial court. In seventeen of the cases
(34.7%), the mother was found to be the primary caretaker by the
trial court. In eleven of those cases, she then lost custody because
she was found to be unfit. In twelve of the sample cases (24.4%),
the father was found to be the primary caretaker. Fourteen of the
cases (28.6%), found that neither of the parents were entitled to a
primary caretaker presumption, either because they shared the
task, or because there was a substitute caregiver. Six of the sample
cases (12.2%) never discussed primary caretaking at all. In these
cases, it appears that the trial court moved on to a discussion of
parental fitness without a determination of who was the primary
caretaker.
624. See infra Figure 8; see also Mercer, supra note 463, at F-1 (describing case narratives
of primary caretaker decisions), G-1 (chart of primary caretaker decisions).
625. Neely, supra note 27, at 182.
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At the appellate court level, the mother was found to be the
primary caretaker in twenty-six of the cases (53%), and the father
was found to be the primary caretaker in only two cases (4%).
Twelve cases (24.2%) determined that neither parent was entitled
to the presumption and six cases (12.2%) were remanded for
further factual findings on the primary caretaker issue. In the
remaining three cases (6.1%), the court indicated in two of the
cases that analysis of primary caretaking was not needed because
the parents were both unfit, and indicated in the other case that
the parents had a joint custody relationship which was working.126
Figure 7
Who Is the Primary Caretaker
1
nded for D natio
TRIAL COURT
APPELLATE COURT
At the trial court level, final custody awards were made as
follows:
" mother received custody in six cases (12.2%);
* father received custody in thirty-three cases (67.3%);
* where there was more than one child, the children were
split between the parents in three cases (6%);
626. These statistics came from Professor Mercer's own study and the results are on file
with the author.
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" father received legal custody (decision-making authority),
but the parents shared physical custody of the child in one
case (2%); and
" parents had joint custody in six cases (9%): in two of these
cases the father had physical custody of the children, in
one case the mother had physical custody, and in three
cases the parents shared physical custody.
At the appellate court level, final custody awards were made as
follows:
" mother received custody in twenty-three cases (46.9%);
* father received custody in fifteen cases (30.6%);
* where there was more than one child, the children were
split between the parents in two cases (4%);
" parents had joint custody in one case (2%); and
* the court remanded eight cases for further factual find-
ings: three cases were remanded for findings on whether
the mother was unfit, four cases were remanded with
instructions that the trial court determine which parent
was the primary caretaker, and one case was remanded to
determine if the joint custody award was working.
Figure 8
Who Receives Custody
U67.
a)
U12.
03.
S Father 0 9
Legal Only to Father.....-- -"
Remand For Oetermnaton
D TRIAL COURT
E APPELLATE COURT
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VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Noticeable Trends in Primary Caretaker Decision-Making
The following eight trends show how trial courts and the West
Virginia Supreme Court reach decisions as to the custody of child-
ren after a divorce: (1) a gender preference for women; (2) a
mother's sexual conduct contributing to the divorce being a leading
predictor of a supreme court decision; (3) trial courts in West
Virginia being preoccupied with a mother's sexual behavior, even
if it only tangentially touches the child; (4) the court's finding that
more parents share the role of caretaking and subsequently
reverting to best interests analysis under this exception; (5) the
temporary physical custodian for the child receiving a custody
presumption of continuity; (6) fathers tending to receive more
favorable treatment if they can point to a female who will help care
for the child; (7) there are increasing exceptions to the primary
caretaker presumption as it erodes; and (8) lower courts occasion-
ally feeling free to ignore the presumption and not always chastised
for their efforts.
1. Trend One: Supreme Court Gender Preference for
Women
The supreme court favors awarding custody to women.
Mothers were awarded sole custody of their children at the sup-
reme court level in twenty-three of the cases. Fathers were award-
ed sole custody in sixteen of the cases. Although in only six of the
forty-nine original trial court decisions the mother received sole
custody of all children, (12.2%), an additional seventeen mothers
received custody after their appeal.627
627. See Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H., 455 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1995); Michael Scott M. v.
Victoria L. M., 453 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1994); Lewis v. Lewis, 433 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1993);
Starkey v. Starkey, 408 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 1991); Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va.
1990); Burger v. Burger, 345 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1986) (discussing cases where the mother
received sole custody at the trial court level). See also Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H., 455
S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1995); DiMagno v. DiMagno, 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994); Feaster v.
Feaster, 452 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1994); Shearer v. Shearer, 448 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1994);
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 449 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1994); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 433 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va.
1993); Simmons v. Comer, 438 S.E.2d 530 (W. Va. 1993); Cummings v. Cummings, 426
S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1992); McDougal v. McDougal, 422 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1992); Kenneth
L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1991); Brown v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 29 (W. Va.
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FLMs shared this gender bias. They awarded mothers custody
in fifty-three percent of the cases, and fathers custody in forty-six
percent of the cases. On the other hand, the trial court often
reversed the FLM award as they awarded custody to only 12.2% of
the mothers."' This trend merely shows that when mothers do not
obtain custody, the likelihood of their success on appeal is good, and
they might take a chance at rolling the dice. Justice Neely provides
comments which support the suggestion that the supreme court
favors mothers having custody. In his dissent in Allen v. Allen,629
he stated:
[A]lthough I strongly favor our primary-caretaker-parent
presumption, I do not read that presumption as providing that
mothers would invariably get custody. In the case before us the
record obviously discloses the. appellee father, as between the
two natural parents, is superior and I would affirm the circuit
court.
6 30
In that case, an alcohol-drinking, marijuana-smoking mother
received custody of her child after the supreme court reversed the
trial court decision in favor of the father.6 3' Evidence indicated that
she had a criminal record which consisted of minor offenses and an
indictment for armed robbery.632 The supreme court suggested that
since the time of these incidents, the mother had rehabilitated
herself and was therefore entitled to the primary caretaker
presumption. 33 The supreme court objected to the trial court's
comments which indicated that its finding in favor of the father
was in part to make an example of the mother.6 34 The circuit judge
indicated,
1991); David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989); T.S.K. v. K.B.K., 371 S.E.2d
362 (W. Va. 1988); Goetz v. Carpenter, 367 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1988); Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358
S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1987); M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987); Bickler v. Bickler,
344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986); Wagoner v. Wagoner, 310 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1983); Gibson v.
Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1983); Heck v. Heck, 301 S.E.2d 158 (W. Va. 1982);
Lounsbury v. Lounsbury, 296 S.E.2d 686 (W. Va. 1982); Mormanis v. Mormanis, 296 S.E.2d
680 (W. Va. 1982); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (describing the cases
where the mother received sole custody at the supreme court level).
628. See Mercer, supra note 463, at G-1 (chart of primary caretaker decisions).
629. 320 S.E.2d 112 (W. Va. 1984).
630. Id. at 118 (Neely, C.J., dissenting).
631. See id.
632. See id. at 115.
633. See id. at 117.
634. See id.
[Vol. 5:1
1998] JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 133
I couldn't live with myself if I would take the chance on all of
the many girls or friends or acquaintances of the plaintiffs who
would think for one second that you can live that way and do
these things and still wind up with your baby because you can't,
not in Cable county. You just can't do it. If it will save one of
them from getting married and having a baby too soon when
they're really not capable of thinking about or dedicating their
whole life to someone else, then it will be worth it as far as I'm
concerned.635
2. Trend Two: Mother's Adultery Is Main Predictor of
Supreme Court Custody Award
Before Garska in 1981, mothers received custody under the
maternal preference standard, unless they were found to be unfit.
A sampling of custody appeals between 1960 and 1981 reveals that
most of these appeals alleged that the mothers had abandoned
their children or had committed adultery, rendering them unfit
custodians. These themes continue to survive after Garska. Just
under half of the cases in the sample discussed the mother's sexual
conduct, either prior to or after the divorce. There were twenty-one
cases alleging the mother's adultery. 36 Adultery appears to be the
main predictor of the supreme court's affirming the trial court
award to the father. This influence is seen the most during the
first eight years after the primary caretaker standard was an-
nounced.
Twenty-three cases were heard at the trial court level between
1981 and 1989. Of these cases, the court awarded custody to the
father in seventeen cases; the court awarded custody to the parents
jointly in four cases; the court directed custody of the children be
split between the parties in one case; and in one case, the court
awarded custody to the mother. During this same eight year
period, the supreme court struggled to give mothers custody. In
twelve of the twenty-three cases, custody was changed from the
father to the mother. Five additional cases were remanded, imply-
ing that the mother was fit or should be the primary caretaker.
One case considered joint custody. Only five cases made an award
to the father. Of those five, three were adultery cases.637 The
supreme court generally prefers to give mothers custody, but is less
635. Id. at 118..
636. See supra note 490 (listing the twenty-one cases).
637. See Mercer, supra note 463, at G-1 (chart of primary caretaker decisions which
compiles this information).
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willing to do so if she has come to the divorce table with "unclean
hands"-if she has contributed to the breakdown of the marriage
through her adultery.
The supreme court struggled less with these adultery concerns
after 1990. The court became more willing to award the mother
custody even in cases where there were allegations of the mother's
sexual misconduct. In addition, the supreme court appears to have
had minimal problems awarding the mother custody when her
alleged adultery consisted of a few adulterous acts. For example,
in Isaacs v. Isaacs,638 the mother of an infant child committed one
sexual act in a car parked in downtown Martinsburg,639 and the
court awarded the mother custody.640 Nor has the supreme court
struggled when there was speculative evidence about the mother's
adultery. In the case of Bickler v. Bickler, 4' when it was pure
speculation that the mother had a sexual relationship with her
male roommate, 42 the court also awarded the mother custody.643
However, the court does have problems awarding custody to the
mother when the mother's adulterous acts lead to the disintegra-
tion of the marriage. For example, in Rose v. Rose,644 the "trouble
started" when the wife began attending social activities and met a
man. 5 Subsequently, she announced she was leaving the marital
relationship.646 The court affirmed an award of custody to the
father.647
3. Trend Three: Trial Courts in West Virginia Are Preoccu-
pied with a Mother's Sexual Behavior, Even When It
Does Not Directly Impact the Child
The mother's adulterous conduct is the focus in the majority of
the trial court decisions which are appealed. The trial court favors
giving the father custody when facts about adultery are alleged
against the mother. To reach this result, it may use other avenues
to circumvent a decision that the mother was the primary care-
638. 358 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1987).
639. See id. at 835.
640. See id.
641. 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986).
642. See id. at 632.
643. See id.
644. 340 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1985).
645. See id. at 177.
646. See id.
647. See id.
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taker, such as the shared custody exception or the unfitness
exception.
The supreme court initially responded to these early adultery-
driven cases by affirming the father's award of custody. That trend
changed in approximately 1991. Since then, mothers have won
custody in these situations, in the great majority of the supreme
court decisions.64 s
4. Trend Four: Shared Caretaking Is No Longer a Rare
Exception, But Is Becoming the Norm
More courts are finding parents to be shared caretakers of
their children, and that neither parent is entitled to the primary
caretaker presumption. This trend often results in an award to the
father. In the fourteen cases where the trial court found that
primary caretaking had been shared, twelve custody awards went
to the father, on the basis that it was in the child's best interest.649
Of the remaining two other cases, one case permitted the children
to be split between the parents, 650 and the other case made an
award to the mother based on the best interests of the child.65' The
conclusion is obvious-shared caretaking favors fathers in West
Virginia.
In evaluating a shared caretaking situation, courts receive and
evaluate evidence on the highest number of the Garska factors, as
was shown in Part I of the study. There is a high percentage of
factors discussed because parties are developing a lot of informa-
tion regarding their caretaking duties. A passage from Shearer v.
Shearer652 illustrates the tedious inquiry required.
648. See, e.g., Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H., 455 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1995); DiMagno v.
DiMagno, 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994); Feaster v. Feaster, 452 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1994);
Cummings v. Cummings, 426 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1992); Kenneth L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408
S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1991).
649. See Campbell v. Campbell, 460 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995); Michael Scott M. v. Victoria
L. M., 453 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1994); Shearer v. Shearer, 448 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1994);
Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniels S., 435 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993); Channell v. Channell, 432
S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1993); Kenneth L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1991);
Brown v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 29 (W. Va. 1991); Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905 (W.
Va. 1990); Marcum v. Marcum, 395 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1990); Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d 833
(W. Va. 1987); T.C.B. v. H.A.B., 317 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1984); Dempsey v. Dempsey, 306
S.E.2d 230 (W. Va. 1983).
650. See Graham v. Graham, 326 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1985).
651. See Efaw v. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990). Note that the supreme court
reversed and awarded custody to the father in the absence of a determination of who was the
primary caretaker.
652. 448 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1984).
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In the present case, the evidence adduced demonstrated that
the appellant [mother], who was not married to the appellee
until six or seven months after the infant child of the parties
was born, remained at home and cared for the parties' infant
child during the first six months of the child's life. The evidence
on who was the primary caretaker of the child after the first six
months of the child's life is somewhat conflicting. The appel-
lant testified that she did approximately thirty percent of the
cooking in the home, while the appellee [father] did approxi-
mately seventy percent of the cooking. However, the evidence
also shows that the parties and the infant child seldom ate at
home. Instead, it suggests that they ate most of their meals
out. The appellant testified that she did the majority of the
shopping, and the appellee did not refute this testimony,
although there was evidence that he did, from time to time,
stop at the grocery store to pick something up. Additional
evidence showed that, for the first year or so after the birth of
the infant child, the appellant did the bathing and grooming of
the child. According to the appellant, during this period the
appellee stated that "I don't do baths." When the child became
older, the child would often take a shower with his father, but
on these occasions the appellant would undress the child and
hand him to his father, who was at the time in the shower.
In her testimony, the appellant did not mention the
purchase of clothing for the child. The appellee, on the other
hand, testified that he had bought clothing for the child.
However, the testimony of Sarah Jo Scolopio, an individual who
worked with the appellant, indicated that the appellant often
left work early in the afternoons to go shopping for clothing.
Testimony regarding who did the laundry was essentially
conflicting.
The evidence relating to the medical care of the child
showed that the appellant started taking the child to a pediatri-
cian shortly after birth and later took the child to the pediatri-
cian on a continuing basis. This testimony was given by Dr.
Ferrari, the pediatrician. Dr. Ferrari did, however acknowledge
that the appellee had on occasion delivered the child.
The evidence relating to the social interaction of the child
indicated that most of his social interaction was with the
appellee's family. There is no question that the arranging of
this interaction was done by the appellee. However, affecting
the question of social interaction was the fact that the child was
very young and was not, in fact, involved in the interaction-type
of functions which slightly older children participate in. [The
child was just under three at the filing of the divorce.]
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The evidence also rather clearly showed that the appellee
did most of the arranging of child care for the parties' child.
The appellee's family had a financial interest or connection
with a child care center, and this center was the primary place
used for alternative child care.
The evidence on who put the child to bed at night and
attended to him at night was sketchy. The evidence relating to
discipline and toilet training was somewhat conflicting. It
appears that the parties disagreed about disciplining and toilet
training, but the testimony of the appellant was that until the
child was toilet trained, she was the one who changed the
infant's diapers, even when both parties were in the home.
The evidence on education was also somewhat conflicting.
The appellee took the child to movies and read such material as
sports magazines to him. The appellant, on the other hand,
suggested that she was involved with the education of the child.
When the divorce proceeding was initiated, the child had just
reached the age of three years old. At that point, he obviously
had not received much education in elementary skills.65
The majority awarded the mother custody as primary care-
taker.654 She was the primary caretaker, at least exclusively for the
first six months of the child's life. Thereafter she was at least as
"deeply" involved as the father. 5
5
Justice Neely filed a dissent to the majority's opinion which
overturned the trial court's finding of shared caretaking and which
found that custody with the father was in the child's best
interests.656 Neely's dissent stated:
There is a disturbing lack of honesty about this Court's
treatment of custody issues. The playing field is simply not
level but is banked against fathers .... [T]his Court steps in
and goes through elaborate contortions to reverse the lower
court's ruling and grant custody to the mother. Yet, in a case
argued before this court on the same day, Dancy v. Dancy, 191
W. Va. 682, 447 S.E.2d 883 (1994), the majority essentially
deferred to the decision of the Circuit court in adopting another
family law master's recommendation giving custody to Mrs.
Dancy-a recovering alcoholic ....
653. Id. at 168-69.
654. See id. at 169.
655. See id.
656. See id. at 170 (Neely, J., dissenting).
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Mrs. Shearer admitted that Mr. Shearer did the grocery
shopping, laundry, and cooking, as well as being actively
involved in his son's toilet training, discipline, educational, and
social activities. Mr. Shearer did all these things while
completing a master's degree....
The simple truth is that there is a rampant gender bias
that has clouded the majority's ability to render impartial
decisions in the area of family law. This case, and the majority
decision in Dancy, are indicative of a disturbing trend that
needs to be investigated by the newly formed West Virginia
Task Force on Gender Bias. 57
5. Trend Five: Possession Is Half the Battle
Temporary custody tends to lead to a permanent custody
award by the West Virginia Supreme Court.65 The reasons behind
this trend include a concern about the continuity of care a child
who has been in the divorce/custody system receives.
6. Trend Six: A Woman in a Man's Life Helps
Fathers have an improved chance of gaining custody if there is
a woman in their lives, particularly when grandparents are
involved. In two of the cases where the father lived with the
grandparents or next door to the grandparents, that factor figured
prominently into the court's decision.659 In Efaw v. Efaw,66 ° the
father had left his wife and child in a destitute situation.66' Due to
a lack of money, the mother asked the father's parents to take care
of the child. 62 The father subsequently obtained custody.663
7. Trend Seven: The Primary Caretaker Rule Is Eroding
Courts are deviating from the primary caretaker presumption.
Moreover, it is fading even at the appellate level. Much of the
evidence of the erosion of the primary caretaker rule, however,
comes from the language of the supreme court itself. In some
657. Id. at 170-71.
658. See supra note 593 and accompanying text.
659. See Channell v. Channell, 432 S.E.2d 203, 205-06 (W. Va. 1993).
660. 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990).
661. See id. at 603.
662. See id.
663. See id. at 600 (noting that the father had a new wife, implying an additional benefit
to the child).
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cases, the court has chastised the lower courts for ignoring the
standard and not following its mandates. The prime example is the
case of David M. v. Margaret M.,664 authored by Justice Neely in
1989. In this case, Justice Neely reiterated the mandates of the
Garska primary caretaker presumption.665 He noted that,
[O]ur very narrow exception to the primary caretaker rule has
of late developed a voracious appetite which, if left unchecked,
will allow it to eat the rule. We write today to reaffirm and
clarify the benefits of the primary caretaker parent rule to
assist the family law masters and the circuit courts in reaching
the best interests of the child by applying the primary care-
taker parent presumption and its limited requirement of
fitness.666
Neely's comment recognizes that the lower courts are using the
escape valve of unfitness to bypass a primary caretaker award,
usually in cases where there is sexual misconduct by the wife. In
David M., the evidence established that the mother was the
primary caretaker of the child.6 7 Nonetheless, the lower court
refused to give her custody on the basis of three acts of marital
misconduct. 668 Neely emphasized the mother's testimony. The
mother testified that two of the instances occurred around mid-
night when the child was asleep, and that the third occurred after
the child and his stepbrother left to visit a neighbor and was
concluded before the child returned home.669 Neely then said:
Although evidence of marital misconduct, this restrained
normal sexual behavior does not make Mrs. M. an unfit parent.
The circuit court was clearly wrong in its position that the
three instances of sexual misconduct, occurring over two years,
warranted a finding of unfitness, without evidence establishing
that the child was harmed, or that the conduct per se was so
outrageous, given contemporary moral standards, as to call into
question her fitness as a parent.67
664. 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989).
665. See id. at 914-15.
666. Id. at 915 (emphasis added).
667. See id. at 927.
668. See id. at 927-28.
669. See id. at 928.
670. Id.
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In one case, Lewis v. Lewis,671 the trial court explicitly ex-
pressed its disapproval of primary caretaking decision-making.
The FLM awarded the father custody of his five year-old daughter,
concluding he was the primary caretaker.672 Evidence revealed that
the only time he did not perform primary caretaker duties was
during the six month period while his daughter was two-and-one-
half years old, and he was working in North Carolina.6" Both the
mother and father worked outside the home. The father testified
that he prepared bottles, changed diapers, cooked, bathed the child,
and washed clothes. 674  The circuit court refused to accept the
FLM's findings. It stated,
The Court has thought long and hard about this case. The
situation the mother now finds herself in does not add any
weight to her argument.
However, the initial reaction of this Court to the question
of custody has been thought and rethought, and this Court
cannot escape the conclusion that a small child, especially a
female child, should be in custody of that child's mother. Call
it "best interests," [c] all it "polar star," call it anything you may,
that is how this Court views the situation.675
The supreme court sent the case back and asked the trial
court to do it again, and to do it right.
We caution the lower court upon remand to refrain from basing
its conclusions on such unsteady ground as its own opinion that
a female child should always be in the custody of her mother.
This Court has endeavored to provide lower courts with a
myriad of factors to be considered in making the difficult
primary caretaker determination. We instruct the lower court
to limit its discretion to the factors previously enunciated and
to avoid any tendency to rely on its personal convictions
regarding the proper placement of a female child.676
Other evidence of the erosion of the primary caretaker rule is the
supreme court's own refusal to apply it in the increasing number of
671. 433 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1993).
672. See id. at 538.
673. See id. at 539.
674. See id.
675. Id. at 538.
676. Id. at 540-41.
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shared custody cases-which were supposed to be the exception,
rather than the rule.67
. Another indicator of erosion is the use of expert witnesses to
decide custody cases. The ordering of home studies and the use of
psychological testimony is evident in recent cases. The FLM in
Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S.17' allowed the father to present
three expert witnesses on fitness and best interests issues. 79
Justice Workman, in her dissent, pointed out that in essence the
FLM was admitting that the rule was being eroded.680 She quoted
the FLM as saying, "and we should feel free to deviate from [the
primary caretaker rule] if there is some real good reason for
that."68 ' Further, she argued that the FLM and circuit court "by-
passed the 'threshold question' of primary caretaker."6"2 She states:
"In this case, both the trier of fact and the circuit judge 'avoided'
the primary caretaker issue by prematurely infusing the issue with
questions of relative fitness and relying on 'experts."'68 3
Finally, Workman also suggested that the rule is eroded when
factors are manipulated to support decisions in which a working
spouse who is abusive to his wife and children gets custody of the
children over the objection of his homemaker wife who "fits the
profile of what at least one member of the Court (Justice Neely) has
said mothers should be."6 4 She concludes, "[bly upholding the
circuit court's ruling, the majority begins an erosion of primary
caretaker rule, or at least sends a signal to domestic relations
practitioners that it will be situationally ignored when
expedient."6 5 Figure 9 maps the key factors operating in the West
Virginia Supreme Court's primary caretaker/custody decision.
677. In Efaw u. Efaw, 400 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1990), the trial court attempted to apply the
primary caretaker standard, even though it felt uncomfortable about an award of custody to
a mother who was having an affair with a military acquaintance and had left her children
with the grandparents for three months. The supreme court stated that shared caretaking
under these circumstances would be the logical factual finding and that the court could turn
to a best interests analysis to awardcustody to the father. See id. at 600.
678. 435 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993).
679. See id. at 11-12.
680. See id. at 16 n.3 (Workman, C.J., dissenting).
681. Id.
682. Id. at 17.
683. Id.
684. Id. at 16 n.1 (Workman, C.J., dissenting).
685. Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
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Figure 9
Map Analysis of Factors Influencing the Supreme Court's Choice
of a Child Custodian
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B. Implications for Divorcing Parties and Attorneys in West
Virginia
The primary caretaker standard is alive and well in West
Virginia, as indicated by Justice Workman in her article.686
However, awards under this standard are not as consistent and
predictable as Garska would suggest.68 ' This standard can be
manipulated by the parties, attorneys, and the courts to reach
whatever decision they desire.
The first recommendation is that, should divorcing parties
want custody of their children, they should cooperate and attempt
to arrive at an agreed-to decision, rather than roll the dice before
the court. A court battle in West Virginia will lead to years of delay
before a final decision can be reached. During this time, the cus-
tody of the children may switch as it goes through the three stages
of interpretation of the rules-from the FLM, to the trial court, to
the supreme court.
Where a mother has unclean hands coming to the table, she
should attempt to distance herself from that relationship or
stabilize it by remarrying, so as to reduce the impact that adultery
has on a primary caretaker determination. Fathers have their best
chance at being awarded custody if they introduce females into
their new living situation, either the child's grandmother or a wife,
although even a girlfriend may satisfy the court.688
Working parents should be ready to present evidence, not only
on how each of them contributed to the primary caretaking of the
child, but also on the child's best interests, as that is likely to be
where the court will turn after finding that they are shared
caretakers. More evidence on primary caretaking factors could be
presented by the parties as a whole. Better developed cases allow
increased opportunity for each side to make an argument that she
is the primary caretaker.
Children should be prepared to be ignored during the custody
decision-making process. Few of the cases discussed the child at
all. Sometimes their ages were not presented. This result alone
does show that the primary caretaker consideration is occurring
without a best interests of the child consideration in most cases.
The focus is on the parents and what they do for the child, not on
686. See O'Hanlon & Workman, supra note 21, at 380-88.
687. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
688. See Kunin, supra note 359, at 569 (describing that fathers who cohabited with a
woman post-divorce had a fifty percent chance of gaining custody).
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how the child's relationship is developed with the primary
caretaking parent who provides those tasks. It is assumed that the
relationship must be there.
C. Implications for Children
Earlier in this article, it was suggested that the primary
caretaker standard was based on the ethological, psychological, and
social science theories of bonding and attachment.689 The standard
purports to examine the intensity of the relationship between the
child and each parent, in order to determine who is the primary
nurturer and attachment figure and in order to prioritize a custody
award to that parent. "The intensity of the bondedness reflects the
amount of involvement with the infant [or child] that has
occurred."69
But if approximately forty-three percent of the cases are using
none of the caretaking factors to determine custody, then we can
assume that many custody decisions in West Virginia are based on
something other than the child's psychological attachment to one
parent.
Further, even if the courts were routinely examining all ten
primary caretaker factors to determine custody, it is question-
able whether the factors accurately identify which parent is the
psychological parent. The standard never considers emotional
caretaking.
The most serious problem with the use of the primary
custody standard is that it ignores the quality of the relation-
ship between the child and the primary caretaker in favor of
counting hours and rewarding many repetitive, concrete
behaviors.
Indeed the most important emotional and interactive
behaviors promoting children's development and psychological,
social, and academic adjustment, such as love, acceptance,
respect, encouragement of autonomy, learning, and self-esteem,
moral guidance, and the absence of abusive interactions, are
not considered.691
Indeed, who prepares meals, shops, purchases clothes for the
child, arranges for baby-sitting, and transports the child to school
689. See supra Part II.B.1.
690. KLAUs & KENNELL, supra note 11, at 1 (discussing the bond between parent and
child).
691. Kelly, supra note 42, at 130.
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and friends' houses has little to do with reciprocal "attachment
behavior"--characterized as the parent holding, caressing and
touching the infant, and the infant "seeking to be near her,
becoming distressed on separation from her, showing pleasure or
relief on reunion with her, and orienting herself to her even when
not in physical contact (listening for her voice, checking to make
certain that she is not too far away)."692 James Levine, father of
two and director of the Fatherhood Project at the Families and
Work Institute in New York City, is quoted by Mary Becker who
posits that the
crucial question is "not who carries the baby in the backpack.
It's who carries the baby in the mind." It is a high level of
empathy with a child so that the child's needs tend to be felt as
one's own, on almost a physical level that enables the primary
caretaker to carry "the baby in the mind." Because, on some
level, she is always thinking of the child and feels the child's
needs as her own, primary caretaking mothers do the boring
routine activities and all the organizing, planning, and emo-
tional caretaking necessary for a child to flourish.693
Finally, under the primary caretaker standard, as used by
West Virginia, the child's bond with the secondary caretaker is
ignored as being unimportant.
And while there is an enormous body of research documenting
the strong bond that develops between infants and primary-
caretaking mothers, there is now a growing body of research
that suggests that most children form a comparable, though
probably not identical, bond with their secondary-caretaking
fathers. On the basis of the current empirical research alone,
there is no solid foundation for concluding that children, even
young children, will be typically better off if placed with their
primary caretaker.6"
D. Implications for Other Jurisdictions
The primary caretaker standard is not living up to its billing
as a discretion-free standard, at least in the cases which are being
appealed. A quick survey of the various results reached in the
692. Chambers, supra note 137, at 529 (citing E. MACCOBY, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT:
PSYCHOLOGICAL GROWTH AND THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 46-54 (1980)).
693. Becker, supra note 28, at 202 (footnote omitted).
694. Chambers, supra note 137, at 560.
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cases in the sample shows that the courts have a difficult time
adapting the standard to "hard" cases. Perhaps decision-making isfacilitated generally in all the cases which are decided in West
Virginia, not just those being appealed. Maybe, too, the pain the
divorcing parties experience is being reduced by the use of a
standard which suggests a definite result. This study cannot
suggest whether the standard is having that impact on divorcing
parties at the trial court level.
However, at the supreme court level, the primary caretaker
standard is not leading to any more predictable results than would
occur using a best interests analysis. The supreme court's increas-
ing use of the shared caretaking exception and the unfitness
exception, coupled with the trial court's erosion of the standard by
the use of expert witnesses in recent cases (moving away from mere
lay testimony to expert testimony to have a broader educational
basis on which to make a custody award) suggests that West
Virginia may change its custody decision-making in the near
future.
Relationships are the substance of life. A discussion of those
relationships is interesting to the court, and it provides a richer
basis on which to make a custody determination. The numbers
game of how many diapers each parent changes, and evidence
about who shops when and for what is boring to the court. Hearing
this testimony and deciding a case on that basis must be frustrat-
ing to the lower courts, as it is certainly monotonous in the
supreme court opinions which reiterate that evidence. It is no
wonder that more factors are not being developed in each case.
Hearing this testimony on a daily basis can lead to little
satisfaction that a custody award to one parent or the other is right
for the child. The courts' tendency to ignore the factors suggests it
doesn't want to hear this evidence, nor does it seem that the parties
want to testify about such mundane activities. Thus, the court
turns to other evidence to make the custody decision, thwarting the
presumption's mandates.
The primary caretaker standard simplifies the connections
between the child and the parents as being a list of tasks the
parent performs for the child. It ignores the genuine emotional
connection formed with the secondary, as well as the primary
attachment figure, and the importance of that figure's presence in
the child's life. It leads to a sole custody award where the non-
primary caretaking parent is divorced from not only the spouse, but
the child. It ignores the reality that removal of either parent will
have a significant impact on the child. Again, perhaps to produce
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subjectively better, fairer results, the courts turn away from the
primary caretaker factors to reach a custody decision they feel is
right for the unique situation.
It appears that courts desire to seek individualized justice,
even where their discretionary decision-making is curtailed by a
rule-based, determinate standard. And maybe they should. For
each case brings one-of-a-kind relationships of father to child,
mother to child, and parent to parent. Discretion, then, is an asset
for the court to use to promote those relationships after a divorce.
Thus, we need to recognize that discretion is an important and
necessary part of custody decision-making.
However, with discretion comes bias. To eliminate bias, we
attempt to reduce the amount of discretion a court can use, and we
are back to an inflexible, bright-line standard which works an
injustice in many cases. This is a vicious circle. Further, as long
as the determinate custody standard leaves some window for
circumventing the normal result, courts will use that exception to
increase their discretion. The West Virginia cases using the
primary caretaker standard have shown that. They have also
demonstrated that judicial bias remains, even where discretion is
presumptively curtailed. The only solution to this cycle is to return
to an absolute rule without exceptions that one parent should
receive custody after a divorce.
Alternatively, if we accept the fact that discretion is necessary
for just decisions, and that bias will infiltrate the decision-making
process, then we should refocus our efforts to educate the judiciary
about what values should be prioritized. Education is the solution
to ignorance and prejudice, not stricter rules which limit thinking.
Perhaps law reform efforts to find the optimal custody
standard are misplaced. It is time to abandon the search for the
magic formula for determining custody after a divorce, and admit
no mechanical test for child placement exists. Instead, we could
attempt to humanize the divorce process, and empower divorcing
parties to compromise, and to agree, on a custody decision.
Opportunities for alternative dispute resolution, other than
litigation, must be made readily available to divorcing parents.
Counseling and mediation must be mandated where couples
disagree.
It is unlikely that we can ever find the perfect formula to settle
custody disputes. Nor can the court accurately predict the impact
of a future custody arrangement on the child and the parents.
Thus, parents should stop turning to the court as an oracle or
fortune teller of their future. They should decide their future
1998]
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themselves. After all, who knows those family relationships better
than the family members themselves.
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